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Payment by Results (PbR) is increasingly popular. £15B-worth of schemes in the UK 
public sector had a PbR element (National Audit Office 2015) and Payment by 
Results is widely used in the United States and Australia (Webster 2015). Despite 
this, there is no framework for target achievement in PbR to guide principals, agents 
and other stakeholders. In my experience at a local level, this omission means that 
Payment by Results does not automatically lead to success.  
 
The research project explored how to develop a practical framework, rooted in 
business and management literature, for the effective implementation of PbR 
programmes in the public sector. The three research objectives of a better 
understanding of the National Troubled Families Initiative’s geographic and socio-
economic context and target cohort and how success can be achieved both in the 
programme and in Payment by Results provision contributed to this. 
 
The key Payment by Results literature was reviewed with the theoretical framework 
of Stakeholder Theory and Agency Theory. The case study methodology then 
reviewed the National Troubled Families Initiative – an eight-year Payment by 
Results programme launched in England as a response to the 2011 English 
disturbances - to identify the gaps in the PbR literature and successful provision from 
the UK and US was then presented as a benchmark of good practice.  
 
In order to provide empirical content and support to the framework, I used a 
pragmatic research philosophy, which was further along the continuum of 
interpretivism than positivism. Mixed methods mainly influenced by qualitative data 
analysis led to the ethical qualitative analysis of Phase One secondary quantitative 
data from the Department of Communities and Local Government – the ‘Troubled 
Families’ principal – and one agent from the North-East of England to identify key 
themes and relationships. These were then explored further by ethically gathering 
primary qualitative data from key stakeholders from another Northeast city, a 
Southeast county and a Northwest consortium of authorities. This data was then 
analysed using thematic narrative analysis and thematic analysis. 
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The research findings expanded upon the guidelines for principals considering 
commissioning Payment by Results provision (National Audit Office 2015) and the 
six elements of an effective outcome (Webster 2016). They provided a new, seven-
stage practical framework for achieving targets in Payment by Results provision. 
This incorporated best practice guidelines for stakeholder analysis, principal 
identification, agent identification and the establishment of an Expert Body and 
incorporated a practical process for successful strategy and operations 
implementation, delivery, data collection and analysis, and findings and action. The 
framework can be applied to all types of PbR provision across the public sector. This 
is something, which renders the research project extremely commercially attractive. 
The PbR framework will better use scant resources, reduce wastage, generate 
efficiencies, create additional jobs, return work from the private to the public sector 
and provide the public sector with a model, which they can market and sell to other 
providers. It therefore creates a win-win situation for key stakeholders including the 
principal, the agent, the service users and the taxpayer. Recommendations were 
also provided to achieve the requisite performance in Phase Two of the National 
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ASB Anti-Social Behaviour 
B Billion 
DCLG Department for Communities and Local Government  
DoH Department of Health 
DWP Department for Work and Pensions 
FIP Family Intervention Project 
HMI Her Majesty’s Inspectorate 
HMP Her Majesty’s Prison 
K Thousand  
K1 Knowledge Learning Outcome One 
K2 Knowledge Learning Outcome Two 
K3 Knowledge Learning Outcome Three 
K4 Knowledge Learning Outcome Four  
L4 Level Four  
LA Local Authority 
M Million 
MoJ Ministry of Justice 
NAO National Audit Office 
NHS National Health Service 
PbR Payment by Results 
S1 Skills Learning Outcome One 
S2 Skills Learning Outcome Two 
S3 Skills Learning Outcome Three 







Benefits Street A British documentary series broadcast on Channel 4, which 
documented the lives of residents of Birmingham and Stockton-
On-Tees; whose lives were characterised by high 
unemployment, crime and benefit dependency 
Common Assessment 
Framework (CAF) 
A process for gathering and recording information about a child 
for whom a practitioner has concerns in a standard format, 
identifying the needs of the child and how the needs can be met 
Complex families ‘Complex’ families are a subset of troubled’ families and have a 
range of issues including mental illness, alcohol or drug 
addiction and suspicion of statutory services 
Ecorys One of the oldest economic research and consulting companies 
in Europe 
Holistic family working Another term for the ‘whole family approach’. The needs of the 
family are considered together and all members of the family 
are given support appropriate to their needs. This differs from a 
model whereby the agent works with each family member 
separately and does not consider how their issues impact upon 
one another 
Identified Establish where a ‘troubled’ family lives and who its members 
are 




A local authority single point of contact for all safeguarding 
concerns regarding children and young people. Also known as 
(CSEH in LA4) 
NEET A young person not in education, employment or training 
Office for Standards in 
Education, Children's 
Services and Skills 
(Ofsted) 
The organisation that inspects and regulates services that care 
for children and young people, and services providing education 
and skills for learners of all ages 
Pupil Premium Additional funding for publicly-funded schools in England to 
raise the attainment of disadvantaged pupils and close the gap 
between them and their peers 
Qualitative data Data in a named form 
Quantitative data Data in a numerical form 
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Resonance A capacity to hear both consonance and dissonance 
Russell Group  A self-selected association of 24 UK public research universities 
with a shared reputation for academic prestige 
SALT Speech and language therapy 
Social value A way of thinking about the allocation and use of scarce 
resources. It involves looking beyond the price of each 
individual contract and looking at what the collective benefit to a 
community is when a public body chooses to award a contract 
‘Turned around’ ‘Troubled’ families who achieved the ASB, youth crime and 
education outcome and the continuous employment outcome 
Whole family approach Another tem for ‘holistic family working’. The needs of the family 
are considered together and all members of the family are given 
support appropriate to their needs. This differs from a model 
whereby the agent works with each family member separately 
and does not consider how their issues impact upon one 
another 
Work Programme A government welfare-to-work programme introduced to get the 
long-term unemployed into work and outsourced to public, 
private and voluntary sector organisations 
‘Worked with’  ‘Troubled’ families who engaged with a key worker, had their 
needs assessed, agreed a plan and had interventions delivered 
to them with the aim of achieving the programme outcomes 
Zero-hours contract A working arrangement, which means there is no obligation for 
employers to offer work or for workers to accept it. 
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CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION 
  
1.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
I followed the learning outcomes of the applied management research project and 
the DBA programme (Appendix One) and used the National Troubled Families 
Initiative as a case study to answer the research question of how to develop a 
practical framework, rooted in business and management literature, for the effective 
implementation of Payment by Results (PbR) programmes in the public sector. 
Through this, I also achieved the research objectives of better understanding: 
 
 The geographic and socio-economic context in which ‘Troubled Families’ was 
implemented 
 The ‘troubled’ families service user group with whom the PbR programme 
intended to achieve positive outcomes 
 How success can be achieved specifically in the National Troubled Families 
Initiative and generally in Payment by Results provision. 
 
My motivation for conducting doctoral research into Payment by Results was my 
two-fold realisation whilst employed by an agent of the National Troubled Families 
Initiative that: 
 
 Not all of the programme’s outcomes were being achieved 
 Some ‘troubled’ families appeared to have achieved a positive outcome with 
the support of the programme but this was not always the case.  
 
As an MBA graduate, I was well aware of the business and management 
frameworks that could support further investigation into this. Consequently, I overlaid 
my ‘practitioner’ foundation with a systematic, ‘academic’ approach to the 
improvement of PbR provision. I demonstrated the qualities and transferable skills 
necessary for employment that requires the exercise of personal responsibility and 
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largely autonomous initiative in complex and unpredictable situations in professional 
environments (S3). By conducting independent, self-financed doctoral research, I 
also showed the ability to identify and effectively utilise the components of the self-
system that foster authentic leadership, appropriate to a given leadership 
environment (S4).  
 
I created through original research a new, seven-stage practical framework for 
achieving targets in Payment by Results and made recommendations relating to 
performance achievement for the local and national ‘Troubled Families’ programme 
(K1). I achieved this through: 
 
 The literature review where I systematically acquired an understanding of a 
substantial body of knowledge at the forefront of my specific area of 
professional practice relating to Stakeholder Theory, Agency Theory, 
outcome-based contracts and Payment by Results (K2) 
 The data I collected using applicable techniques for research and advanced 
academic enquiry (K4) and analysed using informed judgements on complex 
issues in my specialist field (S1) 
 My work-based experience in a local ‘Troubled Families’ programme. 
 
This was supported by my aptitude to undertake research and development at 
advanced level contributing substantially to the development of new techniques, 
ideas or approaches (S2) and general ability to conceptualise, design and implement 
a project for the generation of new knowledge, applications or understanding at the 
forefront of my area of professional practice and to adjust the project design in the 








1.2 THE STRUCTURE OF THE RESEARCH PROJECT  
 
The research project has six chapters. 
 







Chapter One provides the background to the case study with an overview of the 
National Troubled Families Initiative and the four areas whose qualitative data 
enabled the creation of new knowledge about target achievement in Payment by 
Results provision and recommendations for the Phase Two success of the 
programme in LA1 and England (K1). It precedes the systematic acquisition and 
understanding of a significant body of knowledge about Payment by Results and the 
gaps in the PbR literature (K2) prior to the design, conceptualisation and 
implementation of a research project to generate new knowledge about target 
achievement in Payment by Results provision (K3). Chapter One focuses on three of 
the programme’s key stakeholders: DCLG (the principal), the English Local 
Authorities (the agent) and the ‘troubled’ families. The geographic and socio-
economic context of ‘Troubled Families’ will be explained for the four areas whose 
data contributed to the research project and led to the development of the framework 
and ‘Troubled Families’ recommendations. Chapter One also outlines DCLG’s 
expectations of the agent’s delivery of the programme and the concept of the 
‘troubled’ family. 
 
Chapter Two is the literature review. It presents the Stakeholder Theory and Agency 
Theory theoretical framework, discusses outcome-based contracts and considers the 
Payment by Results model and the National Troubled Families Initiative through the 
lens of Stakeholder Theory and Agency Theory. Chapter Three expands upon 
Chapter Two. It gives examples of three successful Payment by Results 
programmes. Two originated from the United Kingdom and one came from the 
United States. They illustrate the importance of creating new knowledge about target 
achievement in PbR provision (K1). The systematic acquisition and understanding of 
the body of knowledge about PbR good practice and the successful management of 
Payment by Results provision in Chapters Two and Three (K2) provided the platform 
upon which I conceptualised, designed and implemented pragmatic research to 
extend the forefront of professional practice in PbR (K3). 
 
With this knowledge in place, Chapter Four outlines the conceptualisation, design 
and implementation of a research project to generate new knowledge about target 
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achievement in Payment by Results provision. It shows how I adjusted the project to 
overcome unforeseen problems (K3). Chapter Four also demonstrates my detailed 
understanding of applicable techniques for research and advanced academic 
enquiry (K4) and my aptitude for undertaking applied research and development at 
an advanced level to make a substantial contribution to the development of a new 
approach in PbR (S2). It shows that I have the qualities and transferable skills 
necessary for employment that require the exercise of personal responsibility and 
largely autonomous initiative in complex and unpredictable situations in professional 
environments (S3) and the ability to identify and effectively utilise the components of 
the self-system that foster authentic leadership, appropriate to a given leadership 
environment (S4). Chapter Four explains the selection of a systematic and ethical 
research methodology to provide an academic practitioner-led evaluation of the 
Payment by Results model using the National Troubled Families Initiative as a case 
study.  
 
Chapter Five comprises the data analysis, which led to the creation and 
interpretation of new knowledge (K1). It illustrates my ability to make informed 
judgements on complex issues relating to the ‘Troubled Families’ case study and 
Payment by Results in the absence of complete data (S1). I also reveal my aptitude 
for undertaking applied research and development at advanced level to contribute 
substantially to the development of a new approach to target achievement in PbR 
(S2) and exercise of personal responsibility and largely autonomous initiative in 
complex and unpredictable situations in professional environments (S3). 
 
The research project closes with Chapter Six. Here, I present new knowledge 
through original research, which will satisfy peer review, extend the forefront of 
professional practice and merit publication (K1). I make informed judgements on 
complex issues in my specialist field in the absence of some data and communicate 
my ideas and conclusions clearly, effectively and in a manner appropriate for 
specialist and non-specialist audiences (S1). I demonstrate my aptitude to undertake 
research and development at advanced level contributing substantially to the 
development of new techniques, ideas or approaches in PbR (S2). Chapter Six 
presents a practical framework for achieving targets in Payment by Results 
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provision. It provides an example from the ‘real world’ of public sector PbR provision 
to direct policy and to instruct strategic and operational managers how to use the 
framework as a management tool for target achievement. This ‘real world’ scenario 
is a mentoring project for vulnerable young people aged 5-25, which Local Authority 
Two (LA2) will commission in 2017. The dynamic nature of this management tool 
means it can be generalised for all PbR provision and be used locally, regionally and 
nationally across the public sector wherever target achievement and the provision of 
value to stakeholder holders is required. Chapter Six closes with recommendations 
for the achievement of the requisite Phase Two ‘Troubled Families’ targets locally 
and nationally.  
 
1.3 THE ‘TROUBLED FAMILIES’ PROGRAMME 
 
The Coalition Government launched the National Troubled Families Initiative in 
December 2011. The programme was a coordinated response to the English 
disturbances of August 2011. It was originally designed to run for three years before 
being extended for a further five years. The research project will therefore refer to 
the period from April 1st 2012 to March 31st 2015 as ‘Phase One’ and 1st April 2015 
to 31st March 2020 as ‘Phase Two’.  
 
Phase One of the National Troubled Families Initiative was a £448M scheme to 
incentivise local authorities and their partners to turn around the lives of 120,000 
‘troubled’ families by May 2015. It worked with families where children were not 
attending school, young people were committing crime, families were involved in 
anti-social behaviour and adults were out of work. In June 2013, the Coalition 
Government announced plans to expand ‘Troubled Families’ and reach an additional 
400,000 families across England. £200M was pledged to fund the first year of the 
initiative; an investment which was presented as evidence of the Government’s on-
going commitment to improve the lives of ‘troubled’ families, transform local public 
services and reduce costs for the long-term (DCLG 2014a). 
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Fifty-one local authorities who had ‘turned around’ a significant number of their 
families by the middle of 2014 were named “Early Starters” and allowed to begin 
Phase Two in September 2014 (DCLG 2014a:4). These areas had the advantage of 
being able to support Phase Two families ahead of schedule but had to tackle earlier 
than the 101 other areas the challenges that the expansion of the programme 
created. Partnership and collaboration were the watchwords of this early adoption 
phase with DCLG and the chosen fifty-one working together to: 
 
 Develop an independent national evaluation for the expanded Troubled 
Families Programme 
 Complete the Troubled Families online cost savings calculator 
 Design a new system of Family Progress Data 
 Refine the suggested indicators to identify families and develop best practice 
in measuring significant and sustained progress with them 
 Introduce a model of transparent local accountability for the success of the 
programme as a tool to drive greater service transformation (DCLG 2014a). 
 
A further cohort of local authorities started Phase Two on 1st January 2015. The 
research project will focus on three ‘Wave One’ and one ‘Wave Two Early Starters’ 
(DCLG 2014a). Two of the local authorities are from the Northeast of England, one 
from the Southeast and one from the Northwest. 
 
1.4 THE FOUR AREAS 
 
The research project focused on the delivery of the programme in four areas. Two 
were local authorities in the Northeast of England, one of which employed me to 
manage their Family Intervention Project (FIP). The third was a local authority in the 
Southeast of England and the fourth was a consortium of ten Northwest local 




 Two North-Eastern local authorities 
 The North-East, South-East and North-West 
 Two cities, a county and a consortium  
 England and three of its regions. 
 
Local Authority One (LA1) is in the Northeast of England and was a “Wave Two 
Early Starter” (DCLG 2014a:4). They contributed their Phase One ‘Troubled 
Families’ quantitative dataset for analysis in early July 2015. I collected qualitative 
data from their Troubled Families Co-ordinator on 23rd July 2015 and a senior 
manager on 15th June 2016. Local Authority Two (LA2) is also in the Northeast of 
England but was a “Wave One Early Starter” (DCLG 2014a:4). I interviewed their 
Troubled Families Co-ordinator on 6th July 2015. Local Authority Three (LA3) is in 
the Southeast of England. Local Authority Four (LA4) is a consortium of ten 
Northwest local authorities, each with their own co-ordinator and a manager with 
oversight of the ten areas who contributed to the research project. LA3 and LA4 
were ‘Wave One Early Starters’ and provided qualitative data on 29th April and 13th 
May 2016 respectively. Thus, I compared: 
 
 Delivery up to Quarter Three 2015 and delivery up to Quarter Two 2016 
 Local Authorities who began delivering Phase Two in September 2014 and in 
January 2015 
 The views of senior managers and Troubled Families Co-ordinators.  
 
Appendix Two contains the key socio-economic data from the areas. The population 
of LA3 was more than double the combined populations of LA1 and LA2 but had 225 
Phase One ‘troubled’ families fewer than both authorities put together. LA1 and LA2 
were “low wage, high welfare cities” and compared poorly with the London average 
weekly wage of £629 and the £2,124 on average spent on welfare in Cambridge 
(Centre for Cities 2016a:1 and Centre for Cities 2016b:11). The data suggested that 
LA1 and LA2 were subject to more financial risk than LA3 during the programme. 
They had a large number of ‘troubled’ families who needed to achieve a positive 
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outcome before the principal released the full funding allocation but the austerity 
measures reduced their overall budget for ‘troubled’ families’ services. 
 
A clear understanding of the socio-economic environment of the National Troubled 
Families Initiative was hindered by the contradictory nature of the available data. 
Some statistics presented a buoyant image of the area where LA1 and LA2 were 
situated and highlighted: 
 
 50,000 more people employed in the North-East in the last two years 
 Unemployment falling by 2.1% to 7.8%; the lowest level since 2008 
 A growth rate of 4.7% compared to the national average of 2.7% (North East 
Local Enterprise Partnership 2015). 
 
However, the Social Mobility and Child Poverty Commission (2014) claimed that the 
area had the joint third highest child poverty rate in the UK as 27% of Northeast 
children were living in poverty after housing costs.  
 
This aside, the latter at least provided a baseline against which to compare the 
Northeast of LA1 and LA2 and the Southeast and Northwest of LA3 and LA4. The 
Southeast – where LA3 was located – had: 
 
 The joint lowest child poverty rate of anywhere in the country 
 The lowest proportion of children in workless households in the UK 
 The second highest earnings and employment in the UK (Social Mobility and 
Child Poverty Commission 2014).   
 
Whereas, like the Northeast, the Northwest of LA4 jointly had the third highest child 






 A median hourly pay of £10.91 per hour – 6% lower than the UK average 
 The second-lowest employment rate in England (Social Mobility and Child 
Poverty Commission 2014). 
 
This data therefore showed the challenging, geographically unequal socio-economic 
backdrop to the National Troubled Families Initiative. 
 
1.5 THE DELIVERY OF THE NATIONAL TROUBLED FAMILIES INITIATIVE 
 
DCLG advocated the agents of the National Troubled Families Initiative looking at 
the ‘troubles’ experienced by a family holistically rather than each problem being 
considered singly or the children, young people, parents and carers being ‘worked 
with’ in isolation. National guidelines stated that five key elements made family 
intervention effective: 
 
1 “A dedicated worker, dedicated to a family  
2 Practical ‘hands on’ support  
3 A persistent, assertive and challenging approach  
4 Considering the family as a whole – gathering the intelligence  
5 Common purpose and agreed action” (DCLG 2012c:6). 
 







1. Creating value-for-money by reducing the agent’s service delivery costs  
2. Improving service quality as the families received a joined-up service from 
one individual rather than several  
3. Reducing inequality by asking one individual to work with the family and 
motivate them individually and collectively to achieve positive outcomes 
4. Transferring a managed risk to the agent who proactively engages and moves 
forward ‘complex’ families  
5. Encouraging market innovation by asking the agents, the wider public sector 
and voluntary sector providers to work together to tackle issues that impacted 
on them all by assessing the family’s issues, creating a single plan and 
allocating actions to the most appropriate stakeholder. 
 
However, this may also allow agents to exploit DCLG and the families by: 
 
1. Providing a reduced and cheaper service delivered by a key worker with a 
broad, non-specialised expertise whom not all members of the family may 
bond with 
2. Doing everything for the family because it was easier in the short-term than 
motivating them to make positive change  
3. Pestering the family with a voluntary service that they do not recognise that 
they need  
4. Failing to meet the needs of very vulnerable family members who require an 
individual service or whose ‘troubles’ are caused by the family  
5. Drawing up a single plan that ignores the different priorities of the family and 




Thus, the ‘whole family’ approach had the potential to create benefits for many 
stakeholders but also provided an opportunity for exploitation (Miller and Sardais 
2011). 
 
Appendix Three comprises the principal’s guidance for the delivery of the National 
Troubled Families Initiative and the issues this provided to the agent. This suggested 
that Phase One of the National Troubled Families Initiative was an extremely 
challenging and complex programme for the agents to deliver. 
 
In Phase Two, DCLG challenged the agent to devise a ‘Troubled Family Outcomes 
Plan’ for each local area to articulate simply and clearly their definition of success 
through the programme. Appendix Four contains the principal’s hypothetical model 
of this and my view of the challenges that it presented. Thus, although Phase Two 
appeared to be less prescriptive and enabled the agents to tailor the local 
programme to their local circumstances, the move away from a national performance 
framework merely created another set of problems to solve. 
 
1.6 THE ‘TROUBLED’ FAMILIES 
 
The English disturbances of August 2011 triggered the National Troubled Families 
Initiative. However, the concept of the ‘troubled’ family was not a twenty-first century 
phenomenon. ‘Troubled’ families had been commented upon since the nineteenth 
century and were variously labelled in the 1880s, early 1900s and 1950s as a “social 
residuum”, “the unemployable” and “problem families” (Welshman 2012:1). They 
were also called “dysfunctional families”, “the underclass”, “antisocial families” and 
“socially excluded families” (McCarthy and Edwards 2011:162-163). I believe that 
these terms dehumanised the families and suggested that they were outside the 
boundaries of acceptable and ‘normal’ behaviour. They also loaned a note of irony to 
the National Troubled Families Initiative, which sought solutions to families’ problems 
by delivering services to the whole family rather than supporting individuals outside 
of the family unit.  
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These terms also conveyed the notion that the families were responsible for their 
own problems; a view challenged by Gordon (2011) who could find no scientific 
evidence of poverty and “a cycle of deprivation” (McCarthy and Edwards 2011:163) 
being passed on through the generations. McCarthy and Edwards (2011) also 
dismissed the ‘experts’ views that ‘working class’ and ethnic minority families caused 
their own ‘trouble’ through their inadequate childrearing and disorganised domestic 
lives. They saw this as a value judgment and not grounded in scientific fact.  
 
Gillies (2007) and McCarthy and Edwards (2011) believed that the negative 
judgements passed on ‘troubled’ families failed to understand the impact of society 
upon them. The former maintained that these families were overwhelmingly 
materially poor, unable to conform to the ‘middleclass’ standards of those who 
commented upon them and negatively affected by social deprivation, low income 
and worklessness. Edwards and Gillies (2011) cited in Edwards et al (2012) noted 
how ‘middleclass’ parents – particularly mothers – had the resources and time to 
devote themselves to parenting their offspring and purchasing for them ‘appropriate’ 
experiences and activities. Because of this, professionals saw them as: 
 
 “…active, responsible, and knowledgeable consumers of whole family-focused 
services and advice with their family and children’s best interests in mind” (Edwards 
et al 2012:15).    
 
This contrasted with ‘working class’ and ‘ethnic minority’ parents’ struggles to 
overcome disadvantage. Edwards et al (2012) believed that practitioners viewed 
these families in terms of their difficulties and made them partly responsible for their 
issues. They treated them as passive clients rather than active participants in 
services and expected these parents to accept professionals’ judgements because 




In my view, the commentators who negatively judged these ‘troubled’ families made 
the fatal mistake of failing to understand both the external pressures upon them and 
that, like ‘untroubled’ families, they were not a homogenous group. I also believe that 
the principal’s view of the families as belonging to three groups - regardless of 
whether their ‘troubles’ were lifestyle choices or unavoidable misfortune - continued 
the disservice to them. 
 
Phase One ‘troubled’ families were labelled as: 
 
 “‘Superlight’ if they required support from 1-2 agencies 
 ‘Light’ if they required support from 3+ agencies who would typically form a 
Team Around the Family (TAF) to ensure that the support offered was co-
ordinated  
 ‘Intensive’ if they were a chaotic family with complex needs who required a 
high level of agency intervention” (DCLG 2012c:31).  
 
The data from Phase One of the National Troubled Families Initiative suggested that 
many families’ ‘troubles’ were linked to ill health. In 74% of Phase One families, there 
was no one in work compared to 17% of households nationally. However, 
 
 71% of these ‘troubled’ families had poor health 
 46% had an adult with a mental health problem 
 32% of the families had an adult with a long-standing illness or disability 
(DCLG 2014b).  
 
49% of ‘troubled’ families’ households comprised single parents compared to the 
national average of 16% (DCLG 2014b). However, the combination of ill health and 
single-parenthood may have explained why these households relied on 
unemployment benefit rather than a salary. Even if these single parents were in good 
health, their childcare commitments may have stopped them working, especially if 
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they lacked the annual fee of £6,003 for a full-time nursery place (Family and 
Childcare Trust 2015).  
 
The data also suggested that ‘troubled’ families’ ill health impacted upon their 
youngsters’ poor school attendance as: 
 
 33% of the families had children suffering from a mental health problem and 
20% of the cohort had a clinical diagnosis compared to a national average of 
approximately 10% of children suffering from a mental health issue at any one 
time 
 20% of the families had children with a clinical diagnosis of attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD); a condition estimated to be experienced by 2-
5% of UK children 
 39% of families had a child with special educational needs; more than double 
the average figure of 19% (DCLG 2014b). 
 
It is unclear whether these families had access to the mental health and other 
support that they needed and how long waiting lists in their area were. 
 
Appendix Five comprises recent UK policy changes that affected both ‘troubled’ and 
‘untroubled’ families. It suggests that the disadvantages for all ages outnumbered the 
advantages but a clear understanding of the information is only possible by 
quantifying each statement. For example, Sure Start was a £3B investment whom its 
target audience of the most deprived families saw as “…stressful and intrusive” (Gill 
and Jack 2007:139). 
 
Research from 4Children (2016) suggested that ‘troubled’ families who the 
programme moved off workless benefits and into paid employment would not 




 Employment did not end poverty, as nearly two-thirds of children in poverty 
lived in working families  
 Across the income distribution, pay had fallen for more than five years in a 
row  
 61% of people with children said that money worries were one of the top 
strains on their relationships, compared to 47% of those without children 
 24% of families reduced their vital spending on items such as groceries in 
order to cope with higher living costs 
 The proportion of low-income families with no savings to fall back on had 
increased substantially with unsecured debt increasing and projected to rise 




 One quarter of adults surveyed felt that work reduced their opportunity for 
social contact and integration (Levitas 2006) 
 Employment for all was another route to inequality and factors such as age, 
gender, ethnicity and disability affected job prospects (Churchill 2015). 
 
This data therefore cast doubt on the positive view of paid employment propagated 
by the National Troubled Families Initiative.  
 
‘Complex’ families are a specific subset of ‘troubled’ families. They have specific, 
serious issues, which impact upon one another. ‘Complex’ families’ issues and the 
challenges faced by the practitioners and services that support them are outlined in 
Appendices Six, Seven and Eight. However, the complexity of families and the 




Some commentators dehumanised ‘troubled’ families; blamed them for their own 
problems; ignored the magnitude of the challenges that they faced and failed to 
recognise the impact of society upon them. It is unclear whether paid employment 





Chapter One introduced the research question of how might a practical framework, 
rooted in business and management literature, be developed for the effective 
implementation of Payment by Results (PbR) programmes in the public sector. It 
identified that the research project had three objectives. These were to understand 
better the National Troubled Families Initiative’s geographic and socio-economic 
context; its service user group; and how success can be achieved both in the 
programme and through Payment by Results provision. 
 
Chapter One set the context for the National Troubled Families Initiative case study 
from the standpoint of the principal, the agent and the families themselves. It 
provided an overview of the ‘Troubled Families’ programme and the four areas 
whose qualitative data enabled the creation of new knowledge about target 
achievement in Payment by Results provision and recommendations for the Phase 
Two success of the programme in LA1 and England (K1). This geographic, social 
and economic data provided a quantitative baseline of information about the quartet 
so that they could be compared and contrasted at a very basic level. Chapter One 
captured the principal’s views about how the agent should deliver ‘Troubled Families’ 
in Phase One, which I juxtaposed with my own experience of the programme as an 
employee of the agent. I also shared the portrayal of ‘troubled’ families in the 
literature and highlighted some of their challenges to give an overview of the concept 
of the ‘troubled’ family and indicate the complex social need that the PbR 




Chapter Two will present the Stakeholder Theory and Agency Theory theoretical 
framework, outcome-based contracts and consider the Payment by Results model 
and the National Troubled Families Initiative through this lens. The systematic 
acquisition and understanding of this body of knowledge (K2) provided the platform 
upon which I conceptualised, designed and implemented pragmatic research to 
extend the forefront of professional practice in PbR (K3). 
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Chapter Two details the systematic acquisition and understanding of a substantial 
body of knowledge at the forefront of my specific area of professional practice (K2). It 
presents the theoretical framework of Stakeholder Theory and Agency Theory and 
considers the key literature on outcome-based contracts and Payment by Results 
(PbR) through the lens of this theoretical framework. The case study of the National 
Troubled Families Initiative – an eight-year Payment by Results programme 
launched in England as a response to the 2011 English disturbances - is then 
reviewed to identify the gaps in the Payment by Results literature. 
 
2.2 STAKEHOLDER THEORY 
 
The term ‘stakeholder’ first appeared in 1963 and referred to the groups without 
whom a particular organisation would cease to exist. The original list of stakeholders 
included “…shareowners, employees, customers, suppliers, lenders and society” 
(Freeman and Reed 2014:146). 
 
2.2.1 The Definition of a Stakeholder and Stakeholder Theory 
 
The definition of a stakeholder has broadened more recently to encompass: 
 
 The wide sense of stakeholder 
“Any identifiable group or individual who can affect the achievement of an 
organization’s objectives or who is affected by the achievement of an organization’s 
objectives. (Public interest groups, protest groups, government agencies, trade 
associations, competitors, unions, as well as employees, customer segments, 
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shareowners and others are stakeholders, in this sense.)” (Freeman and Reed 
2014:147) 
 
 The narrow sense of stakeholder 
“Any identifiable group or individual on which the organization is dependent for its 
continued survival. (Employees, customer segments, certain suppliers, key 
government agencies, shareowners, certain financial institutions, as well as others 
are all stakeholders in the narrow sense of the term.)” (Freeman and Reed 
2014:147). 
 
Freeman - who was viewed as writing the ‘landmark’ book, which embedded the 
concept of stakeholders in management scholarship and in managers' thinking 
(Mitchell et al 1997) and has extensively researched the phenomenon for nearly forty 
years – acknowledged that Stakeholder Theory was not a single theory but a: 
 
 “…framework [or] …a set of ideas from which a number of theories can be derived” 
(Freeman et al 2010:63).  
 
Stakeholder Theory can encourage the search for and creation of meaning within 
organisations and the asking of ‘good’ questions at the start of the inquiry process 
(Freeman et al 2010) as well as being a: 
 
“… powerful vehicle for thinking about the way in which ethics becomes central to 
the core operations of the firm and how managing is a morally laden activity – rather 





I will use Stakeholder Theory in this research project to search for and create 
meaning, and ask ‘good’ questions about the stakeholders involved with Payment by 
Results provision. 
 
2.2.2 The Stakeholder View of the Firm 
 
Freeman (2010) argued that the concept of the stakeholder grew in importance as 
the presence and impact of internal and external change factors upon the 
organisation increased. In addition, the established view of the firm and its 
management developed from an entity with a two-way relationship with its owners, 
employees, suppliers and customers (Figure 2.2.2a) to an organisation with a 
number of stakeholders (Figure 2.2.2b) that needed a strategy for managing each 
stakeholder and an integrated approach for dealing with multiple stakeholders on 

















While the use of the term ‘firm’ appeared to root the organisation in the private 
sector, I will demonstrate that the Stakeholder View of the Firm can be translated 




The internal change and challenges, which the firm was susceptible to included: 
 
 Owners wanting more control over the running of the company and not just 
solely focusing on receiving a return on their investment   
 Customers having access to a global market and not just products of native 
origin  
 Employees rejecting an authoritarian management style and working 
practices and also holding other roles such as that of stockholder, customer or 
member of a special interest group 
 Suppliers providing raw materials on a global rather than local scale and 
functioning in a more politicised environment (Freeman 2010). 
 
External change was more problematic than internal change as it created uncertainty 
and affected the balance of the relationship between the corporation, owners, 
employees, suppliers and customers. Creators of external change included: 
 
 Local governments relying upon business to create jobs and bring prosperity 
to the local area; national governments acting as regulators and passing 
legislation that made the running of a business more complex or costly and 
foreign governments agreeing different rules and protections  
 Overseas competitors operating under different rules that sometimes offered 
them an advantage over home-based competitors 
 Consumer advocates campaigning for change and attracting significant media 
coverage 
 Environmentalists challenging the unintended consequences of business such 




 Special Interest Groups (SIGs) using the political process to further their 
position on a specific issue and harnessing the media to their ends 
 The media scrutinising the actions of corporations (Freeman 2010). 
 
2.2.3 The ‘Real World’ of Stakeholders 
 
A private sector firm or an organisation in the public or voluntary sector requires a 
strategy to manage its stakeholders. The number and type of these stakeholders and 
the strategy for managing the relationship with them will depend upon a range of 
factors such as the size, location and core business of the company. The ‘Classical’ 
and the ‘Real World’ Stakeholder Theory Grids were constructed to convey the 
complexity of the relationship between the stakeholder and the firm (Freeman and 
Reed 2014). They appear in Appendix Nine and Ten.  
 
Like the Stakeholder View of the Firm, I believe that the key concepts of the 
stakeholder, Stakeholder Theory, and the ‘Classical’ and ‘Real World’ Stakeholder 
Theory Grids have applicability beyond the private sector. I will return to these 
concepts later when I discuss the Payment by Results model. In the next section, I 
will introduce Agency Theory and consider it as a standalone concept and in relation 
to Stakeholder Theory. 
 
2.3 AGENCY THEORY 
 
Agency Theory originated slightly later than Stakeholder Theory, in the early 1970s 





2.3.1 The Definition of Agency Theory 
 
Agency Theory is concerned with the agency relationship whereby one party (the 
principal) delegated work to another (the agent) who performed that work 
(Eisenhardt 1989). I capture this pictorially as: 
 
Figure 2.3.1a – Agency Theory 
 
(Based on Eisenhardt 1989) 
 
The nature of this relationship is that of a contract. Thus if Agency Theory is to be 
explained in terms of the Stakeholder View of the Firm (Figure 2.2.2b) the ‘firm’ and 
the ‘principal’ are synonymous and an ‘agent’ stakeholder can be added to the 
diagram to illustrate the difference between ‘contractors’ and actual ‘employees’.  
 
In terms of the ‘real world’ of Stakeholder Theory (Table 2.2.3b), the agent has an 
economic stake and economic power (Freeman and Reed 2014). The agent 
provides a service to the principal (firm) in exchange for an agreed fee and the 
principal employs the agent to create value.  
 
The actual value received by the principal depended upon the extent to which their 
interests diverged with the agent and the accuracy of the principal’s information 
about the agent’s contribution (Bosse and Phillips 2016). Agents were held to be 
“opportunists” and principals or owners to be “responsible parties” (Miller and 
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Sardais 2011:6). The agent was not expected to act in the best interests of the 
principal but to present them with something less than the anticipated value where 
possible. Estimates for the costs incurred by principals in such a situation were 0.2% 
of revenue for large manufacturing firms and 5% for small firms (Bosse and Phillips 
2016). There is no accurate cost calculation for the costs incurred by other 
stakeholders such as employees or customers.  
 
Agency Theory categorised the cost risk to the principal as occurring when the 
desires or goals of the principal and agent conflicted. In this situation, it may have 
been too complex or costly for the principal to verify what the agent was actually 
doing. Furthermore, both parties may have had different attitudes toward risk and 
potentially preferred different actions because of this (Eisenhardt 1989). I capture 
this pictorially as: 
 










The principal and agent’s differing goals and attitudes to risk could have a number of 
origins including outcome uncertainty around new product innovation or team-
oriented jobs in which it was hard for the principal to evaluate the agent’s behaviours 
(Eisenhardt 1989). 
 
In my view, the potential for difference around goals, attitudes to risk and 
preferences for action captured in Figure 2.3.1b and Figure 2.3.1c confirm the need 
for the principal to consider the agent/stakeholder in their strategic planning process 
(Freeman 2010). 
 
2.3.2 Outcome-Based Contracts in Agency Theory 
 
Agency Theory typically classiﬁed agent controls into behaviour-based controls and 
outcome-based controls (Tumbat and Grayson 2016). Rewarding the agent based 
on the outcomes achieved rather than their behaviour was a common incentive 
alignment mechanism. However, it disadvantaged risk-averse agents by offering 
them compensation for outcomes that they did not fully control (Bosse and Phillips 
2016).  
 
Agents’ expectations as to the reward required for their effort was affected by their: 
 
 Perceptions of contribution to the joint effort and compensation of comparable 
others 
 Experiences in prior exchanges with the principal or other principals 
 Prior experience of being a principal 
 Knowledge of other agents’ experiences in exchanges with the principal 
 Beliefs about the operative basis for fairness (Bosse and Phillips 2016).  
 
An outcomes-based contract lost its effectiveness when the outcomes required were 
less clear (Eisenhardt 1989). I capture this pictorially as: 
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A key decision during the contract design phase was how much control or authority the 
principal should exercise in relation to the agent. Historically, Agency Theory allowed 
for relationships where: 
 
 The principal had very high or formal authority over the agent 
 The agent exercised authority over the principal 
 The principal and agent were relatively independent (Tumbat and Grayson 
2016). 
 
The length of the contract was also important. Short-term contracts were seen as 
being harder to manage effectively than long-term ones as the latter enabled the 
principal to learn more about the agent and decide whether their actions were 
appropriate (Eisenhardt 1989). There is also a view that the opportunistic agent and 
the exploited principal do not appear in every case and it is possible to find examples 
of exploitative principals compromising the long-term interests of the organization 
and an ethical agent using their superior information to benefit the organisation and 
its stakeholders (Miller and Sardais 2011). 
 
Heinrich and Marschke (2010) used the principal-agent model as a focal theoretical 
frame for synthesizing theoretical and empirical knowledge about the design and 
dynamics of the implementation of public sector performance management systems. 
They reviewed the burgeoning body of evidence about how performance 
measurement and incentive systems function in practice and how individuals and 
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organizations respond and adapt to them over time and reflected upon examples 
from performance measurement systems in public education and social welfare 
programmes. Heinrich and Marschke (2010) recognised that agents come to know 
the distinct weaknesses or distortions of performance measures and how to exploit 
these measures. If the principal learns faster than the agent does, the usefulness of 
a performance measure is more likely to increase, but if the agent learns faster how 
to manipulate a measure, its usefulness will decline and the measure may ultimately 
be discarded. Heinrich and Marschke (2010) provided a range of actions to counter 
this including:  
 
 Developing effective incentive schemes following work to understand what 
motivates employees 
 Assigning or reallocating tasks across workers accordingly and not grafting 
them onto the structure of an agency  
 Challenging the practice of assigning work so that one group of agents 
performs only measurable tasks and another offers delivery whose 
performance is difficult to measure. They saw this as an exploitative and risky 
practice 
 Advocating performance incentive systems that incorporated evolutionary 
dynamism. In their view, true understanding of the context cannot be known 
prior to programme implementation and performance measures must be tried, 
evaluated, modified and potentially discarded as the principal became better 
acquainted with the agent. 
 
Heinrich and Lynn (2000) investigated the influence of programme structure and 
management governance upon performance; using the case study of the Job 
Training Partnership Act (JTPA). The JTPA was a major initiative in early 80’s 
America, which became a $5 billion federally funded employment and training 
programme for disadvantaged workers. It required the fifty states to provide services 
to those who could benefit and were in need of such opportunities and measured 
performance through the participants’ increased employment and earnings and the 
reduction in welfare dependency. Heinrich and Lynn (2000) investigated the effects 
of programme governance and management on participant employment and 
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earnings. They took advantage of hierarchical, time-varying data from the National 
JTPA Study; specifically the availability of individual-level data on client 
characteristics, programme participation, and outcomes and of site-level structural 
information for the sixteen sites in the National JTPA Study, collected for three 
different years to identify the impact of administrative structures, management 
strategies, and client characteristics on programme outcomes.  
 
 
Heinrich and Lynn (2000) found that a clear authority over programme administration 
reaped significantly higher earnings levels and greater rates of entered employment 
in the first post-programme year. However, there were some qualifications to these 
findings. Programme administrators may choose to sacrifice overall earnings and 
employment achievements in favour of insuring that the least advantaged groups 
were prioritised in service delivery and a higher share of a smaller aggregate 
outcome. They estimated the effects of structure and management policies on 
participants’ earnings and employment outcomes in the first post-programme year, 
not their long-term earnings and employment impacts. Heinrich and Lynn (2000) also 
discovered that the power of these models in explaining individual outcomes is still 
not especially high; a characteristic of working with individual-level data and a 
relatively limited array of client characteristics, compared to all the potential 
intervening factors when examining outcomes in a post-programme period. These 
same challenges are typically encountered in evaluating individual-level outcomes 
for other social programmes as well, including other training programmes, welfare-to-
work initiatives and drug abuse treatment programmes.  
 
This section defined Agency Theory, discussed the relationship between the 
principal and the agent and considered Agency Theory in the context of Stakeholder 
Theory. This followed Jensen and Meckling (1976) who linked the two concepts and 
suggested that managers had a responsibility to act as trustworthy agents to multiple 
stakeholders rather than just the company’s stockholders and should draw these 
stakeholders together to accomplish tasks in an efficient manner. I also considered 
how performance measurement and incentive systems function in practice and how 
individuals and organizations respond and adapt to them over time. 
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The next section will study Payment by Results through the lens of the theoretical 
framework of Stakeholder Theory and Agency Theory. This will facilitate a better 
understanding of PbR whilst applying Stakeholder Theory in a context other than that 
of the traditional environments of information technology and construction (Littau et 
al 2010) and extending the range of Agency Theory into a complex environment 
(Eisenhardt 1989).  
 
2.4 PAYMENT BY RESULTS 
 
Payment by Results (PbR) is a model for delivering public services where the 
‘principal’ in the form of a Government department or other commissioner pays the 
‘agent’ or service provider for the outcomes they have demonstrably achieved rather 
than the activities they have delivered (ICF International 2015). Payment by Results 
is an increasingly common method of funding provision in the UK public sector with 
the National Audit Office (2015) estimating that at least £15B-worth of schemes had 
a PbR element. Payment by Results is also popular in the United States and 
Australia (Webster 2015). 
 
UK programmes vary in terms of the social need that they address and the extent to 
which the PbR element is used. For example, the Department for International 
Development was the principal for nineteen linked African aid programmes to improve 
water and sanitation, education and health. They had a PbR element of only 9%. In 
contrast, the PbR proportion of the contract between the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) 
and HMP Peterborough to improve offender rehabilitation was 100% (NAO 2015).  
 
In the United Kingdom, Payment by Results is a key part of the Open Public 
Services agenda that aimed to: 
 




 Reduce government’s direct involvement in the delivery of social outcomes by 
increasing the provision by the private and social sectors (ICF International 
2015). 
 
The link between PbR, Stakeholder Theory and Agency Theory can be clearly seen 
as these PbR schemes required a stakeholder view to be taken (Figure 2.2.2b) 
(Freeman 2010) and involved a principal setting out the direction and paying an 
agent to carry out work in exchange for an agreed fee. It can be postulated that in 
the programme to reduce offending, the ‘firm’ (Ministry of Justice) had to consider a 





Figure 2.4a – The Stakeholder View of the Ministry of Justice-Funded HMP 
Peterborough Pilot to Reduce Offending  
 
(Based on Freeman 2010) 
 










Many of the UK’s first generation of Payment by Results programmes is still 
underway. Consequently, there is insufficient evidence either to evaluate the 
effectiveness of individual schemes or the Payment by Results mechanism itself 
(NAO 2015). This research project responds to the call for the evaluation of Payment 
by Results to explain and refine the model and advance the argument for or against 
PbR (Battye 2015).  
 
2.4.1 The Payment by Results Model 
 
Payment by Results is: 
 
“A commissioning approach to the delivery of public services where contract 
payments are wholly or partly dependent on the achievement of specified outcomes” 
(Webster 2016:6). 
 
The UK public sector has typically used PbR to address complex social issues for 
which there were no straightforward solutions. For example, through the recent 
schemes to reduce adult offending (Transforming Rehabilitation), homelessness in 
the capital (London Rough Sleepers) and adult worklessness (Work Programme) 
(Webster 2016). As Appendix Eleven shows, Payment by Results is not a uniform 
entity but a mechanism, which can be adapted to suit particular circumstances. 
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Principals selected the Payment by Results model for a number of reasons including: 
 
 Improved outcomes, outcome-focus, value-for-money or service quality 
 Service innovation 
 Opening up the market to new entrants 
 The opportunity to defer payment to the agent until later in the programme; 
something which also transferred the risk to the agent 
 Reduced inequalities (Webster 2016). 
 
Appendix Twelve reveals that there is no conclusive evidence of PbR programmes 
realising these benefits, a view that concurred with my personal work-based 
experience. Their principals established these PbR programmes with good intentions 
and put an outcome-based framework in place to manage their chosen agents. 
However, they have much to learn about the achievement of targets in Payment by 
Results provision and the creation of value for at least the three key stakeholder 
groups of principal, agent and service users. Clearly, some issues with Payment by 
Results must be addressed to avoid: 
 
 Future loss of value to the principals in the form of fewer adults moving into 
work, reducing their substance misuse and desisting from offending 
 Future loss of revenue to agents who are unable to claim all of the funding on 
offer 
 Reduced life chances experienced by some of the most vulnerable adults in 
UK society. 
  




Appendix Thirteen describes social impact bonds; a funding model for Payment by 
Results programmes that has become increasingly common (Whitfield 2015). 
 
2.4.2 Guidelines for Principals Considering Commissioning Payment by 
Results Provision 
 
The National Audit Office (2015) claimed that the Payment by Results model was not 
suitable for all public services and advised principals to consider a range of delivery 
approaches before selecting PbR and to be clear about their reasons for selecting 
the PbR delivery approach over others. They recommended that principals: 
 
1. Develop insight into the operating context before designing their PbR 
scheme 
2. Set clear expectations for performance 
3. Identify challenging but achievable outcomes on which to base payments 
4. Develop from these effective incentives for agents 
5. Monitor the performance of agents and establish clear oversight and 
intervention mechanisms to minimise the impact of agent failure on public 
services 
6. Evaluate how using PbR has improved service delivery and overall value-for-
money (NAO 2015). 
 
This research project will later measure the National Troubled Families Initiative 
against these guidelines to address the third research objective of how success can 






An effective outcome was described as possessing the six key elements: 
 
 Having clarity and complexity 
 Being verifiable 
 Being attributable 
 Factoring in deadweight 
 Addressing issues pertinent to either individuals or cohorts 
 Being segmented (Webster 2016).  
 
For an outcome to have clarity and complexity, it must be clear and meaningful both 
to the principal and to the agent. The outcome must also be meaningful and 
compatible with existing data recording systems (Wong et al 2015). In the 
Transforming Rehabilitation scheme, the National Offender Management Scheme had 
no data for an eighth of the Community Rehabilitation Company service levels and 
assurance metrics and insufficiently robust data in another two and the National 
Probation Service had no data for one fifth of its service levels and insufficiently 
robust data in another two (NAO 2016). It is therefore possible that the data that 
Transforming Rehabilitation required the agent to collect and track was too complex 
for its systems at the time of implementation. 
 
Careful consideration must be given of the measurement of these clear outcomes 
both to increase the likelihood of the programme achieving positive change and to 
minimise any unfortunate ‘unintended consequences’ (Norton 2008) to stakeholders. 
The pilot programme in HMP Doncaster chose a binary measurement rather than a 
frequency or seriousness measurement. This meant that the agent withdrew support 
from individuals who reoffended and could not therefore trigger an outcome payment 
for the agent. This would not have occurred with a frequency or seriousness 
measurement. Here, offenders who committed less crime or less serious crime 
rather than only no crime would have retained their eligibility for support; thus 
increasing their chances of eventual desistance (Pearce et al 2015).  
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The principal and the agent are advised to have a clear dialogue at the outset of 
contract negotiations so that the latter is clear as to the financial benefit available 
from their delivery of the PbR scheme. This may have prevented NHS Direct – the 
agent which won more than 25% of the regional contracts for providing the '111' non-
emergency medical helpline across England – from withdrawing from the contract in 
July 2013. This was done because the calls received took twice as long as expected 
thus impacting upon the capacity of their call centres and reducing the number of 
calls for which they could claim an outcome payment (Torjesen 2013). This case 
also demonstrated the need for the principal to have a contingency plan to replace 
an agent; thus ensuring that other stakeholders such as the customer remain 
unaffected and continue to receive a service. 
 
A clear outcome is not necessarily a simple one as outcomes that are too 
straightforward can narrow the focus of the intervention and fail to deliver the 
outcomes required. This point is particularly important in Payment by Results 
programmes aimed at reducing entrenched social problems with clients from a 
diverse background with a variety of needs who require co-ordinated and extensive 
interventions from a range of providers (Crowe et al 2014). However, principals 
should also beware of attaching too many outcomes to a specific PbR intervention. 
An example of this practice is the Department of Health-funded 'Improving Access to 
Psychological Therapies' PbR scheme. The principal paid the agent to provide 
counselling and psychotherapy to improve adult mental health but also had the 
expectation that this provision would move the client off workless benefits and into 
employment (Tomlinson 2014). 
 
Progression outcomes reflecting individuals’ journeys towards final outcomes are 
widely used in United States and Australian PbR programmes. They bring payment 
for the resources committed to achieving progress and enable better performance 
management. Agents saw the absence of progression outcomes from the Youth 
Contract as a major flaw of the scheme. They received an attachment fee and an 
outcome payment when a young person entered and stayed in employment. This 
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arrangement rewarded the work done by the agent but not the actual progress made 
by the young person (ICF International 2015). 
 
The second characteristic of a good outcome - verification - is particularly 
challenging for programmes attempting to tackle a range of issues across a span of 
providers. An example of this was the drug and alcohol PbR programmes where 
payments varied depending upon whether the clients were binge drinkers needing a 
short intervention or dependent heroin and crack cocaine users requiring a very 
intensive and lengthy service (Maynard et al 2011). Here, any principal concerned 
about verification would actually have to visit the agents and interview a sample of 
the ‘successful’ service users.  
 
The DWP established a Provider Payment Validation Team for the Work Programme. 
Although this will have been complex and time-consuming to set up, it reaped a 
significant cost benefit. The team extensively checked a number of apparent job 
outcome claims submitted in 2013-2014. They failed 7% of them, an exercise which 
saved the principal £2M in reduced payments to agents (NAO 2014) and presumably 
covered the expense of the Provider Payment Validation Team. 
 
The flipside of verification is that it can prove costly to the agent. The early 
implementation of Work Programme placed upon the agents the expectation that 
they delivered outcomes before the IT system that the initiative relied on was 
completed (Crowe et al 2014). This may have contributed to some agents missing out 
on outcome payments. Their clients moved into employment but they were unable to 
prove this to the principal (NAO 2014).  
 
Attribution involves the extent to which the environment beyond the PbR programme 
can affect the outcomes achieved. Attribution affected the Work Programme 
between 2011 and 2014. The principal – DWP – expected to pay the agents £1.7B 
between June 2011 and March 2014 for the outcomes achieved. However, a lower than 
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forecast number of clients progressing into sustained employment - presumably due 
to factors such as the global economic crisis - meant that the principal actually only 
paid out £1.4B (NAO 2014). The external economic environment therefore had a 
significant negative impact on some stakeholders: 
 
 The agents were deprived of £0.3B  
 The principal gained financially by paying out less reward funding but suffered 
reputational damage due to the apparent failure of its scheme 
 The Government lost tax revenue due to fewer adults progressing into 
sustained employment 
 The service users had a reduced chance of finding sustained employment 
and improving their quality of life. 
 
The fourth characteristic ‘deadweight’ referred to outcomes, which would have 
happened anyway. Into this category came outcomes that the service users 
achieved through their own efforts or by accessing support beyond that of the 
Payment by Results programme. While it is possible to establish a control group of 
individuals against which to compare the progress of the cohort accessing the PbR 
scheme, this can be expensive to set-up. It is also difficult for national initiatives to 
institute where performance must be measured by comparing the outcome achieved 
by providers across the intervention – as was the case with Work Programme - or 
against a historical baseline as adopted in Transforming Rehabilitation (Webster 
2016). 
 
The fifth key characteristic of an outcome is whether it addresses the needs of 
individuals or cohorts. An example of the former is DWP’s Work Programme where 
the principal made payments to the agents for positive outcomes achieved with 
individuals. The payment profile of the programme was broken down to a 20% 
attachment fee and two PbR payments of 25% and 55% for a job outcome and 
sustained employment (NAO 2014). This contrasted with the cohort approach of 
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Transforming Rehabilitation where the principal expected the agents to reduce the 
reoffending rate of service users below the historic rate (NAO 2016). 
 
The sixth point to note is that an outcome should consider segmentation (Webster 
2016), the clear delineation between target groups and the linking of varying 
outcome payments to each to ensure that ‘hard-to-help’ as well as ‘easy-to-help’ 
clients are engaged, worked with and supported to achieve a positive outcome. 
Substance misuse provision - where it was unfair for a principal to offer the same 
reward to an agent for bringing about abstinence in a binge drinker compared to an 
entrenched heroin and crack cocaine user – needed client segmentation. Each user 
group required a very different intensity and length of service. Furthermore, the agent 
could ‘exploit’ the principal and prioritise the binge drinkers who were the easiest and 
cheapest to work with ahead of the hard drugs misusers (Mason et al 2015).  
 
However, even if a programme has client segmentation in place, this does not 
necessarily make its longer-term financial viability any easier for the agent. Thus 
although the London Rough Sleepers PbR was praised for its individualised support, 
the agent still faced the difficulty of maximising the financial return from achieving 
their targets while continuing to support vulnerable rough sleepers who had not yet 
moved into stable accommodation (Webster 2016). 
 
2.4.3 The Importance of Service User Involvement in Payment by Results 
Provision 
 
Although clarity and complexity, verification, attribution, deadweight, individual 
versus cohort differentiation and segmentation are essential elements of an outcome 
(Webster 2016), stakeholder involvement is also seen as crucial to the overall 
success of a Payment by Results programme. It has been suggested that service 
users should be involved in the design of appropriate and viable outcomes to ensure 
that the model reflects how they engage with services and to enhance the 
understanding of principals and agents about the barriers to achieving results (Sheil 
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and Breidenbach-Roe 2014). Crowe et al (2014) spoke of service users’ desire for 
commissioners to build their insight, understand communities better and manage 
customer demand more effectively; points which reiterated this view. Crowe et al 
(2014) believed that more service user-focused commissioning would result from an 
increased knowledge of community needs, agents’ methodologies, community 
assets and resources.  
 
The involvement of substance misusers in the Department of Health’s pilot 
programme in eight geographical areas may have had a positive impact on the 
initiative. This scheme gave the agents payments based on ‘recovery-focused’ 
outcomes and emphasized the desirability of recovery from drug or alcohol 
dependency and the completion of treatment without the continued prescribing of 
substitute drugs. It had the ‘unintended consequence’ (Norton 2008) of fewer clients 
completing drug misuse treatment and a higher proportion of service users 
declining to continue with treatment. The agent became more risk-averse in 
discharging service users from treatment and recording them as completed 
successfully; an action which probably incurred a later cost for other health services 
such as Accident and Emergency departments (Mason et al 2015). 
 
My insider knowledge of project and programme delivery leads me to sound one 
note of caution. I know from personal experience that service user involvement is not 
easy to achieve and to do well. Therefore, I recommend an investigation into how 
best to consult the most vulnerable and disadvantaged members of society prior to 
designing PbR initiatives to address their social issues. 
 
I considered the key literature on Payment by Results (PbR) through the lens of the 
theoretical framework of Stakeholder Theory and Agency Theory. In order to identify 
the gaps around the achievement of targets in Payment by Results provision, I will 




2.5 THE NATIONAL TROUBLED FAMILIES INITIATIVE 
 
The Coalition Government launched the National Troubled Families Initiative in 
December 2011 in response to the English disturbances of August 2011. It was 
originally designed to run for three years from 1st April 2012 before being extended 
for a further five years until 31st March 2020.  
 
2.5.1 The National Troubled Families Initiative Viewed Through the Lens of 
Stakeholder Theory 
 
Both Phase One and Phase Two of the National Troubled Families Initiative had a 




Figure 2.5.1 - The Stakeholder View of the National Troubled Families Initiative 
 
 
(Based on Freeman 2010) 
 
4Children was an example of an organisation that campaigned on behalf of families. 
In early 2016, they published an inquiry into British family life that painted a gloomy 
picture of austerity Britain in the early twenty-first century (4Children 2016). Wider 
special interest groups included the Criminal Justice Joint Inspection (CJJI) who 
researched the contribution of Youth Offending Teams to the work of the Troubled 




These stakeholders inhabited the ‘real world’ of the National Troubled Families 
Initiative: 
 
Table 2.5.1 - The ‘Real World’ of the National Troubled Families Initiative 
Stakeholder Theory Grid 
 
 Formal or 
Voting Power 









 -152 English Local 
Authorities 






Influencers   -Employees of the 152 
English Local Authorities 
- ‘Troubled’ Families  
-British Electorate  
-Opposition Parties  
-Media 
-Organisations that 
Campaign on Behalf of 
Families 
-Wider SIG 
(Based on Freeman and Reed 2014) 
 
The ‘real world’ of the National Troubled Families Initiative allowed for some 
stakeholder groups or individuals to have multiple identities, various types of stake 
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and various powers (Freeman and Reed 2014). Thus, an individual holding the post 
of ‘Troubled Families Co-ordinator’ within their local authority could: 
 
1. Hold: 
 An economic stake and economic power as a key employee of one of the 152 
agents delivering the programme 
 An economic stake and political power as a member of a trade union. 
 
2. Be an influencer wielding political power 
 As a member of the British electorate who could vote in a local election for or 
against the funder of the National Troubled Families Initiative 
 As a member of the British electorate who could vote in a general election for 
or against the funder of the National Troubled Families Initiative 
 As a member of an organisation that campaigned on behalf of families 
 Who could share their insider information about the programme and its impact 
upon ‘troubled’ families in the local or national media or on social media 
 If their own family was experiencing ‘troubles’ such as difficulties in school or 
poor health and they met the entry criteria for the initiative. 
 
I have identified the stakeholders in the National Troubled Families Initiative and the 
stakeholder view of the ‘real world’ of the programme. The next step is to discuss the 
relationship between the principal and the agent in the initiative. 
 
2.5.2 The National Troubled Families Initiative Viewed Through the Lens of 
Agency Theory 
 
The principal for the National Troubled Families Initiative was the Department for 
Communities and Local Government (DCLG) and the agent was the 152 English 
local authorities. Following Figure 2.3.1a, the contracts for Phase One and Phase 
Two of the National Troubled Families Initiative can be described as: 
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Figure 2.5.2a – The Contract between DCLG and the English Local Authorities in 
Phase One of the National Troubled Families Initiative  
 
 
(Based on Eisenhardt 1989) 
 
Figure 2.5.2b – The Contract between DCLG and the English Local Authorities in 




(Based on Eisenhardt 1989) 
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Agency Theory warns that the agent could use their superior information - or the 
principal’s lack of information about them - to exploit principals unless effectively 
monitored or incentivized to do otherwise (Miller and Sardais 2011). Within the 
contracts for the National Troubled Families Initiative, the English local authorities 
had the opportunity to use their superior knowledge about: 
 
 Their local ‘troubled’ families to achieve the Phase One and Phase Two 
targets and spend less than the DCLG outcome payment thus making a profit 
at the expense of the principal and the families 
 The potential inability of DCLG to check that each of the 520,000 families 
claimed for over the eight-year period had actually made a change that 
merited an outcome payment and that the 120,000 families claimed for in 
Phase One were not claimed for again in Phase Two.  
 
If the agent chose either or both of these options, they would present the principal 
with a service of less value than DCLG believed that they were commissioning 
(Bosse and Phillips 2016). For their part, the principal trusted that the agents: 
 
 Understood individually and collectively the terms ‘engage’, ‘work with’, ‘turn 
around’ ‘significant and sustained progress’ and ‘continuous employment’ 
 Had sufficient expertise with and experience of their local ‘troubled’ families to 
achieve the target expected of them 
 Had monitoring systems in place to track families’ progress and report to 
DCLG when a positive outcome with a family had been achieved 
 Had monitoring systems in place between Phase One and Phase Two to 
ensure that the same families were not claimed for in both phases 
 Would not ‘pretend’ to achieve success with a family and exploit the principal 
by claiming an outcome fee that they were not entitled to 




The alternative view of Agency Theory - that the principal had the potential to exploit 
their position and compromise the long-term interests of the organisation while the 
agent could use their superior information to benefit the organisation and its 
stakeholders (Miller and Sardais 2011) - found some support in the literature. This 
suggested that, far from exploiting DCLG, the principal exploited the 152 English 
local authorities in Phases One and Two because: 
 
 The actual cost for ‘turning around’ a ‘troubled’ family was £10,000 and not 
£4,000 (DCLG 2012b). Therefore, DCLG expected the agents to cover 60% of 
the Phase One costs from their own budget. Furthermore, if the agents had 
been unable to put processes in place to ‘turn around’ families more cheaply 
during the first three years of the initiative, the cost to the local authorities 
would increase in Phase Two when the funding available was reduced by 
£2,200 per family 
 The agents had to work at financial risk. This risk increased as Phase One 
progressed. The principal paid 80% of the available funding upfront in Year 
One, 60% in Year Two and 40% in Year Three (DCLG 2012b). The risk 
remained the same during Phase Two as the attachment fee remained at 
£1,000 (DCLG 2014a). However, the financial risk per family would increase 
for costly families with multiple, entrenched issues 
 The financial risk multiplied for agents in the most deprived areas of the 
country. Between 2010 and 2013, 49% of the most deprived quintile of 
authorities had a reduction in funding of more than 15% of their spending 
while only 8% of councils serving the least-deprived 20% of areas saw such 
significant funding reductions (Audit Commission 2013). The ten most 
deprived local authority areas in England lost £782 on average per household 
while authorities covering the richest areas lost an average of £48 (Sparrow 
2014) 
 DCLG did not provide a list of the 520,000 English ‘troubled’ families but 
expected the agent to identify these from their existing databases (DCLG 
2012b and DCLG 2014a) 
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 There was no evidence that England actually had 120,000 families who met 
DCLG’s Phase One definition of ‘troubled’. According to Levitas (2012), the 
figure came from a five-year-old longitudinal survey of poverty (Social 
Exclusion Task Force 2007). This identified 117,000 English families who 
were experiencing poverty because they were workless; had a mother with 
mental health problems and at least one parent with a long-standing limiting 
illness, disability or infirmity; had a low income; could not afford a number of 
food and clothing items; lived in overcrowded housing and had parents with 
no qualifications. It was claimed that the principal took this unrelated survey 
and rounded the figure of 117,000 families up to the nearest ten thousand to 
provide a target for the agent to aim at (Levitas 2012) 
 DCLG did not explain where the figure of 400,000 ‘troubled’ families in Phase 
Two came from (DCLG 2014a) and there is no evidence in the wider literature 
to account for this figure. 
 
The principal-agent relationship in the National Troubled Families Initiative can be 
further understood with recourse to the First and Second Agency Theory Problems. 
Figures 2.3.1b and 2.3.1c identified the challenge faced by the English local 













Figure 2.5.2c – The First Agency Theory Problem in Phase One of the National 
Troubled Families Initiative 
 
                                                                              (Based on Eisenhardt 1989) 
 
The principal and agents shared the overall goals of the programme: 
 
 The engagement, work with and ‘turn around’ of 120,000 Phase One English 
‘troubled’ families in return for an outcome payment of up to £4,000 (DCLG 
2012b) 
 Significant and sustained progress or continuous employment with 400,000 
Phase Two English ‘troubled’ families in return for an upfront attachment fee 
of £1,000 per family and a results-based payment of £800 per family (DCLG 
2014a). 
 
However, as Figure 2.5.2c demonstrates, the agent rather than the principal was 
likely to have incurred a higher cost as the English local authorities had to part-fund 
the initiative themselves, find this funding during a time of austerity and finance the 






Figure 2.5.2d – The Second Agency Theory Problem in Phase One of the National 
Troubled Families Initiative 
 
 
DCLG managed the financial risk associated with the National Troubled Families 
Initiative by devising a Payment by Results model for the programme and thus 
passing the risk onto the agent. However, if like the Work Programme, ‘Troubled 
Families’ ultimately fails to achieve all of its outcomes and spending targets (NAO 
2014), it is unclear how the principal intends to manage the reputational risk and the 
financial risk in terms of reduced income tax revenues. 
 
The English local authorities held an economic stake and economic power (Freeman 
and Reed 2014) within the National Troubled Families Initiative. The literature 
suggested that the size and power of the stake would depend upon their location and 
the impact of the austerity measures upon them (Audit Commission 2013 and 
Sparrow 2014). Figure 2.5.2c illustrated that the course of action taken by the 
English local authorities to manage this situation will have depended on their attitude 
to risk, something perhaps determined by their individual economic stake and 
economic power. I will explore the management of risk by the agents of the National 
Troubled Families Initiative later in the research project. 
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One way that the principal controlled the agent was through outcome-based controls 
(Tumbat and Grayson 2016). While the rewarding of the agent based on the 
outcomes achieved was a common incentive alignment mechanism, it 
disadvantaged risk-averse agents by offering them compensation for outcomes they 
did not fully control (Bosse and Phillips 2016). It can be argued that the ‘Troubled 
Families’ contract between DCLG and the English local authorities disincentivised 
areas with a fear of or an inability to manage risk because: 
 
 They were expected to find the 520,000 ‘troubled’ families themselves rather 
than the principal identifying them (DCLG 2012b and DCLG 2014a) 
 There was no accurate data to show how many ‘troubled’ families lived in 
England (Levitas 2012 and DCLG 2014a)  
 Families entering Phase One had an average of nine separate issues (DCLG 
2014b); five more than the four criteria of ASB, youth crime, poor school 
attendance and worklessness that the English local authorities were funded 
by DCLG to reduce in Phase One 
 The Phase One and Phase Two outcome payments were substantially less 
than the actual cost of ‘turning around’ a ‘troubled’ family (DCLG 2012b) 
 Between 20% and 60% of the funding available per Phase One family was 
withheld until they had achieved the requisite outcome (DCLG 2012b). In 
Phase Two, £800 of the £1,800 available per family was withheld until they 
had achieved a positive outcome (DCLG 2014a) 
 Some authorities had lost more than 15% of their budget due to the austerity 
cuts (Audit Commission 2013). 
 
The agents’ views about being managed through an outcomes-based contract where 
they were not fully in control of the outcomes (Bosse and Phillips 2016) will be 
explored later in the research project.  
 
An outcomes-based contract lost its effectiveness when the outcomes required were 
less clear (Eisenhardt 1989). Figure 2.3.2 captured this relationship. The literature 
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suggested that the National Troubled Families Initiative was an example of an 
unclear outcomes-based contract: 
 
Figure 2.5.2e – The Lack of Clarity around the National Troubled Families Initiative 
Outcomes-Based Contracts  
 
 
The effectiveness of the ‘Troubled Families’ contract between DCLG and the English 
local authorities will be explored later in the research project. 
 
2.6 THE PAYMENT BY RESULTS MODEL ADOPTED FOR THE NATIONAL 
TROUBLED FAMILIES INITIATIVE  
 
The Coalition Government used the Payment by Results model to address the 
complex social issue of ‘troubled’ families. The National Troubled Families Initiative 
pledged a network of ‘troubleshooters’ to deal with unemployed families who 
offended and committed anti-social behaviour (ASB) and whose young people were 
not in school. The British Prime Minister described the families whom the programme 
would be targeting as ‘shameless’ (Cameron 2011). His comment was an analogy 
with a popular television programme set on a council estate depicting a feckless, 
alcoholic, unemployed father-of-six, his family and neighbours:  
70 
 
Picture 2.6 - Channel 4’s ‘Shameless’ Family 
 
 
                                                                                                     (Wikimages 2013) 
 
This comment did not recognise the families as stakeholders in the scheme. 
 






Table 2.6a – The National Troubled Families Initiative Payment by Results 
Mechanism  
 
Principal Agents Types of PbR 
Payment 
Types of Non-PbR Payment 





























Upfront payments to providers for 
engaging users in a programme 
(attachment fee) and 
payment for delivery of elements of 
a specific service (fee for service); 
specifically, 80% of the funding per 
family paid upfront in Year One, 
60% in Year Two and 40% in Year 
Three with the rest of the payment 
made after they had achieved a 
positive outcome 
(DCLG 2012b). In Phase Two, 
DCLG paid upfront an attachment 
fee of £1,000 and the outcome fee 
was £800 (DCLG 2014a). 
 
(Based on NAO 2015) 
 
The literature showed that DCLG adopted the Payment by Results model for the 





Table 2.6b – The Reasons for the Adoption of the Payment by Results Mechanism 
for Phase One of the National Troubled Families Initiative  
 
Reason Anticipated Benefit 
Improved Outcomes Each child in the family will have fewer than 3 fixed exclusions 
and less than 15% of unauthorised absences in the last 3 
school terms; and a 60% reduction in anti-social behaviour 
across the family in the last 6 months; and the offending rate 
by all minors in the family will be reduced by at least 33%. In 
the last 6 months, one adult in the family will have volunteered 
for the Work Programme or be attached to the European 
Social Fund provision or move off out-of-work benefits into 
continuous employment (DCLG 2012b) 
Improved Outcome-
Focus 
“A focus on achieving outcomes” (DCLG 2012b:7) 
Better Value-for-Money “£8B of the £9B estimated to be spent on these families each 
year is being spent reacting to problems rather than solving 
them. It is estimated that the average unit cost of intensive 
interventions that are known to work with this group of 
families, including family intervention projects and others, is 
around £10,000. Local authorities [are to be offered] up to 
40% of the cost of extra interventions” (DCLG 2012b:7-8) 
Service Innovation “We want to learn not only about changing the trajectory for 
families but also to change the way services are delivered to 
them” (DCLG 2012b:1) 
Risk Transference Due 
to Deferred Payment 
The funding will be paid primarily on a Payment by Results 
basis (DCLG 2012b) 
Reduced Inequalities “This waste of human potential is not sustainable” (DCLG 
2012b:1) 
                     (Based on Webster 2016) 
Table 2.6c – The Reasons for the Adoption of the Payment by Results Mechanism 
for Phase Two of the National Troubled Families Initiative  
 
Reason Anticipated Benefit 
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Improved Outcomes and 
Reduced Inequalities 
“To improve the lives of troubled families” (DCLG 
2014a:4) 
Better Value-for-Money “As this work is taken to a significantly greater scale 
(…) to reduce costs for the long-term” (DCLG 2014a:4) 
Service Innovation “To transform local public services” (DCLG 2014a:4). 
      (Based on Webster 2016) 
 
I will explore the evidence as to whether these benefits were realised later. 
 
2.6.1 The National Troubled Families Initiative and the Payment by Results 
Best Practice Guidelines  
 
A comparison of the National Troubled Families Initiative and the guidelines for 
principals considering commissioning Payment by Results Provision (NAO 2015) 
provides evidence as to the extent to which the programme met subsequent 
suggested best practice standards:  
 
Recommendation One - Develop insight into the operating context before designing 
their PbR scheme 
The English disturbances took place in August 2011 and the programme began in 
April 2012. Thus, there was less than seven months planning time between the 
catalyst for the initiative and its commencement. DCLG were not specifically 
criticised by the National Audit Office for taking such a short period to establish a 
£448M national programme. However, it was noticeable that they referenced the lack 
of integration between ‘Troubled Families’ and a programme to move families with 
multiple problems into employment; despite both initiatives funding improvements in 
employability, crime and anti-social behaviour among a similar group of people and 




The Department for Communities and Local Government’s Phase One definition of a 
‘troubled’ family was noticeably very broad and allowed local authorities to engage, 
work with and ‘turn around’ families who both caused ‘trouble’ such as anti-social 
behaviour and youth crime and who experienced ‘troubles’ including poor health and 
abuse in the home. The key document released to guide the agent during the 
programme’s crucial implementation stage described ‘troubled’ families as 
households who:  
  
 “Are involved in crime and anti-social behaviour  
 Have children not in school  
 Have an adult on out of work benefits  
 Cause high costs to the public purse” (DCLG 2012b:3). 
 
The extremely lengthy entry criteria for the programme are in Appendix Fourteen. By 
offering support to families with negative behaviour and poor health outcomes, 
DCLG seemed unclear whether ‘trouble’ in Phase One was a lifestyle choice that 
included youth crime, ASB, truancy and unemployment or a set of unfortunate 
circumstances. In the latter category could be included a one-parent family 
comprising: 
 
 A widowed mother whose terminal illness who prevented her from working 
(Criteria 3 and 4) 
 A teenage son who missed school once a week to care for her (Criterion 2). 
In Phase Two, the definition of a ‘troubled’ family continued to be broad with the 
entry criteria being set as families with at least two of the following six problems:  
 
1. “Parents and children involved in crime or anti-social behaviour.  
2. Children who have not been attending school regularly.  
3. Children who need help: children of all ages, who need help, are identified as 
in need or are subject to a Child Protection Plan.  
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4. Adults out of work or at risk of financial exclusion or young people at risk of   
worklessness.  
5. Families affected by domestic violence and abuse.  
6. Parents and children with a range of health problems” (DCLG 2014a:7).  
 
The literature therefore queries how much insight DCLG actually had of the 
operating context when they: 
 
 Designed a PbR scheme that categorised vulnerable families experiencing 
challenging circumstances alongside ‘shameless’ families who chose youth 
offending and anti-social behaviour above engagement with education or 
employment 
 Agreed a contract with the 152 English authorities for the latter to ‘turn around’ 
families including those ‘troubled’ with long-term health conditions that caused 
their poor school attendance and worklessness 
 Assessed the need for the National Troubled Families Initiative, wrote a 
business case for the programme and launched it separately from a DWP 
scheme to assist families with multiple problems despite the two beginning 
only four months apart (NAO 2013). 
 
Recommendation Two - Set clear expectations for performance 
As the literature and Figure 2.5.2e showed, DCLG appeared to lack clarity around 
the outcomes that they required the agents to achieve during the eight years of 
National Troubled Families Initiative. However, as Appendix Fifteen illustrates, DCLG 
(2012b) provided an outcomes framework for Phase One. This framework indicated 
that the agents could achieve the £4,000 outcome payment in one of two ways. 
 




1. “60% reduction in anti-social behaviour across the whole family 
2. 33% reduction in youth offending 
3. 85% attendance record at school and fewer than three school exclusions 
across the children in the family 
4. One member of the family in employment or enrolled on the national Work 
Programme” (DCLG 2012b:9) 
 
Option Two - By moving one adult in the family into employment and off out-of-work 
benefits regardless of whether the family’s behaviour had improved (Higgs 2012).  
 
In Phase One of the National Troubled Families Initiative, it was therefore possible 
for an agent to claim the maximum payment available by only dealing with one 
aspect of a family’s trouble - their reliance on workless benefits -  without having any 
effect on other very visible, impactful and costly ‘troubles’ such as their youth crime, 
ASB and poor school attendance. It can be argued that, by allowing for an ‘Option 
Two’, the principal allowed the agent to act as an ‘opportunist’ and use their superior 
information - or the principal’s lack of information about them - to exploit the principal 
(Miller and Sardais 2011).  
 
Option Two also allowed the agent to exploit other stakeholders including DCLG and 
the families. The former had funded an intervention that only tackled one aspect of a 
four-part social need and the families were still living in difficult circumstances. It is 
possible to argue that moving a parent/carer into paid employment and off benefits 
gave their offspring a role model to follow. A counter argument is an adult at work 
has less time to monitor their youngsters’ behaviour and steer them back into 
education and away from disorder and crime. 
 
In Phase Two, DCLG attempted to reduce the agent’s opportunity to “cream” and 
“park” (House of Commons Work and Pensions Committee 2015:6) families with the 




“Local authorities should identify families across all six problems and ensure the 
Programme’s resources are being used to best effect” (DCLG 2014a:7).  
 
The periodic collection and publication of Family Monitoring/Progress Data and the 
cost savings calculator (DCLG 2014a) were designed to make each area 
accountable for the families for whom they claimed. However, it can be argued that 
making an outcome payment based on the agent’s demonstration of either 
significant and sustained progress or continuous employment (DCLG 2014a) with 
400,000 Phase Two families provided the English local authorities with the 
opportunity to exploit the principal. A further issue in Phase Two was that, while all of 
the outcomes required in Phase One were quantifiable, Criterion Six in Phase One - 
parents and children with a range of health problems (DCLG 2014a) - was a 
qualitative outcome that prevented progress from being measured easily.  
 
Therefore, despite appearing to set clear expectations for performance by agreeing 
an outcome-based contract with the agent, the lack of clarity around this contract 





Recommendation Three - Identify challenging but achievable outcomes on which to 
base payments 
An effective outcome was described as being clear and complex, verifiable, 
attributable and taking account of deadweight, individuals or cohorts and 
segmentation (Webster 2016). The individual outcomes required by DCLG in Phase 
One were clear in that they could be measured quantitatively – a quality that was 
lacking for all of the Phase Two outcomes. However, the ability of an agent to claim 
£4,000 - for moving one adult family member off workless benefits and into 
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employment but not ending the other negative behaviours - demonstrated its lack of 
clarity in other respects. 
 
The outcomes achieved between 2012 and 2015 were hard to verify. This was due 
to the: 
 
 Breadth of the eligibility criteria in Phase One of the National Troubled 
Families Initiative 
 Lack of segmentation, which meant that Phase One families with multiple 
entrenched problems that were ‘turned around’ attracted the same outcome 
payment as a family who had temporarily fallen into ‘trouble’. 
 
The absence of segmentation from the Phase One outcome framework also did not 
encourage the agents to offer the same level of service to ‘easy-to-help’ families and 
‘hard-to-help’ families. An example of an ‘easy-to-help’ and a ‘hard-to-help’ family 
appear in Appendix Sixteen to illustrate that the Phase One ‘Troubled Families’ 
outcome framework permitted the agents to exploit the principal by: 
 
 Prioritising working with ‘easy-to-help’ families above ‘hard-to-help’ families 
 Claiming for the success achieved with many ‘easy-to-help’ families and no or 
much fewer ‘hard-to-help’ families. 
 
This was despite the ‘easy-to-help’ family meeting the entry criteria on a temporary 
basis and not necessarily being the ‘shameless’ families that the programme 
purported to ‘trouble-shoot’. 
 
By stipulating that only the high-cost families with multiple problems, most likely to 
benefit from an integrated, whole-family approach could be claimed for in Phase Two 




 Reduce the agent’s ability to exploit them 
 Improve the chances of the initiative providing value-for-money to the British 
electorate and a responsive service for ‘troubled’ families. 
 
The principal presented the National Troubled Families Initiative as a programme in 
which the English local authorities worked with other stakeholders such as the Police 
and Health partners (DCLG 2012b and DCLG 2014a). However, this multi-agency 
partnership approach reduced the likelihood of the agent being able to prove that the 
eventual achievement of the programme outcomes was attributable to their efforts 
rather than those of another agency. In the case of the ‘hard-to-reach’ families, 
attribution was even more difficult due to the number of agencies whose services 
they required. For example, for the family in Appendix Sixteen, my insider knowledge 
suggested that the local authority and its youth offending service, anti-social 
behaviour team and school attendance officers would have a role in returning the 
son to school and reducing his and the family’s unlawful activities. Other 
stakeholders from the wider public sector and the voluntary sector such as the 
National Probation Service, health agencies, domestic violence co-ordinators and 
employment advisers would address their other ‘troubles’. 
 
The National Audit Office (2013) noted that the National Troubled Families Initiative 
did not use a control group. This factor, like the lack of clarity around the exact 
outcome required by DCLG, meant that the agents could exploit the principal by 
claiming for a cohort of families who would have ‘turned around’ anyway; either 
through their own efforts or with the help of a stakeholder outside the scope of the 
initiative. 
 
The National Troubled Families Initiative paid the agents to improve outcomes in 
individual families rather than across a cohort of the population. This decision 




 Two members – One parent and one child 
 Ten members – Two parents and eight children. 
 
Even if both families were ‘easy-to-help’, it is likely that the ten-member family was 
more expensive and time-consuming to achieve an outcome with due to its greater 
size. Consequently, the small likelihood of the agent achieving a successful outcome 
with large, very ‘troubled’ families could encourage them to exploit the principal and 
only engage, work with and ‘turn around’ small ‘easy-to-help’ families. This process 
was described in connection with work-ready jobseekers and clients with greater 
barriers to employment (House of Commons Work and Pensions Committee 2015). 
However, DCLG potentially reduced the agents’ opportunity to ‘park’ large, ‘hard-to-
help’ families in Phase Two by directing them to work with high-cost families with 
multiple problems who were most likely to benefit from an integrated, whole-family 
approach (DCLG 2014a). 
 
The literature suggested that ‘Troubled Families’ largely lacked the recommended six 
elements of an effective outcome and cannot be described as identifying challenging 




Recommendation Four - Develop from these effective incentives for agents 
The lack of segmentation outlined above evidenced that the principal did not 
specifically incentivise the agents to focus their efforts on achieving positive results 
with: 
 
 The largest ‘troubled’ families 
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 The ‘troubled’ families with the most issues and the most significant and 
entrenched issues.  
 
Thus for the first three years of the programme, DCLG provided the English local 
authorities with the opportunity to both exploit it, the British electorate and the most 
‘troubled’ families whose needs they could either ignore entirely or ‘park’ (House of 
Commons Work and Pensions Committee 2015) until they had worked with smaller 
and less challenged and challenging families. In Phase Two, the principal directed 
the agent to prioritise the most challenging, expensive-to-help families (DCLG 
2014a). However, the agent’s response to this may have been governed by their 
ability to manage the financial risk that work with these families incurred, the reduced 
Phase Two outcome payment and the extent to which they were concerned by the 
threat of the periodic collection and publication of Family Monitoring/Progress Data 
and the cost savings calculator (DCLG 2014a). 
 
Recommendation Five - Monitor the performance of agents and establish clear 
oversight and intervention mechanisms to minimise the impact of agent failure on 
public services 
The principal stated at the outset that it would monitor Phase One of the ‘Troubled 
Families’ programme to evaluate what happened, the difference the programme 
made to families and service delivery and the savings achieved by local areas; 
information that would be much wider than the results reported under the Payment 
by Results scheme (DCLG 2012b). At the beginning of Phase Two, the periodic 
collection and publication of Family Monitoring/Progress Data and the cost savings 
calculator were promised (DCLG 2014a). Thus, the National Troubled Families 
Initiative appeared to plan for Recommendation Five.  
 
The literature does not show whether the principal withheld payment from any of the 
152 English local authorities for a false declaration of outcomes achieved. My insider 
knowledge of the programme informed me anecdotally that a local authority in the 
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South-West were chastised by DCLG for submitting claims for Phase Two families 
that only comprised adults; an interesting occurrence given that DCLG (2014a) did 
not actually stipulate that a Phase Two ‘troubled’ family had to have both adults and 
children. I am not clear whether this agent had outcome funding taken back from 
them or just received a warning as to their future behaviour. 
 
Recommendation Six - Evaluate how using PbR has improved service delivery and 
overall value-for-money  
The Department for Communities and Local Government published ‘The Benefits of 
the Troubled Families Programme to the Taxpayer’ (DCLG 2015b) three weeks 
before the official end of Phase One and two months before the 2015 UK General 
Election. Potentially, its release was timed to appeal to a group of “influencers” with 
political power - the British electorate (Freeman 2010:25). Some of its findings 
appear in Appendix Seventeen. 
 
DCLG (2012b) suggested that the principal adopted the Payment by Results 
mechanism for Phase One of the National Troubled Families Initiative to create 
improved outcomes, an outcome focus, value-for-money, service quality, risk 
transference and reduced inequalities. This small-scale evaluation of Phase One of 
the National Troubled Families Initiative intimated that in 5% of the agent cohort, the 
taxpayer received value-for-money. There was no evidence to refute my implication 
that the programme lacked a solid outcome focus. DCLG (2015b) was also not able 
to demonstrate whether the value-for-money services offered by the agents who 
participated in the survey were a higher quality or reduced inequalities by not 
resorting to creaming and parking and prioritising ‘easy-to-help’ families over more 
challenging ones.  
 
Risk transference by deferred payment is an implied part of PbR because the 
principal defers payment of the full funding allocation until after an outcome is 
completed. However, if the agent chose to exploit the principal by adopting the 
creaming and parking methodology, it is possible to postulate that risk transference 
was not achieved if the issue of ASB- and youth crime-committing, non-school 
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attending, workless families still remained after three years of support and these 
entry criteria had to be included in Phase Two as well. 
 
DCLG’s failure to ensure the clarity and complexity, verification, attribution, 
deadweight, individual versus cohort issues and segmentation of the programme’s 
outcomes (Webster 2016) meant that it was also difficult to analyse the agent’s 
Phase One quantitative outcome performance and understand fully what this 
indicated. However, a consideration of this data showed that by the end of May 
2015: 
 
 104,733 ‘troubled’ families achieved the crime, ASB, education outcomes 
 11,921 ‘troubled’ families achieved the continuous employment result  
 116,654 ‘troubled’ families achieved the ‘turned around’ outcome 
 9,106 ‘troubled’ families achieved the progress to work outcome (DCLG 
2015c). 
  
My analysis of these figures revealed that: 
 
 Countrywide the ‘turn around’ target of 120,000 ‘troubled’ families was missed 
by 3,346 families  
 It was nearly nine times harder for one adult in an English ‘troubled’ family to 
achieve continuous employment and approximately eleven times harder for 
them to achieve progress to work than it was to improve their negative 
behaviours (DCLG 2015c).  
 
A true understanding of these figures is not fully achievable as not every family for 
whom a positive outcome was recorded entered the programme meeting the 




 82% of families had a problem related to education – such as persistent 
unauthorised absence, exclusion from school or being out of mainstream 
education   
 54% of families were involved in crime or anti-social behaviour 
 74% of the families had no one in work (DCLG 2014b). 
 
This suggests that, for 46% of the 104,733 ‘troubled’ families that achieved the 
crime, ASB, education outcomes, their only improvement was in the education part 
of the outcome as they had not previously committed anti-social behaviour or youth 
offending. Furthermore, if 26% of the Phase One entrants had an adult in 
employment, this reduced the number of families in the target cohort of 120,000 who 
could then achieve the continuous employment result or progress to work outcome. 
  
The programme’s lack of clear outcomes, verification, attribution, deadweight and 
segmentation enabled the agent to ‘exploit’ the principal (Miller and Sardais 2011) by 
claiming for outcomes that would have happened anyway, were not achieved by 
them or were achieved with ‘easy-to-help’ families. This chimes with my personal 
experience of ‘Troubled Families’. However, the agent was put at financial risk by 
being unable to draw down all of the funding available until after a positive outcome 
had been achieved with the families. As with the ‘111’ non-emergency medical 
helpline (Torjesen 2013), it was unclear what DCLG’s contingency plan was for 
missing the Phase One ‘turn around’ target, finding themselves with unallocated 
funding and failing to fully meet the needs of more than three thousand ‘troubled’ 
families. At the time of writing, no quantitative data for Phase Two is available so it is 
not possible to analyse the agent’s performance from 1st April 2015 onwards.  
 
Neither DCLG (2015b) nor DCLG (2015c) showed to what extent service users were 
involved in the agent’s service delivery despite Sheil and Breidenbach-Roe (2014) 
and Crowe et al (2014) requesting their involvement. In the absence of any data from 
DCLG as to the service users’ views of the benefits of the National Troubled Families 
Initiative, this information must be found elsewhere. Hoggett et al (2014) evaluated 
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the programme in an unnamed Southwestern city, which my insider information 
informed me was the local authority who had been corrected by DCLG for claiming 
for families without children. Their research included both qualitative interviews and 
extensive ethnographic research with families over an 18-month period. The families 
reported that: 
 
 Working with the whole family was positive as it enabled a holistic approach to 
meet individual and family needs 
 Small caseloads allowed key workers greater time and flexibility to work with 
them; particularly to deal with crises that emerged during the programme 
 They were empowered to address their problems by being given the 
resilience to make short-term changes and the confidence to tackle long-term 
issues 
 The key workers’ enthusiasm, flexibility and confidence in the programme 
were vital to its success and the welfare of workers and families on the 
programme (Hoggett et al 2014). 
 
The evaluation also established the broader value created by the programme and 
provided an interesting contrast to DCLG (2015b). A Social Return on Investment 
Analysis was carried out on sixteen families whose cases were closed during the 
research period. This suggested that for every pound of investment in the Family 
Intervention Team who supported the families, 66p of social value was created 
(Hoggett et al 2014). 
A comparison of the National Troubled Families Initiative against the guidelines for 
principals considering commissioning Payment by Results Provision (NAO 2015) 
suggested that DCLG needed to do further work on the programme before it could 






Chapter Two demonstrated the systematic acquisition and understanding of a 
substantial body of knowledge at the forefront of my specific area of professional 
practice (K2). It viewed the case study of the National Troubled Families Initiative 
through the lens of the theoretical framework of Stakeholder Theory and Agency 
Theory and the key literature on outcome-based contracts and Payment by Results.   
 
I defined the concepts of a stakeholder and Stakeholder Theory and introduced the 
‘real world’ of stakeholders. I defined Agency Theory and discussed outcome-based 
contracts in Agency Theory. I introduced the concept of Payment by Results and 
described the example of the HMP Peterborough pilot PbR programme in terms of 
its stakeholders and agreement between the principal and the agent. I considered 
the variations upon the Payment by Results mechanism and positive and negative 
findings from recent UK PbR provision as well as the social impact bond model. I 
presented the guidelines for principals considering commissioning PbR provision and 
the six key qualities of an effective outcome and outlined the importance of service 
user involvement in Payment by Results programmes. The National Troubled 
Families Initiative case study was then reviewed in terms of its stakeholders and 
their ‘real world’, the contract between the principal (DCLG) and the agent (the 
English local authorities), the ‘Troubled Families’ PbR mechanism and the reasons 
for its adoption. I then mapped the programme against the National Audit Office’s 
2015 guidelines for commissioners and Webster’s 2016 recommendations. 
 
Chapter Two revealed that the National Troubled Families Initiative offered the agent 
the chance to return a service of less value to the principal. This confirmed my own 
experience of the programme. However, by agreeing to act as the agent for 
‘Troubled Families’, the English Local Authorities made themselves liable for the 
potential high cost of the programme and financial risk if they were unable to achieve 
its outcomes. This was due to the contract between the two parties failing to meet 
the recommended good practice PbR guidelines and the ineffectiveness of the 




Chapter Three will also demonstrate the systematic acquisition and understanding of 
knowledge at the forefront of PbR provision (K2). It will provide examples of three 
successful Payment by Results programmes; two from the United Kingdom and one 
from the United States and illustrate the importance of creating new knowledge 










Chapter Two presented the systematic acquisition and understanding of a 
substantial body of knowledge about outcome-based contracts, the Payment by 
Results model and recent PbR provision (K2). I considered the key literature on 
Payment by Results through the lens of the theoretical framework of Stakeholder 
Theory and Agency Theory and reviewed the National Troubled Families Initiative 
case study. This identified the gaps in the Payment by Results literature that a 
successfully designed and implemented research project could fill (K3), something 
which will be outlined in Chapter Four. Chapter Three will continue the systematic 
acquisition and understanding of a body of knowledge about the positive and 
negative benefits of recent UK Payment by Results provision (K2). It will provide 
three examples of successful PbR provision from this country and beyond. This will 
illustrate best practice in the field of Payment by Results, present the management 
practices that achieved this and illustrate the importance of creating new knowledge 
about target achievement in PbR provision (K1). 
 
3.2 THE DELAWARE SUBSTANCE MISUSE PROGRAMME 
 
The State of Delaware Department of Correction developed insight into the operating 
context before designing their Payment by Results scheme (NAO 2015), which 
reduced reoffending and its associated costs by tackling substance misuse. It built 
on research that claimed: 
 




 Reoffending rates could surpass 70% without intervention and treatment 
 Every dollar spent on substance misuse-treatment reaped a sevenfold reward 
(State of Delaware 2016).  
 
The internationally acclaimed three-step substance abuse treatment programme 
successfully rehabilitates drug offenders. This treatment follows the offender from 
incarceration to work release into the community. Its steps comprise: 
 
1. Key 
A prison-based therapeutic community for men that is discipline-based, intense and 
isolated from the rest of the prison population. Its primary goal is to change negative 
patterns of behaviour, thinking and feelings that predispose the offender towards 
substance abuse. Drug abuse is seen as a disorder of the whole person and 
offenders typically become involved with ‘Key’ during the last 12-18 months of 
incarceration to allow material learned to stay at the forefront of their mind as they 
move to the next stage of treatment. ‘Key’ provides a disciplined, regimented routine 
for inmates. They do not have access to television or telephones during the day and 
lose their free time for inappropriate behaviour. The programming lasts for seven 
days a week. Inmates have daily access to staff counsellors, must meet twice a 
week with their caseload group to discuss issues important to their own recovery and 
must present peer seminars to other inmate members regarding issues important to 
their own recovery 
 
2. Crest 
‘Crest’ is a substance abuse treatment programme for lower level male and female 
prisoners. Successful completion is performance-driven and not time-driven. All 
treatment is individualized and performance-based. Phase One lasts for 
approximately two months and participants have no access to phone calls or visits. 
They discuss and learn from their orientation manuals and access self-help groups, 
peer seminars and sessions on substance abuse, thinking errors and stress 
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management. Phase Two lasts approximately two months and comprises the same 
support plus primary recovery, life skills, anger management, effective 
communication, effective problem solving and relapse prevention. Phase Three also 
comprises interview and job-seeking skills, employment and/or enrolment in 
education, recovery maintenance planning, the support of a mentor and aftercare 
appointments  
 
3. Aftercare  
‘Aftercare’ begins once an offender has completed ‘Crest’, is released to probation 
and living full-time in the community. Offenders access weekly group sessions and 
counselling and participate in random, mandatory drug testing (State of Delaware 
2016). 
 
An evaluation of the programme by McLellan et al (2008) praised: 
 
 Its use of incentive payments on top of existing contracts 
 The new, evidence-based clinical interventions and expansion of opening 
hours that it encouraged  
 Its use of proxy indicators, which were as effective as outcomes (McLellan et 
al 2008).  
 
This suggested that, aside from learning more about the operating context before 
designing the Delaware programme and constructing a programme based on 
research that indicated the programme would create value-for-money, the principal 
also: 
 
 Set clear expectations for performance which gave the agent challenging but 
achievable outcomes linked to effective incentives to achieve abstinence 
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 Monitored this performance 
 Evaluated how it improved service delivery to substance misusing inmates 
and achieved value-for-money (NAO 2015).  
 
The successful design and management of this PbR programme in turn provided to 
the principal: 
 
Table 3.2 - The Benefits Offered by the Delaware Substance Misuse PbR 
Programme  
Payment by Results 
Outcome (Following 
McLellan et al 2008) 
Actual Outcome of the Delaware Programme 
Improved Outcomes Reduced substance abuse leading to reduced reoffending  
Improved Outcome-
Focus 
Programme measures were the length of time in treatment, 
active participation in treatment and programme completion  
Value-for-Money The programme proactively tackled substance misuse rather 
than reactively addressed its effects upon the state 
reoffending rate 
Service Quality A service was delivered which was praised by the evaluator 
Service Innovation The agent supported substance misusing inmates in a new 
way, which encouraged them to engage with and take up 




The opportunity to defer 
payment to the agent 
until later in the 
programme 
Successful outcomes were funded as an alternative to 
merely paying for a service upfront 
Reduced inequalities Reduced prisoner substance misuse linked to training, 
employment and stability on release reduced offending rates. 
 (McLellan et al 2008) 
 
The Delaware Substance Misuse Programme therefore has lessons for the 
principals of PbR wishing to address a social need including substance misuse 
provision and reoffending. It contrasts favourably with the treatment provision 
outlined by Mason et al (2015). 
 
3.3 THE LONDON ‘ROUGH SLEEPERS’ PROJECT 
 
The Payment by Results project known variously as the London ‘Rough Sleepers’ 
Project and the London Homelessness Project was a three-year £5M SIB, which was 
funded through the Mayor’s Social Impact Bond. Like the Delaware Substance 
Misuse Programme, it addressed the needs of a very disadvantaged cohort of 
service users. The London ‘Rough Sleepers’ Project began on 1st November 2012 
and aimed to improve outcomes for approximately 830 entrenched rough sleepers 
who on 31st October 2012 had been:  
 
 Seen sleeping rough and/or stayed in a London rough sleeping hostel in the 
last three months 




The principal was the Greater London Authority. They commissioned an agent in the 
form of two voluntary sector providers - St Mungo’s and Thames Reach - to provide 
a range of services to reduce rough sleeping and support clients: 
 
 Into stable accommodation 
 To reconnect long-term with a country with which they had links 
 Towards employment 
 To better manage their health (Mayor of London 2016). 
 
Rough sleepers are amongst the most vulnerable people in society. Of the project 
cohort: 
 
 48% had an alcohol support need 
 29% had a substance misuse support need 
 44% had a mental health support need 
 49% were non-UK nationals. 53% of these originated from Central and 
Eastern Europe (DCLG 2015a). 
 
The capital had 151 existing providers to support rough sleepers and homeless 
people. Like the Delaware Substance Misuse Programme, the London Rough 
Sleepers Project took an innovative approach that was different from traditional 
services. It specifically helped its service users – who were the most challenging 
long-term entrenched sleepers or new to the streets - to access appropriate services 
across personalised recovery pathways and achieve sustained outcomes (DCLG 
2015a). Like the National Troubled Families Initiative, the role of a named person 
was at the heart of delivery (DCLG 2012c). However, the project named them 







The project had five performance outcomes: 
 
1. Reduced Rough Sleeping  
 
This outcome formed 25% of the outcome payment available. Both providers 
reduced rough sleeping in the cohort although one failed to reduce this to below the 
baseline. However, St Mungo’s and Thames Reach were clear that the reductions 
made were an achievement for the entrenched rough sleepers within the cohort and 
claimed that the baseline measure failed to recognise that some clients supported 
away from the street and making progress in accommodation sleep out occasionally. 
They suggested that an outcome, which included an allowance for occasional rough 
sleeping would be a better indicator of progress made (DCLG 2015a) 
 
2. Stable Accommodation  
 
St Mungo’s and Thames Reach exceeded their targets regarding individual entry into 
accommodation with a tenancy rather than a hostel agreement and the sustainment 
of that tenancy at 12 and 18 months. This outcome accounted for 40% of the 
available payments and strong performance here was crucial to the financial viability 
of each SIB. The strong performance against this outcome confirmed the SIB 
‘navigator’ model of incentivising the named worker to ‘go the extra mile’ to provide 
individualised support (DCLG 2015a) 
 
3. Reconnection  
 
The reconnection outcome payment was 25%. The outcome individually measured 
reconnection to the home country for non-UK nationals without a right to reside in the 
UK or voluntary reconnection for those with a right to remain. Progress against this 
outcome improved but was still below target although performance was expected to 
improve following welfare reform that meant individuals from the European Economic 





4. Employment  
 
This was an individual measure, with a range of outcomes to reflect both full and 
part-time work as well as training and volunteering. Fewer clients than hoped for 
achieved a target level qualification, volunteered or became self-employed but higher 
numbers achieved full-time work outcomes at both 13 and 26 weeks. St Mungo’s 
and Thames Reach were happy with their performance given the difficulty of 
achieving this outcome with the cohort due to their complex barriers. Both providers 
noted that, although some clients were volunteers, this was for less than eight hours 
per week and meant the agent could not claim an outcome payment (DCLG 2015a) 
 
5. Health  
 
On-going discussions with the Health and Social Care Information Centre to address 
data protection concerns meant that the agent was unable to demonstrate the extent 
to which Accident and Emergency admissions for the cohort reduced. St Mungo’s 
and Thames Reach were confident that these outcomes were being achieved 
through the holistic support provided by the ‘navigators’. Here too, there was some 
debate about the appropriateness of the metric, which measured the use of health 
services rather than of individual wellbeing (DCLG 2015a). 
 
Thus, the London Homeless Project followed the guidelines for principals 






Table 3.3 – The Guidelines for Principals Considering Commissioning Payment by 
Results Provision Followed by the London ‘Rough Sleepers’ Project 
 
NAO (2015) Guidelines Model Adopted by the London ‘Rough 
Sleepers’ Project 
Develop Insight into the 
Operating Context 
A project was commissioned which offered a 
service beyond that provided by the 151 existing 
providers 
Set Clear Expectation for 
Performance 
The two providers were given a specific cohort with 
which to achieve five positive outcomes  
Identify Challenging but 
Achievable Outcomes upon 
which to Base Payments 
The payment was not split equally among the five 
outcomes indicating some thought went into this. 
40% of the programme payment was allocated to 
achieving stable accommodation. The agent 
performed strongly in this outcome  
Develop from these Effective 
Incentives for Agents 
The reward for the achievement of stable 
accommodation made the programme viable and 
meant that the agent could continue delivering 
despite some outcomes being challenging to 
achieve 
Monitor the Performance of 
Agents, Establish Clear 
Oversight and Intervention 
Mechanisms to Minimise the 
Impact of Agent Failure 
The agent made suggestions around the 
improvement of the reduced rough sleeping, 
employment and health outcomes. These 
suggestions could improve the delivery of this 
project and related PbR provision 
Evaluate How PbR Has 
Improved Service Delivery 
and Overall Value-for-Money 
The innovative ‘navigator’ model exemplified best 
practice in supporting the most disadvantaged 
members of society to make positive change in 
their lives. 
 
The London ‘Rough Sleepers’ Project therefore provided an example of best practice 
in achieving successful outcomes with rough sleepers but more generally in 
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effectively managing provision for service users on the margins of society with 
complex needs. 
 
3.4 TEAM GB AND THE OLYMPIC AND PARALYMPIC PROGRAMME 
 
The improved outcomes of Team GB over a twenty-year cycle is not generally 
labelled as a ‘Payment by Results programme’ but exemplifies best practice in the 
management of targeted outcome funding firstly to achieve success and secondly to 
address factors other than social need. 
 
In 1994, the British Government began to fund significantly elite sport. £5M spent 
before the Atlanta 1996 Olympic Games saw a return of one gold medal. A spend of 
£54M prior to Sydney 2000 increased the medal tally to twenty-eight and tenth place 
overall in the medal table. An injection of £264M by London 2012 saw Team GB win 
sixty-five medals and finish third behind the United States and China (Fordyce 2016).  
 
According to Nevill et al (2012), the success should have peaked after the home 
Olympics. They predicted Rio 2016 would be less successful due to the loss of the 
partisan London crowd. However, an investment of almost £350M of public money in 
elite Olympic and Paralympic sport saw: 
 
1. Britain’s Olympians  
 Win sixty-seven medals 
 Achieve twenty-seven gold medals in fifteen different sports 
 Become the only host nation to win more medals at the next Games and 






2. Britain’s Paralympians: 
 Win one hundred and forty-seven medals 
 Achieve sixty-four gold medals; 12% of those available  
 Match China’s performance of eleven different gold medal-winning sports at 
their home Paralympics in 2008 
 Set forty-nine Paralympic and twenty-seven world records and surpass their 
London 2012 total by twenty-seven medals (Hudson 2016).  
 
Like the London Homeless Project, the British Government’s funding of Team GB 
reflected PbR best practice (Fordyce 2016): 
 
Table 3.4a – The Guidelines for Principals Considering Commissioning Payment by 
Results Provision Followed by Team GB 
 
NAO (2015) Guidelines Model Adopted for Team GB 
Develop Insight into the 
Operating Context 
The principal investigated how increased 
funding could create Olympic and Paralympic 
success  
Set Clear Expectation for 
Performance 
Team GB and individual sports have an overall 
medal and gold medal target  
Identify Challenging but 
Achievable Outcomes upon 
which to Base Payments 
Alongside the medal target, funding is provided 
to individual athletes - for example swimmer 
Adam Peaty - and sporting bodies such as 
British Gymnastics 
Develop from these Effective 
Incentives for Agents 
Funding is reduced or removed if the medal 
target is missed but continued if the target is 
reached. Adam Peaty won gold and broke the 
world record twice during competition. British 
Gymnastics delivered six Rio 2016 medals. 




Monitor the Performance of 
Agents, Establish Clear 
Oversight and Intervention 
Mechanisms to Minimise the 
Impact of Agent Failure 
Intervention mechanisms are placed around 
the individual sponsorship and organisation 
funding. Therefore, the Elite Coaching 
Apprenticeship Scheme retains and develops 
the expertise of successful sportspeople in 
coaching roles. The best sports scientists and 
sports medics supplement their talents. 
Marginal gains are invested in. For example 
through research into the sleep quality of elite 
athletes to ensure that every aspect of their 
environment is the best that it can be 
Evaluate How PbR Has Improved 
Service Delivery and Overall 
Value-for-Money 
The price of 2016 success was £4,096,500 per 
medal for an able-bodied athlete, equivalent to 
£1.09 to each Briton per year of the Olympic 
programme. A significant percentage of the 
population shared in Team GB’s success as 
they watched their achievements on television. 
(Fordyce 2016) 
 
The British Government’s Payment by Results model to achieve Olympic and 
Paralympic success contrasted with that of the Australians who saw the 
sustainability of keeping Australia at the top of the medal count as a price they could 
not afford after Sydney 2000, in which Australians won 58 medals including 16 golds 
(Toohey 2008). The contrast between Australian and British achievement at Rio 









Table 3.4b – The Performance of Team Australia and Team GB at Rio 2016 
 
Country Great Britain Australia 
Medal Table Position 2nd 10th 
Medals Won 67 29 
Gold 27 8 
Silver 23 11 
Bronze 17 10 
 (BBC Sport 2016) 
 
The recent excellent performance of Team GB at Rio 2016 and their on-going 
improvement over the last two decades illustrates best practice in the management 
of Payment by Results provision. It also provides a contemporary example of how 
PbR can achieve positive outcomes in the context of elite sporting success rather 
than to address a social need such as anti-social behaviour, youth crime, poor 





Chapter Three completed the systematic acquisition and understanding of a body of 
knowledge at the forefront of the concept of Payment by Results begun in Chapter 
Two (K2). It provided examples of three successful Payment by Results programmes 
including two in the UK. The Delaware Substance Misuse Programme exemplified 
how substance misuse can be tackled to reduce reoffending and was notable for its 
use of incentive payments; innovative practice around clinical interventions and 
expanded opening hours; effective proxy indicators; and the principal’s clear 
performance expectations, performance monitoring and performance evaluation. The 
London Rough Sleepers Project illustrated how individual holistic support improves 
outcomes for homeless service users. It illustrated the need for challenging but 
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achievable outcomes with effective incentives for the agent. The project also showed 
the benefit of the principal and agent being able to review the performance 
framework and adjust the performance outcomes in the light of changes in the 
external environment. The London Rough Sleepers Project also highlighted the 
difficulty of the agent obtaining clients’ health data and the barriers that this can 
create. Team GB and the Olympic and Paralympic programme showed that the 
Payment by Results model is not just a mechanism for use with disadvantaged 
service users and social need. It is applicable in any situation in which an 
improvement in performance is the desired result; including elite sport where world 
records and medals are the quantifiable measurement of success. 
 
With the foundation of knowledge about Payment by Results in place, Chapter Four 
will contain the conceptualisation, design and implementation of a project for the 
generation of new knowledge about target achievement in PbR provision and 
describe the adjustment of the project design as it progressed (K3). I will illustrate my 
detailed understanding of applicable techniques for research and advanced 
academic enquiry (K4) and my aptitude to undertake applied research and 
development at advanced level (S2). Chapter Four will identify a methodology and 
methods for collecting and analysing data from stakeholders involved with the 
National Troubled Families Initiative to understand more about the programme and 
so advance the knowledge around PbR. My voluntary decision to explore how might 
a practical framework, rooted in business and management literature be developed 
for an effective implementation of PbR programmes in the public sector will show the 
qualities and transferable skills necessary for employment that requires the exercise 
of personal responsibility and largely autonomous initiative in complex and 
unpredictable situations in professional environments (S3) and my ability to identify 
and effectively utilise the components of the self-system that foster authentic 









Chapter Four outlines the conceptualisation, design and implementation of a 
research project to generate new knowledge about target achievement in Payment 
by Results provision. It shows how I adjusted the project to overcome unforeseen 
problems (K3). Chapter Four demonstrates my detailed understanding of applicable 
techniques for research and advanced academic enquiry (K4) and my aptitude to 
undertake applied research and development at an advanced level to make a 
substantial contribution to the development of a new approach in PbR (S2). It shows 
that I have the qualities and transferable skills necessary for employment that require 
the exercise of personal responsibility and largely autonomous initiative in complex 
and unpredictable situations in professional environments (S3) and the ability to 
identify and effectively utilise the components of the self-system that foster authentic 
leadership, appropriate to a given leadership environment (S4). Chapter Four 
explains the selection of a systematic and ethical research methodology to provide 
an academic practitioner-led evaluation of the Payment by Results model using the 
National Troubled Families Initiative as a case study.  
 
4.2 THE ORIGINS OF THE RESEARCH PROJECT 
 
The research project responds to the fact that Payment by Results is an increasingly 
common method of funding provision. The UK public sector had approximately 
£15B-worth of schemes with a PbR element (National Audit Office 2015) and the 
United States and Australia widely use the model (Webster 2016) but there is no 
framework for target achievement in PbR to guide principals, agents and other 
stakeholders. This research project addresses this omission and presents a practical 
framework - rooted in business and management literature - for the effective 
implementation of target achieving Payment by Results programmes; using the 
National Troubled Families Initiative as a case study. 
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My interest in target achievement in Payment by Results provision grew from my 
fifteen-year career in the public sector managing a range of output- and outcome-
based programmes including the ‘Think Family Grant-funded’ local Parenting 
Strategy and a Family Intervention Project (FIP) for ‘complex’ ‘troubled’ families.  
 
My motivation for conducting doctoral research into Payment by Results was my 
two-fold realisation whilst employed by an agent of the National Troubled Families 
Initiative that: 
 
 Not all of the programme’s outcomes were being achieved 
 Some ‘troubled’ families appeared to have achieved a positive outcome with 
the support of the programme but this was not always the case.  
 
Specifically, I was aware that families were being claimed for when they had 
addressed their own problems or received help from an initiative external to 
‘Troubled Families’. More significantly, some ‘successful’ families had made no 
change but ceased to meet the entry criteria (DCLG 2012b) due to unintended 
consequences (Norton 2008) and could be ‘legitimately’ described within the 
boundaries of the programme as ‘turned around’. 
 
As an MBA graduate, I was well aware of the business and management 
frameworks that could support further investigation into this. The systematic 
methodology utilised in the research project came from the need to overlay my 
‘practitioner’ foundation with a systematic, ‘academic’ approach to the improvement 
of PbR provision. 
 
If research into this area had been carried out as part of my day job, I would have 
focused very much on the local ‘Troubled Families’ programme, adopted an action 




 Identify and diagnose problems with the local programme 
 Plan how to overcome these 
 Put appropriate intervention in place 
 Evaluate the change created by this intervention  
 Update the action plan and continue until the problem had been solved (Lewin 
2016 [1946]). 
 
Figure 4.2 Lewin’s Action Research Model 
(Lewin 2016 [1946]:1)  
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While this would have improved our delivery to local ‘troubled’ families and 
maximised the value (Bosse and Phillips 2016) that we gave to DCLG in return for 
the programme funding, it would not have improved the achievement of targets 
nationally in the ‘Troubled Families’ programme or other Payment by Results 
provision. Thus, I adopted a more systematic methodology for the research project 
that enabled me to collect and interpret data systematically and find out new 
information with a clear purpose (Saunders et al 2016). 
 
4.3 THE RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY 
 
Saunders et al (2016) provided me with a choice of five research philosophies for the 
research project: positivism, critical realism, interpretivism, post-modernism and 
pragmatism. These are outlined in Appendix Eighteen. My personal response to 
each of these philosophies appears in Appendix Nineteen. 
 
I dismissed critical realism and post-modernism immediately due to the irrelevancy of 
the manifested world compared to the ‘real world’ of the National Troubled Families 
Initiative and my desire to hear the voices of all stakeholders with power and a stake 
in the programme (Table 2.5.1). In order to make a final selection, I considered the 
underlying assumptions that lay beneath the three remaining research philosophies: 
 
1. The ontological assumption – What is the nature of reality? 
2. The epistemological assumption – What constitutes valid knowledge? 
3. The axiological assumption – What is the role of values? 
4. The rhetorical assumption – What is the language of research? 
5. The methodological assumption – What is the process of the research? (Collis 
and Hussey 2013). 
 




I chose a pragmatic research philosophy for the research project, which was further 
along the continuum of interpretivism than positivism: 
 











The reasons for this were: 
 
Table 4.3 - The Underlying Assumptions of the Research Project 
 
Assumption Pragmatic My Response 
Ontology 
Reality is… 
Complex, rich, external 
‘Reality’ is the practical 
consequences of ideas 
Flux of processes, 
experiences and practices 
I wanted to explore the complex, 
rich reality of the ‘real world’ of 
the stakeholders involved with 
the National Troubled Families 
Initiative to understand the 
processes, experiences and 






Practical meaning of 
knowledge in specific 
contexts 
‘True’ theories and knowledge 
are those that enable 
I was a self-financing ‘insider 
researcher’ who wanted to bring 
practical meaning and ‘true’ 
theories and knowledge to 





Focus on problems, practices 
and relevance 
Problem solving and informed 
future practice as contribution 
success in Payment by Results 
provision by focusing on the 
problems, practices and 
relevance of the National 






Research initiated and 
sustained by researcher’s 
doubts and beliefs 
Researcher reflexive 
I had copious knowledge and 
experience of the National 
Troubled Families Initiative and 
knew from my own experience 
that it was possible to improve its 
current practice and that of 
Payment by Results provision. I 
resolved to be reflexive 
throughout the process and 





research   is… 
Following research problem 
and research question 
Range of methods: mixed, 
multiple, qualitative, 
quantitative, action research 
Emphasis on practical 
solutions and outcomes 
I resolved to find a methodology 
through which I could practically 
view the National Troubled 
Families Initiative. This 
methodology should enable me 
to use a range of methods to 
collect and analyse quantitative 
and qualitative data and use this 
as a gateway to the achievement 
of targets in PbR provision.  
 
Having identified, established and justified the choice of a pragmatic approach for 
the research project, the next step was to consider in more detail the four key 




4.3.1 The Pragmatic Epistemology 
 
The epistemology of a research project is embedded in the theoretical perspective, 
which informs the methodology and provides a context for it. The methodology is 
behind the choice and use of particular methods (Crotty 1998). These four key 
elements in the research project appear as: 
 
Figure 4.3.1 - The Epistemology, Theoretical Perspective, Methodology and Methods 
Adopted in the Research Project 
 
 
(Based on Crotty 1998) 
 
As a Family Intervention Project (FIP) Manager, I already had practical knowledge of 
the National Troubled Families Initiative and Payment by Results provision. I 
supplemented this identity with that of a self-financing academic ‘insider’ researcher. 
The adoption of a pragmatic epistemology enabled me to focus on problems and 
practices associated with ‘Troubled Families’, identify ‘true’ theories and knowledge 
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about the programme and relate these to the wider PbR context to solve the 
problems that this provided to principals and agents and inform their future practice 
(Saunders et al 2016). 
 
4.3.2 The Stakeholder Theory and Agency Theory Theoretical Perspective 
 
This focus on problems, practice and relevance to ‘Troubled Families’ to identify 
‘true’ theories and knowledge and create a practical framework for the achievement 
of targets in Payment by Results provision meant that the research project required a 
theoretical perspective to inform the methodology and provide a context through 
which the National Troubled Families Initiative could be examined (Crotty 1998). 
Each of the four building blocks of management theory (Cole and Kelly 2011) had 
the power to illuminate the National Troubled Families Initiative but each also offered 
disadvantages, which Appendix Twenty-Two outlines. 
 
I rejected these four management theories because of the outlined disadvantages. I 
selected the theoretical framework of Stakeholder Theory (Freeman 2010, Freeman 
et al 2010 and Freeman and Reed 2014) and Agency Theory (Eisenhardt 1989 and 
Miller and Sardais 2011) as the lens through which to examine the National Troubled 
Families Initiative and contribute to new learning about target achievement in 
Payment by Results provision. Stakeholder Theory and Agency Theory built on the 
foundations provided by my insider knowledge of the National Troubled Families 
Initiative and Payment by Results provided. It enabled me to identify: 
 
 The key stakeholders in the National Troubled Families Initiative 
 The type of power and stake that they held  
 Key stakeholders with a range of identities 




This then facilitated an examination of the relationship between the ‘Troubled 
Families’ principal and the agent, the Payment by Results contract (Eisenhardt 1989) 
that bound them and the implications that this had for exploitation (Miller and Sardais 
2011) or the bringing of value (Bosse and Phillips 2016) to the National Troubled 
Families Initiative. These lessons translated into a practical framework for target 
achievement in Payment by Results provision. 
 
4.3.3  The Case Study Methodology 
 
The methodology adopted for the research project was that of a case study; a 
research design that entailed the detailed and intensive analysis of a single case 
(Bryman 2012). The case study methodology enabled the detailed examination of 
the National Troubled Families Initiative through the lens of Stakeholder Theory and 
Agency Theory.  
 
The case study methodology facilitated a comparison of ‘Troubled Families’ against 
the Payment by Results best practice guidelines (NAO 2015) and the six key 
characteristics of an outcome (Webster 2016). From this, the body of knowledge 
about how to improve the management of the ‘Troubled Families’ programme was 
increased, which created a practical framework for target achievement in PbR 
provision. 
 
A deductive approach represents the most common view of the nature of the 
relationship between theory and social research (Bryman 2012). The researcher 
deduces a hypothesis from existing knowledge and evaluates this by gathering and 
analysing new data. In contrast, an inductive approach sees a theory generated from 
the data (Bryman 2012). I thematically analysed the Phase One national and local 
performance data (DCLG 2015c and LA1 2015b), made deductions and then 
evaluated these in the analysis of the five semi-structured interviews. The collection 





Within the ‘Troubled Families’ case study, I collected data from four delivery agents 
representing the Northeast, Southeast and Northwest of England. This decision 
enriched the research project in three ways. Firstly, the initial focus of the research 
project was the local authority area where I spent most of my career and managed 
the Family Intervention Project for the most ‘complex’ local ‘troubled’ families. This 
insider knowledge informed the research project and encouraged local stakeholders 
to participate. The research project then broadened out to encompass a second 
northeast local authority (Local Authority Two (LA2)). This widened the scope of the 
research and highlighted key points of comparison and contrast with Local Authority 
One (LA1). The early focus on the Northeast of England also enabled me to gain 
confidence in collecting and analysing data in a locality that I was familiar with before 
extending the locus of the research.  
 
Nine months after data was collected in Local Authority One and Two, I invited a 
Southeast and a Northwest local authority to participate in the research project. This 
enabled a chronological, geographical and socio-economic comparison to be made 
of the National Troubled Families Initiative that further enriched and informed the 
research project. The inclusion of two cities, a county (Local Authority Three (LA3)) 
and a consortium (Local Authority Four (LA4)) located across England gave the 
research project depth and variety and ensured that it had relevance and resonance 
for all agents concerned with the delivery of the National Troubled Families Initiative 
specifically and Payment by Results schemes in general. It went further than the 
work of Hoggett et al (2014) and Hayden (2015) which restricted their data collection 
to one area in England. 
 
Aside from selecting my own authority - (LA1) - as the initial focus of the research 
project, I also chose it and its neighbour (LA2) based on their strong early 
performance in Phase One of the National Troubled Families Initiative. As Appendix 
Twenty-Three shows, the first set of quantitative data published by DCLG in January 
2013 showed that LA1 had outperformed the other eleven North-East local 
authorities in terms of families ‘identified’ by this date while LA2 was the highest-




I calculated that this was in percentage terms: 
 
Table 4.3.3 - The Performance in Percentages of LA1 and LA2 Compared to the 
National Average as at January 2013 
 
Area Families Identified 
at December 2012 
Families Worked 
With at December 
2012 
Families ‘Turned 
Around’ at January 
2013 
National ‘Average’ 53% 20% 1.4% 
LA1 100% 10% 0% 
LA2  75% 43% 13% 
 
By April 2016 - one full year into Phase Two and nineteen months after the Wave 
One Early Starters (DCLG 2014a) began delivering to the new outcome framework - 
the principal had still not published any Phase Two performance data. This was 
despite the promise of the periodic collection and publication of Family 
Monitoring/Progress Data in Phase Two (DCLG 2014a). Thus, the specific selection 
of LA3 and LA4 - rather than any other local authorities outside of the Northeast - 
followed the recommendation of the Department for Communities and Local 
Government. I had contacts at DCLG, which I made during my secondment to HMI 
Probation in 2013-2014 as the ‘Troubled Families Expert’ for the thematic review of 
the contribution of youth offending teams to the work of the Troubled Families 
programme in England (CJJI 2015). On the advice of these contacts, I approached 
the LA3 and LA4 Troubled Families Co-ordinators and requested their participation 




4.3.4 A Mixed Method Mainly Influenced by Qualitative Data Analysis 
 
The pragmatic research philosophy allowed a range of research methods to be 
utilised to follow the research problem and research question and provide practical 
solutions and outcomes to the research project (Saunders et al 2016). The research 
project collected and analysed both quantitative and qualitative data in three stages 
to achieve an understanding of practice in Phase One and in the implementation 
stage of Phase Two that increased knowledge both about the ‘Troubled Families’ 
programme and successful Payment by Results provision. 
 
Firstly, I analysed the DCLG national secondary Phase One data (DCLG 2015c) to 
understand the performance of the programme both locally and nationally. Secondly, 
I requested secondary quantitative data from LA1 (LA1 2015b) to understand the 
detail behind the national figures for a cohort of local ‘troubled’ families. Thirdly, I 
gathered primary qualitative data from each of the four areas in scope (LA1 2015a, 
LA2 2015, LA3 2016, LA4 2016 and LA1 2016) to capture the depth and richness 
that lay behind the quantitative datasets. 
 
In all three stages of the research project, I analysed the data qualitatively to identify 
the key themes. I further explored the themes identified from the DCLG national data 
during the analysis of the LA1 quantitative data and identified new themes, which I 
traced in the subsequent qualitative data gathering and analysis from the four areas.  
 
I selected a three-stage qualitative method ahead of mixed methods research – a 
method which has recently taken on the more specific meaning of research 
combining quantitative and qualitative research methods (Bryman 2012) - because I 
did not wish to carry out further statistical tests on the Phase One performance data 
available from the principal and agent. The qualitative method ensured that the 
research had: 
 
 Authenticity – “convincing the reader that the researcher has a deep 
understanding of what was taking place” 
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 Plausibility - “requires the researcher to link into some on-going 
concern/interest among other researchers” 
 Criticality – “encourages readers to question their taken-for-granted 
assumptions, and thus offer something genuinely novel” (Easterby-Smith et al 
2015:88). 
 
I demonstrated my deep understanding of what was taking place within the National 
Troubled Families Initiative, linked to other researchers’ on-going concerns about 
this programme and the wider PbR framework. I also questioned the taken-for-
granted assumptions about ‘Troubled Families’ but did not pass judgement on either 
of the datasets provided by the principal and the agent. This approach contrasted 
with that taken in positivist research where the following are important:  
 
 Reliability – “the degree to which a measure of a concept is stable” (Bryman 
2012:712) 
 Validity – “a concern with the integrity of the conclusions that are generated 
from a piece of research” (Bryman 2012:717) 
 Generalizability – “the external validity of the research findings” (Bryman 
2012:712). 
 
The LA1 quantitative dataset (LA1 2015b) comprised a spreadsheet minus the 
names, addresses and dates of birth of the LA1 Phase One ‘Troubled Families’ 
cohort. It indicated the criteria they met on entering the programme and whether the 
agent made a ‘full’ or ‘partial’ funding claim for them. 
 
I gathered the qualitative data from the four areas using the data collection method 
of an ethical interview. A focus group method would have enabled me to collect data 
from several participants and encourage interaction and the joint construction of 
meaning (Bryman 2012). However, an interview allowed the five participants to 
contribute separately to the research project and speak freely. This was particularly 
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crucial in LA1, where I capitalised on my insider knowledge and solid working 
relationships by interviewing a senior manager and the Troubled Families Co-
ordinator, neither of whom may have felt able to speak frankly in front of each other. 
The interview method had other advantages over the focus group method: 
 
 It prevented the two North-East Co-ordinators from being spoken to together 
and feeling compelled to ‘compete’ over whose delivery of the programme 
was the optimum; therefore, exaggerating their successes or hiding the 
challenges faced 
 Data could be collected in 2015 and 2016 thus allowing some points of 
chronological contrast to be drawn 
 The five were not inconvenienced by lengthy cross-country journeys. 
 
The interview method permitted me to control the questioning, avoid the intrusive 
task of observing the participants for a lengthy period and allow the participants to 
provide historical information (Creswell 2009). The latter made an important 
contribution to the success of the LA3 interview as their Troubled Families Co-
ordinator was unable to take part in a lengthy data-gathering session and submitted 
documentary evidence (Local Authority Three 2015b and Hayden 2015) beforehand 
to enable the session duration and interview schedule to be reduced. 
 
LA1 and LA2’s close geographic proximity to the research project’s Northeast base 
meant that that I could interview their Troubled Families Co-ordinators and the senior 
manager face-to-face. I carried out the LA3 and LA4 Troubled Families Co-ordinator 
interviews by telephone (Costley et al 2013) to avoid three days of train travel. On 
the day of the interview with the LA1 senior manager, I was too unwell to attend the 
interview. Consequently, I also conducted this by telephone. Telephone interviews 
have the disadvantage of making it difficult to establish rapport with the participant 
and the lack of visual clues – such as body language – can hinder interpretation. 
However, they save time, money and effort where the two parties are geographically 
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disparate, lessen the likelihood of the interviewee making socially desirable and 
therefore potentially inaccurate responses and protect the interviewer from attack 
from an angry or dangerous interlocutor (Robson 2002). I attempted to overcome the 
lack of rapport by speaking to the LA3 and LA4 Troubled Families Co-ordinators - 
who I had no previous relationship with – prior to the interview. This enabled us to 
establish an acquaintanceship as well as agreeing the parameters of the interview 
and making them aware of their right to give informed consent. 
 
I chose a semi-structured interview method to gather data from the four co-ordinators 
and one senior manager. Like structured interviews, this method used a schedule of 
questions but enabled me to “…allow more verbal answers [and] give participants 
more latitude in responding in their own words” (Costley et al 2013). This method 
therefore offered a greater opportunity than structured interviews to elicit rich, deep 
data from the interviewees. Unlike unstructured interviews, it allowed specific 
discussion around key themes drawn from the literature such as: 
 
 The concept of the ‘troubled’ family – which gave an interesting insight into 
how one stakeholder group was perceived by other groups of stakeholders 
 The Payment by Results framework of the National Troubled Families 
Initiative – which benchmarked this against best practice guidelines (NAO 
2015 and Webster 2016).  
 
However, the semi-structured format gave the five participants the flexibility and 
freedom to provide new information, which went beyond the key themes revealed by 
the literature review. I shared the interview schedule with the interviewees 





The research project had a pragmatic epistemology, a Stakeholder Theory and 
Agency Theory theoretical perspective, a case study methodology and a three-stage, 
qualitative method involving the qualitative analysis of quantitative data and 
qualitative data. I built on my insider knowledge of LA1 and the North-East of 
England, discovered ‘Troubled Families’ best practice and gaps in delivery, 
challenged my existing assumptions and reflected upon chronological, geographical 
and socio-economic points of comparison and contrast. This led to a new 
understanding of the National Troubled Families Initiative and enabled the 
formulation of a practical framework for achieving targets in Payment by Results 
provision. 
 
4.4 ETHICAL APPROVAL 
 
Because the research project was a piece of doctoral research, I required approval 
from the University of Sunderland Research Ethics Committee prior to the data-
gathering phase. I presented the research proposal before I formally asked any 
stakeholders to be part of the project. I received permission to proceed with the 
provisos that: 
 
 The stakeholders who had provided data would not be named nor would it be 
easy to guess their identity 
 Any primary data-gathering through qualitative interviews would be with 
professionals associated with the National Troubled Families Initiative and not 
with any ‘troubled’ families  
 Any quantitative data submitted by these stakeholders should be done so 
minus any family personal details such as names, addresses or dates of birth 
 The research participants must receive a separate participant information 
sheet and consent form for them to retain 
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 The participant information sheet must include details of data handling - such 
as storage, access, retention, secure disposal of audio tapes and transcripts - 
confidentiality and the dissemination of results.  
 
The Participant Information Sheet and Participant Consent Form are in Appendix 
Twenty-Four and Twenty-Five. The Research Ethics Committee’s instruction that 
professionals and not 'troubled' families should be part of the primary data gathering 
had a significant impact on the identity of the stakeholders that I approached to take 
part in the research project. Others factors determined the stakeholder groups from 
whom data was eventually gathered. 
 
4.5 THE STAKEHOLDERS IN SCOPE FOR INCLUSION IN THE RESEARCH 
PROJECT 
 
The ethical guidelines for research and the decision of the University of Sunderland 
Research Ethics Committee had a significant impact upon the stakeholders actually 
selected for inclusion within the research project. Their prohibition of interviews with 
‘troubled’ families or analysing their personal quantitative data scotched my initial 
hopes of placing then at the centre of the data-gathering phase like Hoggett et al 
(2014) and Hayden (2015). 
 
I used the ‘real world’ stakeholder view of the National Troubled Families Initiative 
(Figure 2.5.1) to guide my decisions about from whom to collect data. This 
framework comprised thirteen stakeholders. These were DCLG and the 152 English 
local authorities – which Agency Theory described as the ‘principal’ and the ‘agent’- 
and eleven other stakeholders. Table 2.5.1 showed that these stakeholders held 
between them: 
 
1. An economic stake and economic power  
2. An economic stake and political power  
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3. A stake of influence and political power (Freeman and Reed 2014). 
 
Arguments for and against the inclusion of the thirteen stakeholder groups appear in 
Appendix Twenty-Six. This information guided me to analyse the Phase One 
secondary quantitative data from DCLG (2015c) and to collect further data from two 
stakeholder groups, the English local authorities who were the agent for the National 
Troubled Families Initiative and the employees who delivered the programme for the 
agent. Asking these two key stakeholder groups to contribute meant that there was 
the potential for data collection from: 
 
 A stakeholder group with a variety of identities, stakes and powers 
 One half of the key ‘principal – agent’ relationship 
 All or a selection of the 152 English local authorities  
 A variety of geographical locations and socio-economic positions at different 
times chronologically 
 A sample of Wave One and Wave Two Early Starters 
 A hierarchy of staff. 
 
I resolved to request that my own local authority (LA1) provide their Phase One 
quantitative dataset minus personal family details so that I could trace some of the 
themes identified in the literature and understand from a more detailed local 
perspective the information contained in the national dataset (DCLG 2015c). Mindful 
that statistics could only say so much, I decided to collect primary qualitative data 
from selected employees of the agent who existed in more than one stakeholder 
group and thus held multiple identities, stakes and powers (Freeman and Reed 
2014). 
 
I specifically chose a sample of England’s ‘Troubled Families Co-ordinators’ to 
interview.  DCLG saw this post as integral to the National Troubled Families Initiative 
and provided three years-worth of funding in Phase One for each local authority to 
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appoint an individual to this role (DCLG 2012). In 2015-2016, DCLG gave each local 
authority a Service Transformation Grant. This was twice the size of that previously 
provided by the Phase One Troubled Families Coordinator Grant to reflect the 
increased challenge of co-ordinating the Phase Two programme and the 
programme’s expectations around wider service transformation, the increased 
provision of evidence via Family Progress Data and the completion of the costs 
savings calculator (DCLG 2014a).  
 
Following Table 2.5.1, the Troubled Families Co-ordinators: 
 
1. Hold an economic stake and economic power as a: 
 Key member of one of the 152 local authorities acting as agent and delivering 
the programme 
 Potential member of a trade union 
 
2. Are an influencer wielding political power as a: 
 Member of the British electorate who could vote in a local or general election 
 Potential member of an organisation that campaigned on behalf of families; 
who had insider information about the programme that could appear in the 
media 
 Potential member of a ‘troubled’ family. 
 
This provided a very persuasive argument to a researcher acting on their own and 
without the benefit of a research team.  
 
Ultimately, I gathered qualitative data from the LA1, LA2, LA3 and LA4 Troubled 
Families Co-ordinators. I personally knew the LA1 post-holder and I resolved to 
interview her first both to compare and contrast the local information with that 
gathered elsewhere and to enable me to hone my data-gathering skills. 
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As the research project developed, I realised that the ‘Troubled Families Co-
ordinator role slightly differed from area to area. Thus, the LA3 post-holder held a 
strategic role within the local authority and had regular meetings with DCLG. The 
LA4 Co-ordinator had originally worked within one North-West local authority but had 
then taken up a strategic role with oversight of the programme in a consortium of ten 
local authorities. This then provided a further dimension to the research. This 
strategic and operational dimension supplemented the points of chronological, 
geographical and socio-economic comparison. Further enhancement occurred in 
2016 when I resolved to gather qualitative data in LA1 from a strategic manager. 
 
4.6      ETHICAL GUIDELINES  
 
Although I had already committed not to interview ‘troubled’ families or analyse 
quantitative data bearing their personal details and interview the research 
participants separately to enable them to speak freely, I reviewed the ethical 
principles for research to ensure that I conducted the research project in a proper 
manner. These principles comprised four areas: 
 
 Whether there is harm to participants 
 Whether there is a lack of informed consent 
 Whether there is an invasion of privacy 
 Whether deception is involved (Bryman 2012). 
 
4.6.1 Avoiding Harm to Participants 
 
Research that causes either physical or developmental harm to participants is 
unacceptable. Developmental harm can occur when participants’ self-esteem is 
negatively affected or the research process places them in a stressful situation 
(Bryman 2012). My insider knowledge of ‘Troubled Families’ suggested many 
opportunities to cause harm to professionals within the confines of a research project 
investigating the initiative; particularly where its outcome framework permitted 
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funding claims for families where an adult had moved into employment but the family 
were still committing ASB, youth crime and had youngsters with poor school 
attendance (Higgs 2012). I therefore determined to check the interview schedule for 
potential mentally harmful questions. I also underlined that the purpose of the 
research project was to improve the achievement of targets in Payment by Results 
provision through a focus on the case study of the National Troubled Families 
Initiative and not to cast aspersions about individual delivery agents. 
 
Whilst it is vitally important to protect the research participants from harm, it is also 
important to safeguard the researcher’s physical and mental health and to manage 
risk appropriately (SRA 2003). Hoggett et al (2014) managed the risk posed to their 
inquiry team by: 
 
 Not collecting data from anyone who posed a threat to the researcher 
 Using their key worker as a ‘gatekeeper’ to manage the interface with the 
families; a particularly crucial point given that the interviews took place in the 
family home where the researcher could be placed in danger from a family 
member, friend or neighbour (Hoggett et al 2014). 
 
I minimised the physical and mental risk to myself by only gathering data from 
professionals: 
 
 In ‘successful’ local authorities where the data or my DCLG contacts 
suggested they had performed well in the National Troubled Families Initiative 
 Whom - where possible - were personally known to me 
 In public buildings - with other people close at hand 






4.6.2 Ensuring Informed Consent 
 
It is vital that the researcher maintains the principles of confidentiality; a key issue 
where participants’ vulnerability or lack of awareness may mean they do not perceive 
confidentiality as an issue and provide data that can later have negative ‘unintended 
consequences’ (Norton 2008) for them. Informed consent includes: 
 
 Informing voluntary participants that they do not have to participate 
 Making them aware of their entitlement to refuse to co-operate at any stage of 
the research project for whatever reason and to withdraw data just supplied 
(SRA 2003).  
 
Using the example previously cited, a professional might agree to speak about the 
National Troubled Families Initiative without realising that, by revealing that many of 
their £4,000 Phase One funding claims were for families who were still behaving 
poorly, they could compromise their position with their own management or the 
principal. I therefore made the opportunity to withdraw from the session or not to 
participate at all clear in the Participant Consent Form (Appendix Twenty-Five). 
 
4.6.3 Maintaining Participants’ Right to Privacy 
 
Once informed consent is in place, the researcher must continue to monitor their 
research method, attitude to the participant, demeanour and latent theoretical or 
methodological perspective when dealing with them (SRA 2003). Consent does not 
entitle the researcher to: 
 
 Study all phenomena 
 Act intrusively 
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 Contact subjects without advance warning 
 Ask questions which cause distress or offence 
 Observe participants without their knowledge 
 Obtain information about individuals from third parties.  
 
It is possible to avoid intrusion by making an appropriate use of available data such 
as administrative records instead of embarking on a new inquiry (SRA 2003). For 
this reason, I analysed the national DCLG Phase One quantitative data (DCLG 
2015c) and LA1 Phase One quantitative data (LA1 2015b). This enabled me to draw 
key themes from two sources of information about Phase One delivery and avoid the 
gathering of information through a more intrusive method such as a lengthy 
ethnographic study. 
 
I conducted the five qualitative-data gathering sessions ethically. I contacted the five 
participants in advance of collecting data from them; ensured that the interview 
schedule did not contain questions likely to cause upset; provided these questions 
for their perusal before the session and interviewed them on their own rather than 
with a colleague or a delivery agent from another local authority. I explained to the 
participants how long the sessions were likely to take, offered comfort breaks after 
one hour where applicable and provided them with the opportunity to terminate the 
session early if they desired. 
 
4.6.4 Preventing Deception 
 
It is difficult to maintain the objectivity of social research. The selection of the 
research topic can reflect a systematic bias in favour of certain cultural or personal 
values. The employment base of the researcher, the source of funding and other 




 Independent researchers can be subject to a specific contract in which roles 
and obligations are specified in advance 
 Employee researchers often have non project-specific contracts comprising 
an obligation to accept instructions from the employer. Researchers based in 
the public sector may also be restricted further by statutory regulations 
covering compulsory surveys and official secrecy (SRA 2003). 
 
Researchers like me with the freedom to study an area of personal interest and draw 
on their insider knowledge still have a responsibility to be objective and to highlight 
barriers to this. Social researchers are bound by a professional obligation to resist 
approaches to problem formulation, data collection or analysis, interpretation and the 
publication of results that are explicitly or implicitly likely to misinform or to mislead 
rather than to advance knowledge (SRA 2003).  
 
The motivation behind my decision to improve target achievement in Payment by 
Results provision using the National Troubled Families Initiative as a case study 
was: 
 
 Fifteen years’ experience of managing public sector projects and programmes 
 Four plus years’ employment with a ‘Troubled Families’ agent based in the 
North-East of England 
 Considerable insider knowledge of Payment by Results and the National 
Troubled Families Initiative 
 Concerns that the PbR framework was not leading to success and funding 
was being claimed for ‘troubled’ families whose success was not attributable 
to the programme or were not actually ‘turned around’. 
 
I made every effort to maintain objectivity throughout the investigation. The 




 Identified the gaps in the literature 
 Concurred with my choice of the case study research methodology to fill these 
gaps 
 Provided a framework for the analysis of the data collected 
 Provided a framework for the presentation of the research project’s findings 
and conclusions. 
 
I was also reflexive throughout the research project. I paid attention to and was 
continually aware of: 
 
“…the way different kinds of linguistic, social, political and theoretical elements are 
woven together in the process of knowledge development, during which empirical 
material is constructed, interpreted and written” (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2000:5). 
 
I considered my role in the processes of data-gathering, data analysis and the 
presentation of the research findings and the effect that I could have on each of 
these. I was aware of the potential impact of my personal interest in and insider 
knowledge of Payment by Results and the National Troubled Families Initiative upon 
the research project as a whole and its resonance with professionals involved with 
‘troubled’ families.  This contributed to my adoption of: 
 
 A pragmatic research perspective to support action to improve target 
achievement in PbR provision by contributing practical solutions to inform 
future practice drawn from the National Troubled Families Initiative  
 A pragmatic epistemology to focus on problems and practice associated with 
‘Troubled Families’, identify ‘true’ theories and knowledge and enable 
successful action in the field of PbR 
 The Stakeholder Theory and Agency Theory theoretical perspective drawn 
from the existing business and management literature to identify the 
stakeholders in the ‘real world’ of the National Troubled Families Initiative and 
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collect data from representatives of the agent whose experience could 
contribute to target achievement in Payment by Results provision 
 An ethical case study methodology to examine the National Troubled Families 
Initiative across England  
 A qualitative method to facilitate the collection of data from stakeholders 
across the country and its analysis for gaps to support recommendations for a 
practical framework for achieving targets in PbR provision. 
 
I specifically achieved reflexivity by: 
 
 Maintaining a weekly reflective diary during the earlier period of research 
(Easterby-Smith et al 2015) 
 Sharing elements of my research at the British Academy of Management 
2014 and 2015 annual conferences in Belfast and Portsmouth and at a 
doctoral symposium at Glasgow Caledonian University; actions which held my 
work up to peer review 
 Asking the research participants to read the interview transcriptions and 
revise them if their views were not accurately presented. Their limited 
changes suggested the qualitative primary research had resonance with 
them. 
 
This project was a piece of self-financed research and not bound by a contract or 
filtered through a funder before the release of its findings. However, because I did 
not have a principal who set me the goal of improving target achievement in 
Payment by Results provision, I had to provide a persuasive argument to each 
stakeholder whom I asked for data. Fortunately, because all four areas were keen to 
celebrate their good practice but also hold the initiative up to further national debate 
and so benefit from this, their involvement was not hard to obtain.  
 
I tightly managed our interfaces to prevent them from being too intrusive, time-rich 
and therefore costly to the research participants. Fortunately, my status as a doctoral 
student gave academic prestige to the study and ultimately encouraged five 
128 
 
professionals to contribute to and take an interest in the research. The research 
project was the work of a single researcher rather than a collaborative effort of 
colleagues of different levels of seniority and from different disciplines. This had the 
disadvantage of limiting the size of the project but meant that the reputation and 
careers of other contributors did not need consideration. 
 
Research, which claims to be representative of a group of stakeholders but actually 
only represents the views of an individual stakeholder, is an example of deception. 
Bailey (2012) intimated that ‘Listening to Troubled Families’ (DCLG 2012a) was 
deceptive as it purported to present the views of sixteen ‘complex’ families but each 
of these had only one or two members whose voice was heard and who presumably 
spoke for everyone else. I witnessed such a ‘deception’ in 2015, when I watched an 
Ecorys researcher interview a local ‘troubled’ family in their home. The matriarch 
spoke at length while the rest of the family sat quietly. Therefore, the information 
provided actually reflected her views rather than those of the family. However, I 
countered any accusations of deception in this research project by interviewing 
professionals from a cross-section of local authorities from across the country and 
producing research that would resonate with other stakeholders involved with the 
programme. 
 
A further responsibility of the social researcher is to alert potential users of their data 
to the limits of its reliability and applicability without either overstating or understating 
the validity or degree to which the information can be generalised. Confidence in 
research findings depends critically on their faithful representation with any covering 
up of errors or over-interpretation reflecting poorly on the researcher and the 
reputation of social research (SRA 2003). However, as previously stated, I did not 
focus on the issues of reliability, validity or generalizability (Bryman 2012) but chose 
to focus on: 
 
 Authenticity due to my insider knowledge about the ‘Troubled Families’ case 
study and how this can illuminate knowledge about the achievement of targets 
through Payment by Results 
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 Plausibility by responding to Webster (2016) who found a lack of conclusive 
evidence for the benefits of PbR 
 Criticality by questioning the notion that PbR was universally good because 
principals chose it to improve outcomes, outcome focus and value-for-money; 
drive service innovation; open up the market to new entrants; defer payment 
until later in the programme; defer risk to the agent and reduce inequalities 
(Webster 2016). 
 
Maintaining confidentiality is essential in research and social researchers must 
remove the opportunities for others to infer identities from their data (SRA 2003). The 
Data Protection Act controls how organisations, businesses or the government uses 
personal information and stipulates that everyone responsible for using data have to 
follow strict data protection principles. Personal information must be: 
 
 Used fairly and lawfully 
 Used for limited, specifically stated purposes 
 Used in a way that is adequate, relevant and not excessive 
 Accurate 
 Kept for no longer than is absolutely necessary 
 Handled according to people’s data protection rights 
 Kept safe and secure 
 Not transferred outside the European Economic Area without adequate 
protection (GOV.UK 2016). 
 
In order to meet these requirements, the Phase One LA1 quantitative data (LA1 
2015b) was only used within the ‘Troubled Families’ case study and to improve 




 Emailed to me at work and saved only to my password protected work 
computer  
 Carefully and methodically analysed to ensure that correct conclusions were 
drawn from it 
 Destroyed on completion of the research project. 
 
The qualitative primary data gathered from the four areas was also only used within 
the ‘Troubled Families’ case study and to improve the achievement of targets in 
Payment by Results provision. It was: 
 
 Collected using a recording device and then professionally transcribed; a 
process which omitted all identifying details such as the names of people or 
places 
 Carefully and methodically analysed to ensure that correct conclusions were 
drawn from it 
 Destroyed on completion of the research project. 
 
The Data Protection Act detailed a stronger legal protection for more sensitive 
information, such as: 
 
 Ethnic background 
 Political opinions 
 Religious beliefs 
 Health 
 Sexual health 




No information pertinent to these exact themes was included within the LA1 Phase 
One quantitative data (LA1 2015b) but a political reference was removed from one 
transcription at the request of the participant (LA3 2016). 
 
Social research is not carried out in a vacuum; making it difficult for researchers to: 
 
 Not take sides 
 Tailor research concerns to meet the restrictions of the funder 
 Gain access to organisations who worry how they will be represented 
 Negotiate with professionals once inside the organisation who either view the 
researcher with suspicion or want to draw them into internal politics 
 Publish the completed research project and control how it is subsequently 
used (Bryman 2012). 
 
I avoided these issues by: 
 
 Approaching local authorities whom the national data (DCLG 2013) and 
DCLG suggested were delivering ‘Troubled Families’ well 
 Collecting data from LA1 professionals whom I knew  
 Resolving to withdraw from the other three areas if their representatives 
became suspicious of my motives 
 Refusing to become involved with internal politics 
 Remaining strictly neutral and not presenting my authority’s delivery of 
‘Troubled Families’ as the best 
 Self-financing the research project myself 




Having reflected on the ethical research project guidelines, I began work on the 
interview schedule. 
 
4.7 THE INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
 
The literature review and the qualitative analysis of the two quantitative datasets 
(DCLG 2015c and LA1 2015b) informed the choice of questions in the semi-
structured interviews with the four Troubled Families Co-ordinators and the one 
senior manager.  
 
The Phase One DCLG national dataset (DCLG 2015c) provided me with information 
about the number of ‘troubled’ families nationally and in each of the four areas of 
focus who had achieved the four key performance indicators. It suggested that it was 
easier to improve a ‘troubled’ family’s negative behaviours than it was to progress 
one adult in the family into training or employment. The lack of clarity around which 
of the programme’s eligibility criteria each ‘successful’ family actually met and my 
insider knowledge that LA1 claimed for families who addressed their own issues and 
who no longer met the entry criteria rather than had made a positive change left 
many questions unanswered by DCLG (2015c). Therefore, I used the LA1 Phase 
One quantitative dataset to learn more about the impact of ‘verification’, ‘attribution’ 
and ‘deadweight’ on performance. 
 
The first draft of the interview schedule therefore had interview questions arranged 
into topic areas and referenced their source from the literature and the national and 
local quantitative datasets. Appendix Twenty-Seven contains an example from this.  
This example sought information about the ability of Payment by Results provision 
to: 
 
 Address social need and change behaviour 
 Understand how the agent identified all local ‘troubled’ families when there 




 Ascertain the agents’ view about an outcome framework that rewarded 
success where all entry criteria were not addressed (Higgs 2012). 
 
The ‘topic area’ and ‘literature’ boxes were removed from the second and final draft 
of the interview schedule. This comprised shorter and less complex questions 
accompanied by a prompt if the interviewee seemed unsure what response to give. 
For example: 
 
 Do you think the National Troubled Families Initiative can make sustained 
change with families with problems? 
Prompt - ‘Problem families’ have been discussed throughout the industrial era in 
the UK suggesting it is an enduring problem. 
 The DCLG data suggests that LA1 achieved their ‘troubled’ families’ 
identification early on in Phase One. Is this the case? How was it achieved? 
How will this be built on for Phase Two? 
 In Phase One did the Government only pay for services that improved 
outcomes for families? 
 
The questions prepared for the four Troubled Families Co-ordinators were identical 
but had some slight geographical and chronological variance. For example: 
 
 LA1 was quizzed as to how they had identified their ‘troubled’ families so 
quickly and LA2 were asked how they achieved their success in converting 
identified families into those who were ‘worked with’, ‘turned around’ and 
achieved the anti-social behaviour, youth crime and school attendance 
outcome. This was influenced by the performance of LA1 and LA2 compared 
to the national average as at January 2013 (DCLG 2013), which was captured 
in Appendix Twenty-Three 
 The LA3 and LA4 questions were updated to reflect that their interviews were 
carried out more than a year after the official launch of Phase Two rather than 
134 
 
three months after Phase One had ended as was the case with the LA1 and 
LA2 interviews 
 Twenty-four questions were moved from the LA3 interview schedule to 
shorten the session at the request of the Co-ordinator. The answers to these 
questions were taken instead from the two LA3 local evaluations (Local 
Authority Three 2015b and Hayden 2015) 
 The LA4 interview schedule was reduced and altered in deference to their Co-
ordinator’s strategic role and oversight of delivery across ten local authorities 
rather than one. This included removing operational questions and asking 
questions about the ‘area’ rather than the ‘authority’. For example, the LA4 
Co-ordinator was asked whether ‘troubled’ families were the same across his 
area as an alternative to being asked about the ‘man in the street’ and 
workers’ views of the ‘troubled’ family  
 The LA1 and LA2 interview schedules omitted to probe the single detail that 
made the most difference in the programme, which should be funded beyond 
2020. This was rectified in the third and fourth interviews. 
 
The four Co-ordinator interview schedules are in Appendices Twenty-Eight to Thirty-
One. 
 
The Troubled Families Co-ordinators interview schedules focused on six themes: 
 
1. Generic Questions 
2. The Concept of the ‘Troubled’ Family 
3. Local Good Practice 
4. The Mechanics of the ‘Troubled Families’ Programme 
5. Local Challenges 




Theme One borrowed a technique from job interviews. Simple, personal questions 
based on their role and the difference between Phases One and Two allowed the 
Troubled Families Co-ordinators to draw on their insider knowledge of the 
programme and speak eloquently and with confidence. Theme Two drew on the 
documentary evidence in the literature and Stakeholder Theory. It introduced the 
concept at the heart of the National Troubled Families Initiative, the ‘troubled’ family 
itself. It invited the agents to share their and other stakeholders’ understanding of 
this concept; reflect on how geography affected the view of ‘trouble’ and to consider 
whether the concept had changed between the two Phases of the programme when 
the definition of a ‘troubled’ family had broadened (DCLG 2014a). 
 
Themes Three and Four drew on the documentary evidence about the National 
Troubled Families Initiative and the DCLG national quantitative data and considered 
the programme through the lens of Agency Theory. It encouraged the participants to 
reflect on: 
 
 Their relationship with the principal (Figure 2.3.1a) 
 The potential costs of the programme (Figure 2.5.2c) 
 The principal and the agent’s attitude to risk (Figure 2.5.2d) 
 The clarity of the ‘Troubled Families’ contract (Figure 2.5.2a, Figure 2.5.2b 
and Figure 2.5.2e). 
 
Themes Three and Four enabled the Co-ordinators to: 
 
 Demonstrate occasions when they had used their superior knowledge to 
benefit and bring value to the ‘Troubled Families’ programme or used the 
principal’s lack of knowledge about them to exploit DCLG or any other 
stakeholder (Miller and Sardais 2011) 
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 Consider the outcome framework in the light of the six key elements of clarity 
and complexity, verification, attribution, deadweight, individuals and cohorts 
and segmentation (Webster 2016). 
 
They also had the chance to explore: 
 
 The importance of the key worker role to the agent’s delivery 
 The development of the employees of the agent 
 The ability of the programme to address a historic social need (Welshman 
2012) and reach the whole family 
 The involvement of other stakeholders including the ‘troubled’ families (Sheil 
and Breidenbach-Roe 2014 and Crowe et al 2014) 
 The challenges of delivering a public sector programme with a uniform 
funding structure but economic inequalities (Audit Commission 2013, Sparrow 
2014, Centre for Cities 2016a and Centre for Cities 2016b).  
 
Theme Five drew upon the documentary evidence from the literature and the DCLG 
Phase One national quantitative data. It explored the principal’s focus on moving 
workless families off benefits and into paid employment in terms of: 
 
 The families’ aspirations for themselves 
 The ethical dilemma of prioritising economic activity above positive behaviour 
(Higgs 2012)  
 The impact of the local socio-economic environment upon the agent’s ability 
to achieve their targets (Audit Commission 2013, Sparrow 2014, Centre for 
Cities 2016a and b) 
 The belief that paid work limited social inclusion (Levitas 2006) was another 
route to inequality and did not necessarily move families out of poverty 
(Churchill 2015).  
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Theme Six gave the participants the opportunity to provide any important additional 
information. ‘Counterfactual prompting’ (Way et al 2015) was used to invite the four 
Co-ordinators to imagine the world differently to their articulated perspective. After 
being empowered to provide any further information that the interview had not 
allowed them to share, a ‘magic wand question’ (Way et al 2015) was asked so that 
they could ignore real or imagined constraints and think outside the immediate 
considerations of the current local and national delivery of the National Troubled 
Families Initiative. Having been given the chance to abandon rationality and logic to 
come up with new ideas, the interview schedule ended with an invitation to put some 
of their ideas into practice and to take on the role of an agent whose superior 
knowledge could benefit ‘Troubled Families’ (Miller and Sardais 2011). 
 
The interview with the LA1 senior manager was the last interview conducted and 
was an opportunity for an employee placed in the highest echelons of an agent to 
reflect on the programme in relation to Agency Theory (Figure 2.5.2a), the Payment 
by Results best practice guidelines (NAO 2015) and the six key elements of an 
outcome (Webster 2016). I asked three questions: 
 
 Were the targets for Phase One and Phase Two of the National Troubled 
Families Initiative clear? 
 Were these targets easily measurable? 
 Can you outline the issues involved with applying the Phase One and Phase 
Two targets to service delivery? 
 
I based the interview schedules for the five participants on the Stakeholder Theory, 
Agency Theory and Payment by Results good practice and the themes explored in 
the National Troubled Families Initiative literature, the national DCLG quantitative 
data and the LA1 local quantitative data. I adjusted each schedule to take into 




I sent an Interview Feedback Form to each participant after the session. This is in 
Appendix Thirty-Two. I used this feedback to improve each successive interview. 
 
4.8 THE PILOT INTERVIEWS 
 
In June 2015, I conducted two face-to-face pilot interviews to test the interview 
schedule and the Interview Feedback Form. The first pilot interview was with a 
member of my family. The second was with a close friend employed within LA1’s 
‘Troubled Families’ programme. The pilot interview participants received a copy of 
the interview schedule beforehand to familiarise themselves with the questions and 
consider how to answer them. I re-presented them with the interview schedule at the 
start of the session, which I recorded using two devices to minimise the possible loss 
of data. 
 
The exercise of carrying out pilot interviews ironed out any difficulties and built my 
confidence. The second pilot interview actually took eighty-eight minutes and 
demonstrated that the case study methodology and semi-structured, face-to-face 
interview method were appropriate. My colleague provided encouraging written 
feedback. This stated that the session was long but relaxed, well-structured and 
appropriate. It provided space for a fully considered response. The provision of the 
interview schedule in advance enhanced their participation (Pilot Interview 
Participant 2015).  
 
Two pilot interviews were undertaken, which confirmed the selection of the research 
methodology and method and provided confidence for the interviews with the 
Troubled Families Co-ordinators and LA1 senior manager. 
 
4.9 THE STAKEHOLDER INTERVIEWS 
 
The five stakeholder interviews went extremely well and generated over four hours of 
qualitative data. The participants’ knowledge of the local and national ‘Troubled 
Families’ programme and my own insider knowledge meant that the interviews - 
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although semi-structured and three by telephone and three with professionals that I 
had never met - had the flow of a conversation. The quintet had a clear interest in 
the subject, had studied the interview schedule, had mentally prepared their answers 
and provided rich, thoughtful data with complete, well-thought out, well-structured 
answers.  
 
Despite having a prompt for many of the questions, I rarely had to use these. My 
interlocutors were experts in the field so understood the purpose of the questions, 
frequently gave a real life example to illustrate a point but did not go off at a tangent. 
The inclusion of additional information at the end allowed key local data to be 
included. It transpired that DCLG frequently asked the LA3 and LA4 Co-ordinators to 
discuss their programme with other local authorities so they were well-versed in 
sharing their superior knowledge to benefit other agents or stakeholders (Miller and 
Sardais 2011). The depth of the qualitative information provided and the points of 
comparison and contrast between the North-East local authorities, the South-East 
local authority and the North-West consortium justified their inclusion in the research 
project. The fact that the three 2016 interviews were conducted by telephone did not 
affect the quality of our interaction nor did it render these sessions less informative 
than the face-to-face sessions conducted in 2015. 
 
All five participants were complimentary in the feedback and described the interview 
process as straightforward and clear in its requests and purpose. They welcomed 
the advance copy of the interview schedule. LA3 was particularly grateful that I 
granted the request to reduce the interview schedule. However, LA3 and LA4 did 
note that video-conferencing or a face-to-face interview would have enhanced the 
experience. LA2 suggested that exploring how to place strategically the programme 
within the local authority and with key partner agencies would have improved the 
session. I attempted this in the LA4 interview. The LA3 Co-ordinator stated that they 
were looking forward to seeing the completed research paper and using it as a 
reference point with their forthcoming Phase Two independent local evaluation. They 
also highlighted that the questioning around the involvement of families in the 
programme had encouraged a discussion at a recent team away day as to how 
families could become more involved, particularly families who had achieved a 
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successful outcome previously. The data provided by the quintet of interlocutors is 
analysed and presented in Chapter Five. 
 
I carried out seven interviews in total; two pilot sessions; one each with the LA1, 
LA2, LA3 and LA4 Troubled Families Co-ordinators and an interview with a senior 
manager from LA1. The quality and quantity of the data gathered and the positive 
interview feedback justified the selection of the ethical case study methodology and 
semi-structured, face-to-face and telephone interview method. 
 
4.10 LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH PROJECT 
 
Throughout the research project, I demonstrated my detailed understanding of 
applicable techniques for research and advanced academic enquiry and my aptitude 
for undertaking applied research and development at an advanced level to contribute 
substantially to the development of new approaches to PbR provision. I designed 
and implemented a robust project, which combined a ‘practitioner’ foundation with a 
systematic ‘academic’ approach to explore how a practical framework, rooted in 
business and management literature, might be developed for an effective 
implementation of PbR programmes in the public sector. I generated new knowledge 
about target achievement in Payment by Results and provided the first guidance for 
principals, agents and other stakeholders involved with PbR provision. I adjusted the 
project to manage unforeseen problems but acknowledge that it had some 
limitations. 
 
The first limitation was the very general secondary quantitative data that I analysed 
first. The national Phase One quantitative data (DCLG 2015c) merely provided an 
overview of the achievement in the four key performance indicators. However, I 
made maximum use of this by comparing the data across the country and in LA1, 
LA2, LA3 and LA4 to examine the situation in the North-East against that in England, 
the South-East and the North-West. I then compared the two ‘behaviour’ indicators 
with the two ‘employment’ indicators to understand the relationship between these 




The greatest limitation was with the LA1 (2015b) Phase One quantitative data, which 
I analysed ethically and therefore minus personal data appertaining to families. This 
prevented me from learning about ‘deadweight’, ‘attribution’ and ‘verification’ in a 
local context (Webster 2016). I would counter this limitation by highlighting the 
importance of ethical research and noting that this limited quantitative data at least 
showed the difference in ‘trouble’ and ‘distance to travel’ between LA1 families and 
English ‘troubled’ families overall. I then pursued this in the semi-structured 
interviews. 
 
The second limitation was the stakeholders included within the research project. 
Payment by Results best practice (Sheil and Breidenbach-Roe 2014 and Crowe et al 
2014) dictated that service users should contribute during the data-gathering phase. 
However, the University of Sunderland Research Ethics Committee prevented me 
from analysing ‘troubled’ families’ personal quantitative data or from interviewing 
them. Thus, the LA1 local Phase One quantitative data (LA1b 2015) provided by 
Local Authority One lacked basic key information such as families’ names, dates of 
birth, ages and addresses. It also did not contain specific details of their ‘troubles’ 
such as their criminal convictions and anti-social behaviour. This meant that I was 
unable to: 
 
 Filter out individual families to understand their ‘troubles’ on entering the 
programme, if they had accepted or been offered key worker support and the 
impact of this upon their lives 
 Filter out groups of families with specific issues – such as Y11 pupils with 
poor school attendance or ‘dangerous’ families - to understand if they had 
accepted or been offered key worker support and the impact of this upon their 
lives. 
 
The prohibition on collecting primary qualitative data from the families placed the 
research project out of kilter with Hoggett et al (2014) and Hayden (2015) who both 
interviewed ‘troubled’ families. A city in the South West of England commissioned 
the former to conduct an evaluation of their local programme and facilitated six family 
interviews. LA3 County Council funded a two-year research programme to support 
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the design and delivery of a robust evaluation framework for the local programme. 
They commissioned a University of Portsmouth research team led by Professor 
Hayden to achieve this and permitted them to interview eleven ‘troubled’ families.  
 
By omitting the voice of the stakeholders whom the principal designed ‘Troubled 
Families’ to support, my research project was potentially open to criticism. However, 
I overcame this omission by interviewing one senior manager with a clear oversight 
of my local programme and four Troubled Families Co-ordinators. The latter were 
integral to the agent’s delivery of the programme. They held an economic stake and 
economic power within the programme; were an influencer with political power and 
by their own admission were in touch with many of the programme’s stakeholders: 
 
“I am the kind of lead person of the Department for Committees and Local 
Government. I am the named person there (…) I am a lead for the programme so it 
means I kind of manage the kind of overseeing of the governance of it, manage the 
overseeing of the kind of operationalizing of the programme and I am accountable 
for you know all the kind of gubbins, but I also manage services as well so it is kind 
of a dual role (…) I am very immersed in delivery (…) I suppose at the table on 
strategic conversations. (…) I have had a degree of influence (…) I am also very in 
touch with what is happening in families as well.” (LA2 2015) (pxcvii and xcviii) 
 
The qualitative data contributed by these five individuals was new information, which 
greatly increased the understanding of the National Troubled Families Initiative and 
created a practical framework for target achievement in PbR. I am therefore 
confident that I overcame the limitation placed upon me by the University of 
Sunderland Ethics Committee. 
 
The third limitation was the number of participants from whom I collected qualitative 
data. I was a lone researcher working full-time whilst undertaking the research 
project. Unlike Hoggett with his team of five and the Portsmouth Team, I had to work 
around my day job and the commitments of my interlocutors and could not task 
colleagues to carry out the interviews that I was unable to attend. This placed some 
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restraints on the research project, most noticeably that I never actually met two out 
of the five research participants.  
 
I overcame this disadvantage by speaking to them ahead of the actual interview 
session and sharing the interview schedule, participant information sheet and 
participant consent form. This enabled me to adjust the interview schedule to 
accommodate the LA3 Co-ordinator’s busy diary and the LA4 Co-ordinator’s 
strategic role. It also gave both the opportunity to withdraw their co-operation and 
material during any part of the interview process if they felt that harm was being 
caused to them or their organisation, their privacy was being invaded or I had 
deceived them (Bryman 2012).  
 
I would therefore counter any challenges to the legitimacy of the LA3 and LA4 
interviews by showing that – although not conducted face-to-face – they were 
ethical. I would also state that, unlike Hoggett et al (2014) and Hayden (2015) who 
only evaluated one local ‘Troubled Families’ programme, I gathered qualitative data 
from four high-performing local authorities in North-East, South-East and North-West 
England in 2015 and 2016. This gave me an overview of the programme from the 
position of: 
 
 Two North-Eastern local authorities 
 The North-East, South-East and North-West 
 Two cities, a county and a consortium  
 England and three of its regions. 
 
I also saw the programme: 
 
 Chronologically - from Summer 2015 to Summer 2016 in the local authority 
area of which I had the most insider knowledge  
 Hierarchically - through the eyes of an LA1 strategic manager and LA1’s 
‘operational’ Troubled Families Co-ordinator 
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 Geographically – through the eyes of a strategic manager in the North-East 
and ‘strategic’ Troubled Families Co-ordinators from the South-East and 
North-West 
 Socio-economically – across three English regions.  
 
This provided greater insight into the National Troubled Families Initiative and 
challenged current public sector practice where austerity cuts have reduced the 
workforce’s opportunities to attend good practice events and share experiences with 
colleagues from elsewhere in the country. Thus, I was able to better explore key 
issues and create a practical framework for target achievement in PbR provision 
rather than solely make recommendations on the national and local delivery of the 
programme.  
 
The fourth limitation of the research project was that three of the interviews were 
conducted by telephone. This was due to the distance between my North-East base 
and Local Authorities Three and Four, my illness on the day of the LA1 senior 
manager interview, my full-time job, my interlocutors’ diary commitments and my lack 
of a research team. It can be argued that my third, fourth and fifth interviews suffered 
because I was unable to build a rapport with the interviewees and missed important 
cues provided by body language. I would challenge this. 
 
My prior telephone conversation with the LA3 and LA4 Troubled Families Co-
ordinators and their preview of the interview schedule, participant information sheet 
and participant consent form established the key themes that I wished to pursue 
during the session and my desire to conduct the interview ethically. The LA3 and 
LA4 Co-ordinators were then able to plan their responses and send me documentary 
evidence about their local programme (Local Authority Three 2015b and Hayden 
2015). The semi-structured interview method used on the day supported our 




 An unstructured interview method where I would have struggled to develop a 
telephone conversation with a stranger informally around a general area of 
interest and concern (Robson 2002) 
 A fully structured interview with predetermined questions, fixed working and a 
pre-set order (Robson 2002), which would have prevented my two 
experienced interlocutors from speaking at length about the local programme, 
taking our discussion in a new direction and allowing me to respond by asking 
my questions in a different order to maintain the natural flow of the discussion. 
 
I believe that the new data generated by these two interviews, the subsequent 
practical framework for target achievement in PbR provision and recommendations 
for the National Troubled Families Initiative in LA1 and England vindicates the use of 
the semi-structured interview format. 
 
Interviewing the LA1 senior manager by telephone rather than in person was a last 
minute decision taken in light of my unexpected illness and desire not to lose my slot 
in her busy diary. Our pre-existing relationship and the fact that I only required a 
response to three questions meant that I was less concerned than the other two 
telephone interviews about the lack of opportunity to build up a rapport or respond to 
body language cues. The rich data that I gathered again justified my decision to 
speak to her by telephone rather than rearrange our meeting. It also indicated my 




Chapter Four captured the conceptualisation, design and implementation of a 
research project to generate new knowledge about target achievement in Payment 
by Results, which responded to the absence of any guidance for principals, agents 
and other stakeholders. I adjusted the project as it developed and unforeseen 
problems arose such as the prohibition on interviewing ‘troubled’ families and the 
illness, which prevented me from conducting the final qualitative interview face-to-
face (K3). The research project demonstrated my detailed understanding of 
applicable techniques for research and advanced academic enquiry (K4) and my 
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aptitude for undertaking applied research and development at an advanced level to 
contribute substantially to the development of new approaches to PbR provision 
(S2). It also showed the qualities and transferable skills necessary for employment 
that requires the exercise of personal responsibility and largely autonomous initiative 
in complex and unpredictable situations in professional environments (S3) and my 
ability to identify and effectively utilise the components of the self-system that foster 
authentic leadership, appropriate to a given leadership environment (S4). 
 
Chapter Four traced the origins of the research project and outlined the pragmatic 
research philosophy, pragmatic epistemology, Stakeholder Theory and Agency 
Theory theoretical perspective, case study methodology, mixed method mainly 
influenced by qualitative data analysis and deductive/inductive approach. It 
discussed the ethical approval given by the Universal of Sunderland Research Ethics 
Committee and the impact that this had upon the stakeholders who were chosen to 
be part of the research project. I presented the ethical guidelines that governed the 
research. I outlined the steps taken to avoid harm, obtain informed consent, protect 
the privacy and avoid deceiving the Phase One ‘troubled’ families whose quantitative 
data was analysed and the four Troubled Families Co-ordinators and one senior 
manager who I interviewed. I shared details of the interview schedule, pilot 
interviews and stakeholder interviews including the adjustments made to conduct the 
interviews ethically and the participants’ feedback that fed into the subsequent 
interviews. I also highlighted the limitations of the research project but ably 
countered these. 
 
Chapter Five comprises the data analysis, which led to the creation and 
interpretation of new knowledge (K1). It illustrates my ability to make informed 
judgements on complex issues relating to the ‘Troubled Families’ case study and 
Payment by Results in the absence of complete data (S1); aptitude for undertaking 
applied research and development at advanced level to contribute substantially to 
the development of a new approach to target achievement in PbR (S2)  and exercise 
of personal responsibility and largely autonomous initiative in complex and 









Chapter Five comprises the creation and interpretation of new knowledge (K1). This 
information came from my analysis of the Phase One national and local quantitative 
data provided by the principal and the agent of the National Troubled Families 
Initiative and the qualitative data gathered during the five semi-structured interviews 
with employees from four local areas in which ‘Troubled Families’ was delivered. 
Chapter Five illustrates my ability to make informed judgements in the absence of 
complete data on complex issues relating to Payment by Results and the National 
Troubled Families Initiative case study (S1). It also demonstrates my aptitude for 
undertaking applied research and development at advanced level to contribute 
substantially to the development of a new approach to target achievement in PbR 
(S2). I also exercised personal responsibility and largely autonomous initiative in 
complex and unpredictable situations in professional environments (S3). 
 
The research project deliberately analysed both quantitative and qualitative data. 
The role of the quantitative data analysis in the research project was to provide a 
general picture of the outcomes achieved locally and nationally within Phase One of 
the National Troubled Families Initiative to draw out points of comparison and 
contrast and identify key areas of interest. The role of the qualitative data analysis 
was to explore further these issues and to explain them. There was no conflict in the 
analysis of quantitative and qualitative data. Indeed, the research project benefitted 
by using both types of data and a rich picture of the National Troubled Families 








5.2 QUANTITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS 
 
The research project analysed two types of Phase One quantitative data. Firstly, the 
information published by the principal. This showed what each of the participating 
English local authorities individually and collectively achieved up until the end of May 
2015 in the four key performance indicators: 
 
 Achieving crime, ASB, education outcomes 
 Achieving continuous employment result 
 ‘Turned around’ 
 Achieving progress to work (DCLG 2015c). 
 
Secondly, the Phase One LA1 local quantitative data was analysed. This comprised 
a spreadsheet of selected data about the 2,856 local ‘troubled’ families (LA1 2015b) 
who were in scope of the programme including their postcode, date of entry to the 
provision, the entry criteria that they met and whether a claim was made for them. At 
the request of the University of Sunderland Ethics Committee, the spread sheet 
provided omitted very personal details such as the families’ names, dates of birth, 
ages, addresses, levels of risk and level of engagement with ‘Troubled Families’. 
 
The quantitative data analysis phase was deliberately designed to review information 
from the principal and the agent - two key ‘Troubled Families’ stakeholder groups – 
and to be ethical. Thus, it only analysed quantitative data that: 
 
 Did not contain any personal family details 
 Did not cause harm to participants by placing them in a stressful situation or 
exploiting their vulnerability 
 I gathered in an unobtrusive manner (Bryman 2012 and SRA 2003).  
 
Quantitative data analysis involves reducing the amount of data collected to test for 
relationships between variables and to develop ways of presenting the results of the 
analysis to others (Bryman 2012). The research project reduced the national dataset 
(DCLG 2015c) by filtering the results for each of the four performance indicators for 
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England, LA1, LA2, LA3 and LA4. The local dataset (LA1 2015b) was reduced by 
filtering the families for whom LA1 had made a funding claim. However, the research 
project did not distinguish types of variables from the data or carry out univariate, 
bivariate or multivariate analysis to learn more about a single variable, the 
relationship between variables or the relationship between three variables (Bryman 
2012:330). This was because I wished to avoid the criticisms levelled at quantitative 
research that it can: 
 
 Fail to distinguish between people and social institutions from the world of 
nature 
 Possess an artificial and spurious sense of precision and accuracy 
 Rely on instruments and procedures and so hinder the connection between 
research and everyday life 
 Create a static view of social life that is independent of people’s lives (Bryman 
2012). 
 
I was determined to root the research project in the ‘real world’ of the National 
Troubled Families Initiative; to question the taken-for granted assumptions about 
‘troubled’ families and offer new research (Easterby-Smith et al 2015) that could 
answer the research question, achieve the research objectives and provide 
recommendations for the programme and a practical framework for achieving targets 
in Payment by Results provision. Consequently, the two quantitative datasets were 
analysed qualitatively; a decision, which was consistent with the pragmatic research 
paradigm chosen for the research project (Figure 4.3). Therefore, I did not carry out 
any statistical tests on the principal’s and the agent’s quantitative information to 
explain their: 
 
 Measurement – including the reliability and validity of the data 
 Causality – why the phenomenon is the way that it is 
 Generalization – how the findings can be generalized beyond the confines of 
the context 




Instead, the national data (DCLG 2015c) and the local quantitative data (LA1 2015b) 
was analysed for key themes that could be further explored in the verbal testimony 
gathered from the four areas (LA1 2015a, LA2 2015, LA3 2016, LA4 2016 and LA1 
2016). 
 
The research project utilised thematic analysis for the Phase One quantitative data 
(DCLG 2015c and LA1 2015b). Although, generally only applied to qualitative data 
(Saunders et al 2016), this is a flexible, accessible, generic approach, which helps 
to: 
 
 Comprehend often large and disparate amounts of data 
 Integrate related data drawn from different transcripts and notes 
 Identify key themes or patterns from a data set for further exploration 
 Produce a thematic description of these data; and/or 
 Develop and test explanations and theories based on apparent thematic 
patterns or relationships 
 Draw and verify conclusions (Saunders et al 2016). 
 
It is suitable for use within any qualitative philosophical position provided the 
assumptions are made clear and the researcher is reflexive throughout the study 
(Saunders et al 2016).  
 






 Become familiar with your data 
 Code your data 
 Search for themes and recognise relationships 
 Refine themes and test propositions (Saunders et al 2016).  
 
I achieved familiarity with the two quantitative datasets by reviewing them minutely 
but did not code either as they were already in a manageable size and format. DCLG 
presented the dataset under the four Phase One performance outcomes. The local 
dataset provided information on each local ‘troubled’ family. This included the entry 
criteria that they met and whether Local Authority One had submitted a ‘partial’ or 
‘full’ funding claim. 
 
I searched the national dataset (DCLG 2015c) for themes appertaining to: 
 
 Individual local authority performance 
 North-East regional performance 
 National performance 
 Family ‘behaviour’ 
 Adult ‘employability’.  
 
I then recognised relationships within the data, refined these themes and tested two 
propositions generated from this data and the literature (See Appendix Two): 
 
1. It was easier to improve Phase One ‘troubled’ families’ negative behaviours 
than it was to move them into training and employment 
2. It was easier to achieve this in an area such as LA3 where the economy was 
booming and the austerity measures were less hard-hitting than in more 




I searched the local dataset (LA1 2015b) for the themes of “deadweight”, “attribution” 
and “verification” (Webster 2016:27) and recognised relationships within the data. I 
refined these themes and then tested four propositions drawn from this data and the 
literature. The literature suggested that the principal did not develop insight into the 
‘Troubled Families’ operating context before designing their PbR scheme (NAO 
2015) and produced a Payment by Results framework (DCLG 2012b) whose 
outcomes did not comprise all of the six key elements (Webster 2016). 
Consequently: 
 
1. In Phase One of the National Troubled Families Initiative, DCLG allowed the 
agent to claim for families who had made progress outside of the programme. 
Into this category came those who were too risky to be offered a key worker or 
families who refused to engage with their key worker 
2. In Phase One of the National Troubled Families Initiative, DCLG allowed the 
agent to claim for families who had made no progress but no longer met the 
entry criteria (DCLG 2012b). Into this category came families who had never 
committed ASB or youth crime but were eligible through their poor school 
attendance. This had not improved but the agent issued a funding claim under 
Performance Indicator One, when all of their youngsters reached the school 
leaving age 
3. The concept of the ‘troubled’ family is variable 
4. It is harder to ‘turn around’ a family living in a deprived area with few job 
opportunities and a higher proportion of austerity cuts such as LA1 (See 
Appendix Two) than a family living in an area where these factors are less 
prevalent.  
 
5.3 QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS 
 
Qualitative data is generally characterized by its volume and absence of researcher-
imposed structure (Costley et al 2013). This was not the case with the qualitative 
information gathered from the four Troubled Families Co-ordinators, which I 
deliberately collected using an interview schedule arranged into six themes because 
I wanted to know more about the themes found in the literature and the quantitative 
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data and the six propositions that I had already tested. The final interview merely 
comprised three questions so also had a researcher-imposed structure (Costley et al 
2013). 
 
I reviewed the five transcripts using thematic narrative analysis and thematic 
analysis. The purpose of the former was to enable me to identify analytical themes 
within the five narratives with an emphasis on ‘what’ the narratives were about rather 
than ‘how’ they were constructed (Saunders et al 2016). For this first phase, I 
analysed each interview in turn. I paid attention to the chronological sequence and 
contextual background of the themes that I identified, something that enabled me to 
develop a rich, full explanation of each.  
 
My reasons for conducting thematic narrative analysis related to the choice of the 
deductive and inductive approach that I took within the research project. The review 
of the literature and the quantitative data analysis meant that I had a number of 
theories, which I wished to explore further through the interviews:  
 
 As ‘troubled’ families are a historic concept (Welshman 2012) and DCLG did 
not develop insight into the operating context (NAO 2015), the National 
Troubled Families Initiative cannot make sustained change with families with 
problems  
 There is no single view of a ‘troubled’ family (LA1 2015b)  
 Families’ needs did not change between Phase One and Phase Two (DCLG 
2014b) but the DCLG definition ‘caught up’ (DCLG 2014a) 
 It is easier to identify families who are eligible for the programme in Phase 
Two than it was in Phase One (DCLG 2014a)  
 The agent is only working in Phase Two with costly families with multiple 
problems who are most likely to benefit from a whole-family approach (DCLG 
2014a) 
 The key worker role is integral to families achieving positive outcomes (DCLG 
2012c) 
 DCLG’s lack of insight into the operating context (NAO 2015) has meant that 
families’ voices did not contribute to the development of the programme 
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 In Phase One, the Government allowed claims to be made for families who 
achieved positive results without agency support and for families who made 
no change (LA1 2015b) 
 Areas most affected by the austerity measures and with limited job prospects 
(Appendix Two) are disadvantaged by factors such as the Government giving 
specific local targets to be achieved in Phase One, designing a funding 
structure that offers the same reward for success regardless of the resources 
of each local authority and reducing the Phase Two outcome payment from 
up to £4,000 to £1,800 (DCLG 2015c) 
 DCLG’s lack of insight into the operating context (NAO 2015) and their taking 
of the Phase One target for challenging families from data about challenged 
families (Levitas 2012) affected the local ability to identify local troubled 
families 
 Phase One was challenging because the principal funded positive movement 
around youth crime, ASB, truancy and unemployment but the agent had to 
deal with other issues too (DCLG 2014b). 
 
This deductive approach meant that I analysed the interview transcriptions for 
evidence for or against these theories. However, because I was aware that one 
quantitative dataset - which I had used to test my theories about the nature of the 
Phase One families claimed for and the ease with which positive outcomes could be 
achieved with them - was drawn solely from one deprived city in the North-East of 
England, I also approached the research project inductively. I keenly gathered data 
that would enable me to derive new theories about the National Troubled Families 
Initiative and analysed the data a second time for illustrations of differences in the 
actions taken and outcomes recorded and the reasons behind this (Saunders et al 
2016). 
 
As guided by Saunders et al (2016), the thematic analysis of the qualitative data 
began with a period of repeated listening to the interviews, on their own initially and 
then whilst reading the transcripts, to achieve familiarity with them. Although the 
qualitative data was in a manageable size and format - just over four hours in length 
– and comprised six key themes courtesy of the semi-structured interview schedule, 
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which I had purposely issued in advance so that the participants could neatly 
arrange their thoughts – I still coded the data. 
 
The coding involved labelling each unit of data in the transcript with a code that 
symbolised or summarised the meaning of the extract (Saunders et al 2016). This 
was to make each piece of interesting data accessible for further analysis. I began 
by coding the data that related to my deductive approach and then coded the data 
relating to the inductive approach. The first step simplified the second step. I did not 
have to code every unit because much of the transcription was already coded. From 
this came three types of codes: 
 
 ‘In vivo’ and relating to terms used by the participants e.g. ST (Service 
Transformation) 
 Labels to best describe the unit of data e.g. SD (Service Delivery) 
 ‘A priori’ codes relating to the ‘Troubled Families literature and the previously 
analysed quantitative data e.g. P1 (Proposition One – The National Troubled 
Families Initiative cannot make sustained change with families with problems) 
(Saunders et al 2016). 
 
My codes showed the non-occurrence as well as the occurrence of specific 
phenomenon. They also demonstrated the depth of the participant’s feelings about 
specific issues through the attribution of: 
 
 S – The interviewee had a strong feeling about a phenomenon and spoke of it 
at length and/or with passion 




 W – The interviewee had a weak feeling about a phenomenon and either 
spoke of it briefly and/or without passion or claimed to have no knowledge of it 
at all. 
 
Once I had reduced and rearranged the qualitative data, I then searched for themes 
and recognised relationships within it. Each theme related to a broad category 
incorporating several codes that appeared to relate to one another and indicated the 
importance of an idea to my research (Saunders et al 2016). I looked for key 
concepts in these codes, recurrences, single items that the participants presented as 
being important, patterns, trends, relationships between codes and within themes 
and the hierarchy of themes. After refining these themes, I was then able to test my 
propositions. 
 
5.4 THE ANALYSIS OF THE PHASE ONE DCLG NATIONAL QUANTITATIVE 
DATA 
 
The research project qualitatively analysed the national data (DCLG 2015c) in late 
June 2015 to understand achievement under the four key performance indicators: 
 
 Across the country 
 In LA1, LA2, LA3 and LA4.  
 
This facilitated a comparison of the situation in the North-East with that in England, 
the South-East and the North-West. 
 
The research project then analysed this data to understand the ease or difficulty with 





 Improved their behaviour by achieving the crime, ASB and education 
outcomes and being ‘turned around’ 
 Become more economically active by achieving the continuous employment 
result or achieving the progress to work outcome (DCLG 2015c). 
 
I returned to these themes in the qualitative interviews. 
 
The qualitative data analysis revealed that the agent failed to meet the target 
specified by the principal in Phase One of the National Troubled Families Initiative. 
Although collectively the four areas who contributed to the research project ‘turned 
around’ their 11,495 ‘troubled’ families, the agent missed the national target by 3,346 
families (DCLG 2015c). 
 
A detailed thematic analysis of the national and local data under the four key 
performance indicators (See Appendix Thirty-Three) showed quantitatively the 
difficulty of moving families into paid employment compared to changing their 
negative behaviours. In percentage terms this was: 
 
Table 5.4 - The Four Key Performance Indicators as at the End of May 2015 in LA1, 
LA2, LA3, LA4 and England 
 








‘Turned Around’  Achieving 
Progress To 
Work Outcome  
England 87% 10% 97% 8% 
LA1 96% 4% 100% 0.5% 
LA2  92% 8% 100% 0.9% 
LA3 89% 11% 100% 0.4% 
LA4 94% 8% 100% 11% 
 




 In England, it was nearly nine times harder for one adult in a ‘troubled’ family 
to achieve continuous employment and approximately eleven times harder for 
them to achieve progress to work than it was to improve their negative 
behaviours 
 In LA1, it was twenty-four times harder for one adult in a ‘troubled’ family to 
achieve continuous employment and nearly two hundred times harder for 
them to achieve progress to work than it was to improve their negative 
behaviours 
 In LA2, it was more than eleven times harder for one adult in a ‘troubled’ 
family to achieve continuous employment and more than one hundred times 
harder for them to achieve progress to work than it was to improve their 
negative behaviours 
 In LA3, it was eight times harder for one adult in a ‘troubled’ family to achieve 
continuous employment and more than two hundred times harder for them to 
achieve progress to work than it was to improve their negative behaviours 
 In LA4, it was almost twelve times harder for one adult in a ‘troubled’ family to 
achieve continuous employment and nearly nine times harder for them to 
achieve progress to work than it was to improve their negative behaviours.  
 
However, as previously noted, a true understanding of these figures was not fully 
achievable given that: 
 
 18% of Phase One families did not have a problem related to education  
 46% of Phase One families were not involved in crime or anti-social behaviour 
 26% of Phase One families had at least one adult in work (DCLG 2014b). 
 
The Phase One DCLG national quantitative data could not be analysed further to 
understand whether the inability to ‘turn around’ 120,000 ‘troubled’ families; progress 
a significant percentage of ‘troubled’ families into training and employment and 
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tackle their worklessness and benefit dependency as effectively as their negative 
behaviours was related to: 
 
 Stakeholders – such as DCLG, the English local authorities and their 
workforce, the wider public sector, voluntary sector partners or the ‘troubled’ 
families 
 The principal and agent 
 The Payment by Results contract 
 Specific geographic, social or economic issues. 
 
The quantitative data also could not illuminate my theories around: 
 
 ‘Troubled’ families as a historic concept (Welshman 2012) with no single view 
(LA1 2015b), a varying national definition (DCLG 2012a and DCLG 2014a) 
and a range of issues outside those rewarded with funding in Phase One 
(DCLG 2014b) 
 The principal’s lack of insight into the operating context (NAO 2015), their 
taking of the Phase One target for challenging families from data about 
challenged families (Levitas 2012) and the families’ lack of a voice in the 
programme design (Sheil and Breidenbach-Roe 2014) 
 The nature of claims made in Phase One (LA1 2015b) and the impact of a 
range of social and economic factors upon performance (DCLG 2015c) 
 The agent’s approach to delivering Phase One (DCLG 2012b) and the ease of 
identifying eligible Phase Two families (DCLG 2014a)  
 The importance of the key worker role (DCLG 2012c). 
 
I therefore thematically analysed the LA1 local data (LA1 2015b) to see if this could 
shed light on these theories. 
 




I received the LA1 Phase One local quantitative data by email and on a spreadsheet 
in early July 2015; one week before I began my qualitative interviews. To complete 
the first step in the thematic analysis, I reduced the data to a manageable size and 
applied a filter to the spreadsheet to separate out the families for whom LA1 had 
made a funding claim. To understand more about the themes of ‘deadweight’, 
‘attribution’ and ‘verification’ (Webster 2016), I then searched for information about 





This was with a view to understanding how many LA1 Phase One families for whom 
the agent made a funding claim were too risky to receive a key worker or refused to 
engage with their key worker. It was also to test the theory that the principal paid the 
agent for family progress achieved without the help of the 'Troubled Families' 
programme.  
 
The LA1 spreadsheet did not provide detail appertaining to risk or non-engagement. 
Although my insider knowledge told me that the agent claimed for both types of 
families locally, I was unable to provide evidence to support or discredit this theory.  
 
I then reviewed the LA1 quantitative data to test the theory that the principal allowed 
the agent to claim for families who had made no progress but no longer met the entry 
criteria (DCLG 2012b). My insider knowledge told me that this had occurred in LA1. 
Families entered the programme workless and with poor school attendance but not 
committing ASB or youth crime. The agent made a claim under Performance 
Indicator One when all of their youngsters reached the school leaving age even 
though their attendance had remained below 84% until they had officially left school. 
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However, the lack of personal family details including dates of birth meant that I was 
unable to confirm or deny the theory that LA1 had claimed for families who had not 
made a positive change but ceased to meet the school attendance criterion. 
 
Next, I analysed the LA1 local quantitative data to test the theory that the concept of 
the ‘troubled’ family is variable. I looked at whether it is harder to ‘turn around’ a 
family living in a deprived area with few job opportunities and a higher proportion of 
austerity cuts such as LA1 (See Appendix Two) than a family living in an area where 
these factors are less prevalent. I achieved this by reviewing the Phase One LA1 
dataset to understand the eligibility criteria that families had met when they entered 
the programme.  
 
Local Authority One divided their ‘successful’ families into two groups; families for 
whom a ‘partial’ and a ‘full’ payment was submitted. The spreadsheet did not explain 
these two terms. However, I applied my insider knowledge and speculated that they 
were: 
 
1. Partial Claim 
Families for whom the agent claimed £3,900 because their ASB had reduced 
by 60% across the whole family, their youth crime had reduced by 33% and 
their school attendance was 85% or more (DCLG 2012b) 
 
2. Full Claim 
Families for whom £4,000 was claimed because they had achieved the above 
and had one member of the family in employment or enrolled on the national 
Work Programme (DCLG 2012b) and families who had not achieved the 
above but had one adult in the family in paid employment and off out-of-work 
benefits (Higgs 2012).  
 
An analysis of this dataset revealed that the agent made a ‘partial’ claim for 804 LA1 
families and a ‘full’ claim for 110 families. This did not explain why the DCLG national 
data (DCLG 2015c) showed that all 805 of LA1’s families had been ‘turned around’ 
but as I was not quantitatively analysing the dataset and commenting on its 
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reliability, validity or generalizability (Bryman 2012), I did not concern myself with 
this.  
 
Of the 110 ‘full’ claim families: 
 
 77% were involved in crime or anti-social behaviour 
 87% had a problem related to education 
 90% had no adult in work (LA1 2015b). 
 
Thus, for the three entry criteria, a higher percentage of LA1 ‘full’ claim families met 
each than the national average (DCLG 2012b).  
 
Of the 804 ‘partial’ claim families: 
 
 73% were involved in crime or anti-social behaviour 
 82% had a problem related to education 
 83% had no adult in work (LA1 2015b). 
 
Thus, for two of the entry criteria, a higher percentage of LA1 ‘partial’ claim families 
met them than the national average (DCLG 2012b). In one criterion – education – 
the figures were the same. Appendices Thirty-Four, Thirty-Five and Thirty-Six 
represent this figuratively. 
 
The thematic analysis of the LA1 quantitative data therefore suggested that the 
Phase One LA1 families were more ‘troubled’ than the English average because - for 
each of the three eligibility criteria of youth crime and ASB, school issues and 
worklessness - a higher percentage of LA1 families met each criterion than the 
average English ‘troubled’ family entering the programme. Although each of these 
eligibility criteria is relative - and more LA1 families could commit youth crime than 
the national average but their crimes be of a less serious nature - it is possible to 
infer from this data that some geographical areas have a greater percentage of 
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‘trouble’ than others. A second inference is that these more ‘troubled’ areas had 
further to travel with their families to ‘turn around’ their ‘troubles.  
 
5.6 THE THEMATIC NARRATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE QUALITATIVE INTERVIEW 
DATA 
 
I analysed individually the five qualitative interviews conducted between July 2015 
and June 2016 using thematic narrative analysis. 
 
5.6.1 THE LA1 TROUBLED FAMILIES CO-ORDINATOR INTERVIEW 
 
The LA1 Troubled Families Co-ordinator interview took place on 23rd July 2015 and 
lasted thirty-nine minutes and forty-five seconds. It provided new information about 
the National Troubled Families Initiative. However, because of the length of the 
interview, the transcription is in Appendix Thirty-Seven and not reproduced in its 
entirety here.  
 
I originally scheduled this session as the first interview so that I could draw on my 
insider knowledge, gain confidence from speaking to a work colleague and test the 
research methodology in familiar surroundings. Unfortunately, my interlocutor’s busy 
schedule meant that I had to postpone unexpectedly the session for two weeks. It 
therefore took place after the interview in LA2. I also had to conduct the LA1 
interview in a busy cafeteria close to my interlocutor’s room rather than the peaceful 
haven of my office as this fitted in best with her diary.  
 
Although I enjoyed the interview and gathered interesting data that further developed 
my knowledge of the National Troubled Families Initiative in the local authority where 
I had spent most of my working life, the session was significantly shorter than that 
carried out in LA2. The result, I believe, both of the noisy location, my interlocutor’s 
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limited availability and the fact that she had only been in post for one year and 
therefore just had anecdotal knowledge of the first two years of Phase One. This 
contrasted with her LA2 counterpart who had been in post since the initiative began 
and had been involved with the local delivery of family services before the National 
Troubled Families Initiative. I am confident that my presentation of the interview 
schedule well in advance of our meeting at least enabled my relatively inexperienced 
colleague to prepare well for the session, speak at length about the local delivery 
that she had an awareness of and reduced the time spent together so that she was 
not inconvenienced.  
 
The semi-structured interview method was a good support to our discussion. An 
unstructured interview where I had a general area of interest and concern but let the 
conversation develop informally in this area (Robson 2002) would have failed 
miserably. My interlocutor may have struggled to provide information without the 
crutch of an interview schedule and could have been embarrassed by her single year 
of experience of ‘Troubled Families’. If the session had stalled, I would have recalled 
her busy schedule and felt embarrassed at taking up her precious time. In contrast, a 
fully structured interview with predetermined questions, fixed working and a pre-set 
order (Robson 2002) would have removed any illusion of a conversation with a 
colleague, which I hoped would elicit the richest data. 
 
I designed the LA1 interview schedule to increase my knowledge about the local 
delivery of the National Troubled Families Initiative in Phase One. I was keen to 
understand more about good practice in LA1. For example, how they had identified 
all of their ‘troubled’ families by December 2012 (DCLG 2013) and achieved the 
target set by the principal of ‘turning around’ all 805 of their ‘troubled’ families. I also 
wished to reflect on the LA1 quantitative data and ascertain from the person who 
was now tasked with gathering and returning LA1’s quantitative information to DCLG 
if funding claims were made for families who ‘turned around’ themselves or did not 
make a change but had ceased to meet the entry criteria. I also wanted to learn 
more about the local perception of ‘troubled’ families and if national factors such as 
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the outcome fee or performance framework and local factors such as employment 
opportunities affected achievement in the programme. 
 
I conducted the LA1 interview ethically. I shared the Participant Information Sheet 
and Participant Consent Form (Appendices Twenty-Four and Twenty-Five) on my 
first approach to the LA1 Co-ordinator and again before our interview so that she 
was aware of the parameters of the session and her rights relating to it. I did not 
want to cause harm to my participant during the qualitative data gathering session by 
placing her in a stressful situation (Bryman 2012) or encouraging her to make 
revelations that may have subsequent unintended consequences (Norton 2008). For 
example, that would lead to the principal reclaiming funding for outcomes that LA1 
had not achieved within the confines of the PbR programme. I therefore carefully 
proofread the interview schedule and elected to interview the LA1 Troubled Families 
Co-ordinator on her own and not with either the LA1 Senior Manager or the LA2 
Troubled Families Co-ordinator. This decision meant that any rich discussions 
around the operational and strategic local delivery of ‘Troubled Families’ in LA1, the 
various delivery models adopted across the North-East and the difficulty of delivering 
nationally-prescribed PbR provision locally were lost. However, I had the satisfaction 
of knowing that the session was ethical whilst allowing the pursuance of key themes 
from the literature review and the quantitative data analysis. 
 
Appendix Two suggested that LA1 was more affected by the austerity measures and 
had fewer employment opportunities than LA3. It also suggested that LA1, LA2 and 
LA4 experienced deprivation (Social Mobility and Child Poverty Commission 2014), 
which may influence the movement of ‘troubled’ families into training and 
employment. I would have liked to test these theories fully in a focus group with the 
Troubled Families Co-ordinators from the North-East, South-East and North-West 
but again, ethical issues prevented me from doing this. However, what was lost by 
speaking to the LA1 Co-ordinator alone was gained by collecting data from her in the 
calendar year prior to the LA3 and LA4 interviews and so being able to make a 
chronological comparison of ‘Troubled Families’ in three areas between July 2015 
and May 2016. 
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The thematic narrative analysis of the Local Authority One interview revealed that 
her response to the interview schedule comprised data in seven key themes: 
 
1. Service transformation 
2. The concept of the ‘troubled’ family 
3. The programme outcomes 
4. The local delivery model 
5. The importance of the key worker role 
6. The principal’s lack of insight into the ‘Troubled Families’ operating context 
7. The delivery of a national programme at a local level (LA1 2015a). 
 
The theme of service transformation ran throughout the interview. The LA1 Co-
ordinator revealed that she had been brought in to reduce duplication by bringing 
services and processes together and ensuring that ‘Troubled Families’ became part 
of “mainstream everyday business” (LA1 2015a) (plxxiv). This had proved to be a 
challenge and one which would have been simplified by the presence of one 
‘Troubled Families’ team rather than a number of services with their own funding, 
statutory requirements and ways of working.  
 
A significant change noted for Phase Two had been the abandonment of the 
‘Troubled Families’ label and the Phase One ethos of “getting money and chasing 
results” (LA2 2015a) (plxxv). Since the beginning of 2015, the Co-ordinator had 
focused on embedding the ‘whole family’ approach and developing tools and 
processes such as the new Intelligence Hub and integrated locality-working to 
support this. LA1 designed the Intelligence Hub to overcome the barrier of the 
families’ personal data appearing across disparate systems. The Hub pooled data, 
matched it and identified how many issues families had so local services could target 
and support the families at an early stage. This preventative, proactive, cost-effective 
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response was seen as one answer to the “increasingly diminished resource” (LA1 
2015a) (plxxxii) in the integrated locality model, which delivered services to families 
in the area of the city where they lived. 
 
LA1 strove to encourage service transformation through their Phase Two outcome 
framework, which referenced all six of the programme’s key areas (DCLG 2014b). 
This framework combined the local practicality of the agent and the aspiration of the 
principal and had a mix of quantitative and qualitative measures. However, the LA1 
Co-ordinator believed the latter would pose difficulties, as qualitative measures 
required assessment around the quality of work delivered and some measurements 
to which LA1 still did not have access. A considerable barrier to the achievement of 
the LA1 Phase Two outcome framework was the unwillingness of Health partners to 
relax their tight data protection restrictions. Therefore, families meeting five out of the 
six Phase Two entry criteria (DCLG 2014a) were identified directly using relevant 
data but families meeting Criterion Six – parents and children with a range of health 
problems (DCLG 2014a) - were identified indirectly when other issues were flagged 
up. The LA1 Co-ordinator felt that despite “some local willingness”, “unless we get a 
change at the top in legislation we will never ever make many inroads into it” (LA1 
2015a) (plxxix). This comment mirrored some elements of the London Rough 
Sleepers Project where data protection prohibited the agent from demonstrating their 
impact upon Accident and Emergency admissions (DCLG 2015). 
 
One element of local service transformation introduced for Phase Two was the 
making of referrals to services beyond ‘Strengthening Families’; the name of the 
local programme. Ironically, many of these - such as the Child and Adolescent 
Mental Health Service (CAMHS), adult mental health support and speech and 
language therapy – were health services. Another key innovation was the view that 
all frontline workers had a role to play in making a difference to families’ lives 
regardless of their organisation or whether they worked in the public or voluntary and 
community sector. However, Social Care had not yet fully embraced this concept 
despite Criterion Three specifically referring to children in need of help including 
those with a child protection plan (DCLG 2014a). The LA1 Co-ordinator therefore 
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noted that one of her two wishes for the future was for Social Care to more fully 
integrate and engage with ‘Troubled Families’. 
 
The second theme highlighted by the LA1 Co-ordinator was the concept of the 
‘troubled’ family. In Phase One, LA1 worked with families with entrenched issues 
including the narrow focus of ASB, youth crime, poor school attendance and 
worklessness (DCLG 2012b) for which the programme rewarded them. However, the 
‘Strengthening Families’ model was more developed by July 2015. In line with the 
broader Phase Two criteria (DCLG 2014) that acknowledged that ‘troubled’ families 
were more complex than the previous narrow definition, LA1 looked at all families’ 
needs such as depression and speech and language therapy rather than ‘troubles’ 
and allocated resources on the basis of this. The Co-ordinator applauded the 
principal for their expansion of the programme’s scope for Phase Two. The widening 
of the DCLG definition of a ‘troubled’ family meant that LA1 had no difficulty 
identifying eligible Phase Two families. 
 
The LA1 Co-ordinator revealed that, while the principal’s understanding of the 
concept of the ‘troubled’ family differed between Phases One and Two, the National 
Troubled Families Initiative’s stakeholders also had differing views of ‘troubled’ 
families. The public saw them as a stereotype with lots of unruly youngsters, noise 
and problems played out in the community. The families saw their lives as normal; 
“that’s life and that is how we get on with things” (LA1 2015a) (plxxvii). The key 
worker saw their vulnerability and dysfunction and not just their visible ‘troubles’. Just 
as the principal and other stakeholders’ views of the cohort differed, the Co-ordinator 
did not believe that the concept of the ‘troubled’ family was the same across the 
country. She suggested that extremism, gangs and weapons were more prevalent in 
the South and postulated that rural and inner city families each had very different 
issues. 
 
The third theme discussed was the outcomes achieved by the programme. The first 
point made was the difference between the picture presented by the National 
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Troubled Families Initiative quantitative data and the local reality of the programme. 
The LA1 Co-ordinator claimed that the first quantitative data return made by LA1 and 
published by the principal (DCLG 2013) was incorrect and that LA1 had not identified 
all of their Phase One families by December 2012. Secondly, she revealed that 
LA1’s Phase One outcomes (DCLG 2015c) did not solely represent families who had 
a positive outcome in the local programme but comprised: 
 
 Families who received a ‘Troubled Families’ service and were ‘turned around’  
 Families who received a different service and were ‘turned around’  
 Families who ‘turned around’ themselves 
 Families who did not make a change but ceased to meet the eligibility criteria 
(LA1 2015a). 
 
The last point was described as “cost neutral”, “inevitable” and symptomatic of a 
national outcome framework that “allowed for a lot of cheating a lot of easy wins” 
(LA1 2015a) (plxxxviii and lxxxvii). She did not have a view on the principal giving the 
agent a target and a target drawn from families with ‘troubles’, rather than letting 
them analyse their own local data to understand how many ‘troubled’ families lived 
locally but felt that Phase One was “a numbers game” (LA1 2015a) (plxxxviii).  
 
The LA1 Co-ordinator was adamant that the Phase Two local outcome framework 
would provide a significant step forward in addressing the unintended consequences 
of the Phase One national outcome framework. It would only permit funding claims 
for families who “achieved positive results in each of the areas they have been 
identified as (…) having issues in” (LA1 2015a) (plxxxviii). However, she anticipated 
difficulty ahead in converting work done with families into progress for which LA1 




“It is going to be very hard to get families out at the other end but we don’t know that 
until we have done our first claim” (LA1 2015a) (plxxxvii-lxxxviii). 
 
The fourth theme discussed was the Phase Two delivery model and whether local 
authorities were working with all families with needs or just those with multiple issues 
causing the highest cost to the public purse as directed by the principal (DCLG 
2014a). The LA1 Co-ordinator was very clear that LA1 did not “distinguish between 
families with multiple needs and families with only a couple of needs” (LA1 2015a) 
(plxxxii). LA1 based their delivery model on pre-existing successful family-based 
interventions such as the Family Intervention Project and the Child and Family Team 
for the more complex cases and multi-agency forums such as Team Around the 
Family meetings for families with lesser needs. These arrangements ensured an 
assessment of families’ needs and the putting in place of a plan and appropriate 
delivery. In LA1, the agent allocated the families an appropriate service and level of 
intensity when required. Thus, a family needing intense support would get a FIP key 
worker. A family with a lower level of need such a NEET youngster would receive 
support to move them into education, employment or training. Here the key worker 
would just work with the young person and not the whole family. In many LA1 
families, offered intensive holistic family support, the take-up by family members 
differed. The Co-ordinator noted that, in many LA1 families, the father either was 
absent or took a secondary parenting role so the principle interface was with the 
mother; an interesting slant on the predominance of the matriarchal voice in 
‘Listening to Troubled Families’ (DCLG 2012a).  
 
The fifth theme discussed by the LA1 Co-ordinator was the importance of the key 
worker to the national Troubled Families Initiative. My colleague saw them as crucial 
to the local delivery model and: 
 
 “The difference between a family not sorting their issues out and sorting their issues 
out. They are absolutely critical.” (LA1 2015a) (plxxxv) 
171 
 
To achieve progress within the programme, she described the key worker as 
needing to build a good relationship with the family but show them “tough love” and 
to make the family resilient by being “reliable [but not] too relied upon” (LA1 2015a) 
(plxxxiv). Thus, the key worker had to guide the family towards resolving their issues 
but not do everything for them.  
 
LA1 took a lead on workforce development and did not presume that every frontline 
worker intuitively knew how to work holistically or possessed the optimum qualities. 
Due to not being in post at the time, the LA1 Co-ordinator was unsure of the 
composition of the Phase One training other than its multiple briefings. However, she 
revealed that Phase Two included briefings to update on the changes to the outcome 
framework; Hidden Sentence training and domestic violence-awareness training for 
staff working with families of offenders or families who met Criterion Five (DCLG 
2014a); training for chairs of Team Around the Family (TAF) meetings and 
signposting to existing LA1 Safeguarding Board training. 
 
The sixth theme covered was the principal’s lack of insight into the ‘Troubled 
Families’ operating context. The LA1 Co-ordinator had no idea of the impact upon 
the programme of the principal using data about challenged families rather than 
challenging families for the Phase One targets (Levitas 2012) or the extent to which 
the National Troubled Families Initiative heard the families’ voices during the design 
stage or Phase One. However, LA1 intended to replicate the principal’s apparent 
lack of consultation with their service users and did not anticipate giving them a role 
in Phase Two as this was a “business as usual approach” (LA1 2015a) (plxxxvii). 
 
The final theme explored in the LA1 Troubled Families Co-ordinator interview was 
the local delivery of a national programme. My colleague did not feel disadvantaged 
by managing a programme with an outcome framework that funded positive 
movement around ASB, youth crime, truancy and unemployment but had to deal 
with other issues as this was the nature of family work. LA1 staff took a ‘whole family’ 
approach and did not just “go in and look at those three issues to ‘turn them’ around” 
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(LA1 2015a) (pxc). She did not have a view about the impact of a uniform national 
funding fee that took no account of the agent’s local resources and was unmoved by 
the reduction of the Phase Two outcome fee as “it is an embedded model [and] we 
don’t use the money for anything” (LA2 2015a) (pxc). Despite the significant austerity 
measures imposed on LA1 (Appendix Two), her view was that “if the funding 
stopped tomorrow we would lose some posts but ultimately we would still have our 
business there” (LA2 2015a) (pxc). She was unclear what would have been achieved 
without the National Troubled Families Initiative but believed that the forthcoming 
national impact study would evidence this. 
 
The LA1 Co-ordinator was clear that a lack of local jobs, no requirement for key 
workers to move families into work for the last fifteen to twenty years, the families’ 
multiple problems and their “zero aspiration” (LA1 2015a) (pxciii) impacted on LA1’s 
ability to achieve the progress to work or sustained employment outcomes (DCLG 
2015c). She was unclear about the impact locally of underemployment or zero-hours 
contracts but was certain that the North-East economic situation negatively affected 
LA1’s ability to get ‘troubled’ families into work and noted that “authorities in the 
South and Manchester and further down” (LA1 2015a) (pxciii) had achieved better 
outcomes as they had more jobs and employability processes. The Troubled 
Families Employment Advisors and a ‘Steps to Work’ voluntary programme for 
residents who wanted to become work-ready were LA1’s attempt to overcome this 
disadvantage in Phase Two. However, the Co-ordinator believed that the key to 
progress to work or sustained employment outcomes was the workforce making a 
“culture shift” (LA1 2015a) (pxcii) and routinely thinking about supporting their clients 
into employment.  
 
She was very clear that the “dubious” Phase One outcome payment of £4,000 for 
getting a ‘troubled’ family member into work made no impact on LA1 delivery as they 
were not “geared up for it” and “were just trying to survive getting (…) the outcomes 
for attendance and the others” (LA1 2015a) (pxcii). Despite, LA1’s lack of readiness 
to tackle the Phase One ‘employment’ outcomes, she was clear that ‘Troubled 
Families’ was the right programme to get the cohort into work as it advocated 
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delivering services in a holistic family way and addressing all issues including 
worklessness. 
 
One final issue that hindered the local delivery of a national programme was the 
barriers provided by national policy and legislation including the continued allocation 
of funding to target individuals rather than families. This prevented local substance 
misuse services for youths from supporting the whole family and using this as a 
route to abstinence for the young person. 
 
5.6.2 THE LA2 TROUBLED FAMILIES CO-ORDINATOR INTERVIEW 
 
The LA2 Troubled Families Co-ordinator interview took place on 6th July 2015 and 
lasted one hour, forty-eight minutes and fifty-eight seconds. It provided new 
information about the National Troubled Families Initiative and was my first 
opportunity to gain insight about the delivery of the programme in a local authority 
other than LA1. The length of the interview means that the transcription appears in 
Appendix Thirty-Eight rather than being included here.  
 
I originally scheduled this session as the second interview so that I could use the rich 
qualitative data gathered in my own local authority as a foundation upon which to 
compare delivery elsewhere and to test the research methodology in familiar 
surroundings with a close colleague. However, the LA1 Co-ordinator’s busy schedule 
delayed the LA1 session and meant that the LA2 interview took place more than two 
weeks before it rather than one week afterwards. 
 
I had never met the LA2 Troubled Families Co-ordinator prior to the interview. The 
LA1 Co-ordinator provided me with her name and email address and we arranged 
the interview via email. My assumptions about ‘Troubled Families’ in LA2 came from 
the first and final DCLG national quantitative datasets (DCLG 2013 and 2015c) and 
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LA2’s place as a Wave One Early Starter to whom the principal had given 
permission to begin Phase Two a term ahead of my own area. I also had insider 
knowledge of LA2’s reputation for strong innovative delivery to children and families. 
I therefore approached the interview with the hope of ascertaining how LA2 had got 
to grips very quickly in 2012 with working with and ‘turning around’ their ‘troubled’ 
families and with sustaining this high performance into 2015. 
 
The LA2 interview was conducted ethically (Bryman 2012). I avoided harm to the 
participant and myself by arranging to meet in her place of work – the LA2 Civic 
Centre – thereby ensuring that neither of us was meeting a stranger in an unfamiliar 
and unsafe environment.  
 
The semi-structured interview method with its predetermined questions whose order 
could be changed based on the interviewer’s perception of appropriateness (Robson 
2002) made the session into a rewarding experience. I believe that an unstructured 
interview where I had a general area of interest and concern but let the conversation 
develop informally in this area (Robson 2002) would have initially floundered since 
my interlocutor was a complete stranger; although our shared interest and expertise 
in ‘Troubled Families’ would have eventually overcome any initial embarrassment. At 
the other end of the spectrum, I am convinced that a fully structured interview with 
predetermined questions, fixed working and a pre-set order (Robson 2002) would 
have hindered my interlocutor and have given her less opportunity to speak at 
length. It would also have prevented me from adjusting the order of the questions to 
respond to key themes within her answers and to conduct the session as an informal 
but very rewarding conversation with an experienced local expert. 
 
The LA2 interview schedule virtually mirrored that agreed with LA1, with a few minor 
adjustments to explore specific details around their performance in Phase One. In 
our email exchange before the interview and in the wording chosen for the 
Participant Information Sheet (Appendix Twenty-Four), I took care to emphasise that 
the interview was for the purposes of learning more about the National Troubled 
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Families Initiative to support improvement in the programme and Payment by 
Results provision. I made it clear that the interview would not compare in an injurious 
way LA2 with any other area, embarrass their Co-ordinator or interrogate her 
inappropriately about their delivery of Phase One and plans for Phase Two. During 
the session, I steered clear of any potentially harmful questions around the local 
delivery model and never inferred that it was inferior to the one with which I was 
familiar.  
 
By presenting the LA2 Co-ordinator with a Participant Consent Form (Appendix 
Twenty-Five) whist we were planning the session and again before it began, I 
underlined the voluntary nature of her participation and gave her the opportunity to 
withdraw herself and her data at any time. I maintained her right to privacy, 
conducted one interview rather than several and provided a comfort break as the 
session took longer than expected. As with LA1, I invited her to make any 
amendments to the transcription. She chose not to. 
 
When planning the session, I was mindful that LA1 and LA2 are two largish cities in 
the North-East of England with similar challenges (Appendix Two) and an 
occasionally unhealthy local rivalry. Although putting the two Co-ordinators together 
would have triggered a lively debate, I chose not to do this. I wanted to avoid 
embarrassment both to the LA1 Co-ordinator who had significantly less experience 
of operational management and ‘Troubled Families’ than her counterpart and to the 
LA2 Co-ordinator who may have felt intimidated by being questioned by a stranger 
and being outnumbered by two LA1 employees. Although I expressed some 
personal opinions during the interview and used examples from LA1’s delivery to 
explain points, this was with a view to giving the session the natural feel of a 
conversation and not designed to cause offence or trigger rivalry. I believe that what 
the LA2 interview lost in being able to compare the two North-East delivery models 
and Phase One outcomes simultaneously, it gained in giving undivided attention to 
an agent with a passion for and a knowledge of the subject. 
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It would have been interesting to interview the LA2, LA3 and LA4 Co-ordinators 
together since they were both Wave One Early Starters. However, this would have 
meant at least two of my interlocutors undertaking a lengthy journey involving an 
overnight stay. By collecting data in LA2 in 2015 and LA3 and LA4 in 2016, I lost one 
point of comparison but had the opportunity to compare data collected ten months 
apart from three areas that DCLG considered made sufficient strides in Phase One 
to receive ‘Early Starter’ status. 
 
The location of the interview in a quiet room in LA2’s Civic Centre meant that it was 
considerably easier to conduct than the LA1 session. I was somewhat apprehensive 
when the session began because it was my first interview, I was worried about my 
research methodology failing and I was unclear how carrying out the session with a 
complete stranger would affect my ability to gather data. I did not want to 
inconvenience my interlocutor by conducting the interview badly and having to ask 
for a second session to fill in the gaps. However, my nerves swiftly melted away. The 
LA2 Co-ordinator was a passionate, engaging speaker with an in-depth knowledge 
of the local programme and a deep interest in the subject of ‘troubled’ families. 
 
The LA2 Troubled Families Co-ordinator had been in post since the initiative began 
and worked in LA2 at a senior level before that. She had clear and firm opinions 
about all aspects of the National Troubled Families Initiative and I did not have to 
prompt her to give her views. I very quickly gained confidence during the session, 
which never felt awkward. I designed the LA2 interview to increase my knowledge 
about the local delivery of the National Troubled Families Initiative in Phase One and 
to learn more about LA2 good practice. For example, how they worked with and 
‘turned around’ so many ‘troubled’ families early on in the programme (DCLG 2013) 
and maintained this momentum throughout Phase One (DCLG 2015c). I also wanted 
to learn more about the local perception of ‘troubled’ families and if national factors 
such as the outcome fee or performance framework and local factors such as 
employment opportunities affected achievement in the programme. This was of 
particular interest to me given the similarities between LA1 and LA2 (Appendix Two). 
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The thematic narrative analysis of the Local Authority Two interview revealed that - 
like her LA1 counterpart - her response to the interview schedule also comprised 
data in seven key themes: 
 
1. Service transformation 
2. The concept of the ‘troubled’ family 
3. The programme outcomes 
4. The local delivery model 
5. The importance of the key worker role 
6. The principal’s lack of insight into the ‘Troubled Families’ operating context 
7. The delivery of a national programme at a local level (LA2 2015). 
 
The theme of service transformation ran throughout the interview and provided a rich 
thread of interesting information. Phase One of the National Troubled Families 
Initiative enabled LA2 to embed the outcomes approach within their service delivery 
model. Collectively the area agreed that change could only be created by partner 
agencies working together and therefore used workforce development to increase 
the number of staff working holistically with local families. Phase Two saw the 
infrastructure built upon and the whole family approach practice deepened across a 
more diverse range of ‘troubles’. A cross-section of agencies co-wrote the Phase 
Two family outcomes plan and commissioned services were required to work 
towards achieving its targets. The wider workforce was alerted to and trained to 
identify and manage issues such as domestic violence and abuse; thus swelling the 
pool of specialist workers with generic key workers with additional skills and 
knowledge. When asked for three wishes, the LA2 Co-ordinator noted the significant 
cultural change brought about by the ‘Troubled Families’ ethos and acknowledged 




The second theme covered was the concept of the ‘troubled’ family, a term that LA2 
chose not to adopt. They branded their local programme the ‘[LA2] Families 
Programme’ rather than the National ‘Troubled’ Families Initiative. While the LA2 Co-
ordinator noted that they had a “significant but small percentage of families” who met 
the stereotype of “neighbours from hell” with a “high level of criminality, anti-social 
behaviour” (LA2 2015) (pxcix), most Phase One families suffered both complex 
issues and a layering of complexity that made their lives a struggle. Services that 
tried and failed to be supportive or just focused on meeting their own needs 
compounded this. She believed that the media depiction of ‘Benefit Street’ strongly 
influenced the public view of ‘troubled’ families as workless benefit cheats with many 
children. This contrasted with key workers who saw the families’ vulnerabilities and 
recognised that they were not particularly enjoying their lifestyle. The LA2 Co-
ordinator knew from discussing the issue with regional and national colleagues that 
‘troubled’ families were not the same across the country and different areas had 
different challenges, most notably London with its gang culture. 
 
Although the DCLG definition of a ‘troubled’ family had changed between Phase One 
and Phase Two, she believed that a constant thread across the two Phases was 
families who required the support of a number of agencies. The change in criteria for 
Phase Two allowed LA2 to work with families in a preventative way rather than just 
supporting those who had many problems for a long time. The local family outcomes 
plan encouraged prevention rather than reaction. For example, it supplemented the 
school eligibility criteria with a criterion of persistent lateness. This built upon the 
local knowledge that unpunctuality was also an indicator of parental difficulties in the 
home. 
 
The LA2 Co-ordinator spoke in detail about LA2’s Phase One and Phase Two 
service delivery - all new information - and therefore extremely interesting to me. She 
revealed how her role entailed leading the local programme, overseeing its 
governance, operationalizing it, managing services, linking with the staff that helped 
local families and liaising with the principal. She enjoyed the autonomy of the role, its 
lack of prescription, the fact that she could combine operational delivery with 
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strategic oversight and LA2’s embrace of whole family working as a means of 
transforming services. The programme’s ethos had created some initial challenge. 
The LA2 Co-ordinator wanted it to be an initiative that partners bought into but some 
mistrusted DCLG’s agenda in the early days of the programme. These colleagues 
did not welcome holistic family working and had a more stereotypical notion of 
‘troubled’ families. However, LA2 largely welcomed the National Troubled Families 
Initiative as they had a number of successful Family Intervention Projects that 
promoted the use of a ‘whole family’ approach. Thus, much of the successful Phase 
One delivery was based on these tried and tested interventions. 
 
Their overall success in Phase One was achieved by involving all services in delivery 
and taking a patient approach at the very beginning of the programme. LA2 spent 
March to September 2012 in: 
 
 Building partnership-arrangements 
 Agreeing data sharing protocols 
 Analysing the data to understand what would be achieved if LA2 did nothing 
 Understanding what the agent must do locally to achieve the positive 
outcomes required by the principal (LA2 2015).  
 
LA2 did not commission new ‘Troubled Families’ services. They identified from the 
data the families or individuals already working with organisations such as Social 
Care or the youth offending service where there was a plan in place. They then 
examined these plans to establish the improvements needed to address all of the 
family’s needs. LA1 also divided their cohort of 1,010 into three groups: 
 
 Families requiring the existing FIP intensive service 
 Families with several needs that could be co-ordinated through a TAF 
180 
 
 Families with a lower need that community-based interventions could address 
(LA2 2015).  
 
This followed the three-tiered approach advocated by DCLG (2012d). Robust multi-
agency working and leadership by the local authority supported agencies to make 
the cultural shift towards recognising problems did not occur in isolation and were 
not solvable by one agency. Therefore, youth crime, anti-social behaviour and issues 
in the home triggered problems in school and had to be addressed through a multi-
agency approach rather than leaving the school or other responsible agency to deal 
singly with the most prominent symptom such as poor school attendance or sanction 
the most visible individual perpetrator such as the teenage truant. 
 
The Co-ordinator led a review of family services in Phase Two to accommodate a 
£5M austerity cut. She calculated that, if all of the ‘Troubled Families’ outcome 
funding was drawn down and combined with funding from health and schools, this 
would create a budget of £7M. She then planned how services could be delivered 
that would meet the ‘Troubled Families’ targets and ensure that all available funding 
was claimed and met service user need at all levels. Service delivery centred on 
Community Hubs in the three “0-30%” (LA2 2015) (pciv) most deprived areas of the 
city where 80% of the most vulnerable families lived. Three voluntary sector-
commissioned providers delivered in each area and offered an integrated 0-18 
approach. 
 
The LA2 Co-ordinator welcomed the broadening of the entry criteria in Phase Two. 
This evolution enabled more families to receive a service but created significant 
issues. The huge numbers and high-level metrics were “more challenging than 
Phase One” (LA2 2015) (pcx) with its requirement for LA2 to manage “thousands 
and thousands and thousands of bits of data” for nearly 3,500 local families with at 
least four members meeting a number of criteria (LA2 2015) (pcxi). LA2 had done 
their best to manage thus far but acknowledged that the relevant data sat on a 
number of systems.  
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Key partners wrote the Phase Two outcome framework jointly: 
 
 The Police led on Outcome One 
 A Headteacher and education colleagues led on Outcome Two 
 Social Care led on Outcome Three  
 Job Centre Plus and the LA2 Employability Team led on Outcome Four 
 Community Safety partners and the Domestic Violence Team led on Outcome 
Five  
 Public Health colleagues and providers led on Outcome Six (LA2 2015). 
 
This ensured that its component metrics were correct, its outcomes related to 
datasets that could be isolated and tracked and it contained the key priorities of 
relevant partners to ensure full and continued inter-agency buy-in. Outcomes were 
not included where data was not available to either identify the cohort or track their 
progress. Thus, the Phase Two outcome framework did not specifically reference 
young carers, as their information was not readily available. 
 
The fourth theme discussed was the programme outcomes. The Co-ordinator had 
been “sceptical” about the PbR framework. She preferred the “finance available to do 
the work” (LA2 2015) (pcxxv) but recognised that the Phase One outcome 
framework had reinforced the outcomes approach in LA2 and motivated its staff to 
achieve positive outcomes. The excellent performance across Phase One (DCLG 
2013 and DCLG 2015c) was partly attributable to LA2’s excellent data systems. 
These enabled them to use externally verifiable data to identify eligible families, 
ensure they had a plan in place, wash the data termly and then claim for the families 
who had achieved the programme outcomes. The Co-ordinator was adamant that 
there were local safeguards in place to ensure that all families who were claimed for 
had made a genuine change and the authority had not relied on families who had 
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made no change to help them to achieve the programme target. This had meant that 
LA2 had to follow up on all school leavers to ensure they were in education, 
employment or training before claiming under the ‘school attendance’ outcome. LA2 
instituted audit processes in Phase Two to ensure that families would not be claimed 
for just because they no longer met the eligibility criteria due to moving house or 
having their perpetrator imprisoned. 
 
We discussed the negatives of the PbR outcome framework including issues such as 
youngsters hugely improving their attendance from 40% to 65% or four children in a 
family of six achieving the requisite target but neither group triggering a reward for 
the holistic family support received from LA2. In an unexpected revelation, the LA2 
Co-ordinator admitted that they had simplified the Phase One outcome framework to 
save back office time. However, this actually gave the principal more ‘value’ than 
they had paid for rather than exploiting them. For example, LA2 had simplified the 
calculation to ascertain whether the anti-social behaviour element had been 
achieved. Instead of claiming for a 60% reduction - which was rather complicated - 
they claimed for no ASB.  
 
They also revealed that the local employability provider’s inferior data system was 
responsible for the low performance in the progress to work outcome rather than 
solely the local economic climate. They were unable to return to LA2 any outcome 
data about the families referred for employability support. This lack of verifiable data 
made LA2 unwilling to claim for “batch referrals” (LA2 2015) (pcxxviii) from DCLG. 
Consequently, and despite colleagues from across the country legitimately referring 
“500 families” to get “£100 per family” (LA2 2015) (pcxxviii), LA2 just returned data 
where families had come off workless benefit. 
 
The Co-ordinator did not have a problem managing the Phase One programme that 
funded positive movement around youth crime, ASB, truancy and unemployment but 
dealt with other issues. The holistic family approach demanded that all issues be 
addressed not just those relating to the outcome framework. As befitting a whole 
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systems approach of holistic family support, all LA2 Phase Two families received 
support not just the families with the costliest use of services as directed by DCLG 
(2014a). 
 
The importance of the key worker role was the fifth theme discussed. LA2 had the 
capacity for two hundred families to receive intensive support and the remainder to 
have a key worker operating at a universal level. The Co-ordinator noted that 
schools in a deprived area had a Pupil Premium budget of up to £0.5M. The local 
expectation was that this would fund pupil welfare staff to support the whole family 
and not just the individual pupil experiencing difficulties. The LA2 Co-ordinator 
acknowledged the importance of the key worker role and the fact that “super beings” 
(LA2 2015) (pcxix) were needed with tenacity; a value base; the ability to engage, 
motivate, challenge and support families; co-ordinate services; deliver therapeutic 
services such as motivational interviewing; offer targeted parenting work and know 
about child development.  
 
LA2 did not presume that the workforce had the skills, knowledge and experience to 
deliver the role but took a lead in workforce development across the city and offered 
training, mentoring and awareness-raising support. LA2 had supported their Phase 
One workforce to embrace the ‘whole family’ approach by placing Integrated 
Working Mentors in specific organisations across the city such as the youth 
offending team. These senior practitioners had modelled holistic family working to 
staff unused to the concept and enabled them to move from supporting one 
individual in the family to assessing, planning and working with all of the family. In 
Phase Two, the Integrated Working Mentor role made way for Early Help Advisors. 
They sat in the MASH, identified families with needs, and ensured they received a 
multi-agency plan to address these.  
 
Aside from this mentor support, LA2 commissioned training for the city’s key 
workers. They paid for 170 workers to complete training in ‘Working with Families 
with Complex Needs’; trained staff to deliver parenting programmes and offered 
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monthly themed workshops on issues such as education, children missing school 
and debt management. In Phase Two, the training offer broadened to managers. 
LA2 equipped them to supervise staff working with families with complex needs and 
to recognise and focus on all of their issues rather than those traditionally dealt with 
by their agency. Therefore, schools did not just focus on school attendance. LA2 
also explored how to support staff to deliver against all six outcomes and support 
teenagers as well as younger children. 
 
The sixth theme discussed was the principal’s lack of insight into the ‘Troubled 
Families’ operating context. The local data showed that LA2 had 80% more ‘troubled’ 
families than the DCLG target. This miscalculation meant they were eligible for less 
outcome payments than they should have been.  Although the DCLG figures were 
like comparing “apples and pears” (pcxxviii), LA2 were never in doubt that they 
would find enough local families with whom to achieve the requisite outcomes. 
Furthermore, the Co-ordinator was clear that the National Troubled Families Initiative 
could make sustained changes with families with problems. However, this was as 
part of a whole systems approach that adopted holistic family working and targeted 
support to meet the needs of the family rather than its individual members. She did 
not see ‘Troubled Families’ as a standalone programme. She was unclear how the 
LA2 delivery model would have looked without ‘Troubled Families’ but postulated 
that it may not have emphasised work with families with complex needs; perhaps 
sanctioning them for misbehaviour instead of supporting them. She also suggested 
that Adults and Children’s Services might not also work as closely together as they 
currently do without the impetus of the initiative. 
 
Just as the principal failed to incorporate service users’ views into the design of 
‘Troubled Families’, LA2 had not listened to the family’s voice as much as they 
wished. There were no families on the Programme Board and no plans for this in the 
future. However, the LA2 Co-ordinator was confident that families informed the 
development of local intensive support services by providing views to local providers. 
Interestingly, although every ‘troubled’ family had a plan, not every family member 
received an equal offer. LA2 had prioritised working in Phase One with the “key 
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influencers” (LA2 2015) (pcxxii) – the parents. Trust had often been built with the key 
worker gaining some “quick wins” (LA2 2015) (pcxxiii) such as resolving the family’s 
debt issues and accessing a food bank for them. Although the main issue in a family 
may have been the child’s school attendance, the key worker mediated between the 
matriarch and the school rather than the youngster and school to ensure a return to 
education. A challenge for Phase Two - where domestic abuse was specifically 
mentioned under Criterion Five (DCLG 2014b) - was how to achieve progression in a 
family where a domestic violence perpetrator lived under the same roof as the victim. 
 
In the final theme - the delivery of a national programme at a local level – the LA2 
Co-ordinator discussed feeling uncomfortable about the programme’s focus on 
families’ worklessness despite 85% of the cohort being on benefits. However, the 
Troubled Families Employment Advisors had taken significant steps in addressing 
this mind-set in the workforce. They queried the key workers’ reluctance to discuss 
training and employment and asked why they had aspirations for their own families 
but not local ‘troubled’ families. These workers also highlighted that there were local 
vacancies thus busting the myth that there were no local jobs for jobseekers to apply 
for. 
 
While, underemployment and zero-hours contracts proved challenging to families in 
employment, the LA2 Co-ordinator believed that the barriers to ‘troubled’ families 
finding work included: 
 
 Their multiple problems, which proved a challenge to themselves and 
potential employers 
 The families’ limited life experience beyond their own communities 
 Employers’ preferences for flexible employees such as young students 
 The difficulty of raising awareness of local job opportunities 





 Raising families’, employers’ and key workers’ expectations that ‘troubled’ 
families can work 
 Altering employers’ attitudes to ‘troubled’ families 
 Supporting the local economy to create jobs for local people 
 The public sector offering priority work placements (LA2 2015).  
 
She was clear that offering the agent £4,000 to move a ‘troubled’ family off workless 
benefits and into sustained employment had not influenced the local delivery model 
but had encouraged further discussion of employability.  
 
In many respects, the National Troubled Families Initiative had provided a funding 
lifeline to LA2. It had underpinned existing services rather than providing additional 
resources to purchase new ones and meant that LA2 did not have to cut some family 
services. Despite a £5M budget cut, the LA2 Co-ordinator was unfazed by the 
reduction in funding for Phase Two. She explained that it enabled DCLG to release 
the same amount of funding to the agent but, because 400,000 rather than 120,000 
families were involved, reduce the fee available per family. She welcomed the 
£1,000 attachment fee as this gave LA2 a more secure income than that available in 
Phase One. It also meant that the business model was easier to run, as it required 
less projection around the size of the outcome fee that the agent could secure 
subsequently. 
 
The LA2 Co-ordinator acknowledged that delivering ‘Troubled Families’ had required 
LA2 to work at considerable risk until all of the programme funding could be claimed. 
The local authority had shown leadership and had chosen not to pass this risk onto 
the voluntary sector agencies that they had commissioned to deliver specific 
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targeted family services. To ensure that LA2 continued to perform strongly in Phase 
Two, the local authority specified that their subcontractors must work towards the 
outcomes on the local ‘Troubled Families’ plan and submit quarterly data to 
triangulate with the information on their own data systems and thus evidence 
families’ progress. 
 
5.6.3 THE LA3 TROUBLED FAMILIES CO-ORDINATOR INTERVIEW 
 
The LA3 Troubled Families Co-ordinator interview took place on 29th April 2016 and 
lasted for fifty-one minutes and nineteen seconds. It provided new information about 
the National Troubled Families Initiative and was my first opportunity to gain insight 
about the delivery of the programme outside my native North-East of England thus 
adding a geographical dimension to the research project. The length of the interview 
means that the transcription is in Appendix Thirty-Nine rather than being included 
here.  
 
This session took place approximately nine months after my second interview and 
was with a Co-ordinator who had recently been elected to represent the agent on the 
National ‘Troubled Families’ Programme Board and therefore had a national 
overview and understanding of the initiative and not just a local view. This enabled 
me to compare the data gathered in LA3 with that in the North-East chronologically 
and see it nationally and strategically rather than just local and operationally. 
 
The views put forward by the LA1 and LA2 Co-ordinators, that ‘troubled’ families 
from the South and London had different issues to families from elsewhere and 
these areas had more jobs and processes to support ‘troubled’ families into work, 
originally drew me to interview a Troubled Families Co-ordinator from the South. I 
intended to identify potential interviewees from the Phase Two quantitative national 
performance data as this had served me well when I originally narrowed the twelve 
North-East local authorities down to two in 2015. By April 2016, DCLG had not 
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released any Phase Two performance information.  I therefore approached a DCLG 
contact that I had made whilst seconded to HMI Probation in 2014. She 
recommended that I speak to the LA3 Co-ordinator as his area performed strongly 
and had a South-East England location.  
 
This recommendation coupled with the local authority’s status as a county rather 
than a city and its different demography to LA1 and LA2 (Appendix Two) satisfied me 
that I would gather interesting information from LA3 for comparison with the two 
North-East authorities. The distance between my North-East home and LA3, the 
potential cost of two days of train travel and an overnight stay and my concern about 
the unreliability of public transport meant that I elected to carry out a telephone 
interview.  Despite the fact that this method was untested and required building a 
rapport with a stranger without the benefit of face-to-face contact, I approached the 
LA3 interview with anticipation rather than trepidation. I particularly looked forward to 
contrasting delivery in the South with that of the North and speaking to a practitioner 
with a strategic overview of the National Troubled Families Initiative. 
 
As with the LA2 Co-ordinator, I contacted him by email and we had a prior telephone 
conversation to agree the logistics of the interview session. I had already amended 
the interview schedule used for the LA1 and LA2 interviews in deference to his 
strategic position, busy schedule and the fact that LA3 were almost two years into 
their delivery of Phase Two. However, to ensure that no vital data was missed, the 
LA3 Co-ordinator emailed me two documents about the local offer and Phase One 
performance (Hayden 2015 and Local Authority Three 2015b). I read these carefully 
before the interview and removed the questions for which these documents provided 
answers.  
 
The semi-structured interview method with its predetermined questions whose order 
could be changed based on the interviewer’s perception of appropriateness (Robson 
2002) meant the data collection process could be fitted around the LA3 Co-
ordinator’s busy diary. The semi-structured interview schedule allowed him and me 
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to be clear about the areas in which I was interested. The LA3 Co-ordinator 
accordingly sent me documents containing some of this information (Hayden 2015 
and Local Authority Three 2015b). I then removed the relevant questions from the 
interview schedule and he gave full and complete answers to the remaining 
questions. This would not have been possible in an unstructured interview where 
conversation develops informally in specific areas (Robson 2002). Like the LA2 Co-
ordinator, I quickly established a rapport with the LA3 representative; helped by his 
friendship with my line manager, of which I was not previously aware. The semi-
structured format allowed this session to be relaxed, enjoyable and unhindered by 
our separation of hundreds of miles or a fully structured format with predetermined 
questions, fixed working and a pre-set order (Robson 2002). 
 
The LA3 interview was conducted ethically (Bryman 2012). I avoided harm to the 
participant and myself by speaking on the telephone rather than by meeting as 
strangers in an unfamiliar environment. In our email exchange before the interview 
and in the wording chosen for the Participant Information Sheet (Appendix Twenty-
Four), I took care to emphasise that the interview was for the purposes of learning 
more about the National Troubled Families Initiative to support improvement in the 
programme and Payment by Results provision. I made it clear that I had not 
designed the interview to challenge LA3’s Phase Two delivery in the absence of any 
DCLG national performance data or to question the Phase One model. During the 
session, although I referenced the local delivery model and assumptions that North-
East providers had about their Southern-based counterparts, I took care not to hint at 
any North-South rivalry. 
 
By presenting the LA3 Co-ordinator with a Participant Consent Form (Appendix 
Twenty-Five) whist we were planning the session and again before it began, I 
underlined the voluntary nature of his participation and gave him the opportunity to 
withdraw himself and his data at any time. A few weeks after the interview, I emailed 
him the transcription and invited him to make any amendments. He asked me to 
remove a political reference, which I did. 
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The data collection phase would have benefitted from re-interviewing LA1 and LA2 
again with the LA3 Co-ordinator to understand how delivery had moved on in the 
North-East and how it compared with a South-East model. However, in the interim, 
the LA1 Co-ordinator had left her post and I would have had to inconvenience the 
LA2 Co-ordinator by asking her to host the LA3 telephone conversation or travel to 
my office to be part of it. I therefore chose just to interview the LA3 Co-ordinator on 
his own. 
 
Like the LA2 Co-ordinator, he proved to be a passionate, engaging speaker. He had 
an in-depth knowledge of the LA3 delivery model as well as the programme across 
the country and some local and national political insight due to his senior position in 
a large successful local authority and key contacts with DCLG. Thus, what the 
session lost in not being able to make regional comparisons at the point of recording, 
it gained in providing an overview of ‘Troubled Families’ in 2016 from a South-East 
and strategic viewpoint. 
 
My reading of the LA3 documents (Hayden 2015 and Local Authority Three 2015b) 
meant that the reduced interview schedule did not detract from the quality of the 
discussion or the data gathered. By making the telephone call from my peaceful 
office, I was able to focus fully on our interaction and soon forgot the several 
hundred miles that actually separated us. This was another interview, which I really 
enjoyed. Like the LA2 Troubled Families Co-ordinator, he had been in post since the 
initiative began and possessed firm, evidence-based opinions about all aspects of 
the National Troubled Families Initiative and its wider context. This session also had 
the comfortable flow of a conversation. 
 
Interestingly, the thematic narrative analysis of the Local Authority Three interview 
was harder than that of the LA1 and LA2 interviews because key themes such as 
service transformation, service delivery and the local delivery of a national 
programme were more tightly interwoven. However, for the sake of consistency with 
the two North-East interviews, the LA3 data appears in the same seven key themes: 
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1. Service transformation 
2. The local delivery model 
3. The concept of the ‘troubled’ family 
4. The programme outcomes 
5. The importance of the key worker role 
6. The principal’s lack of insight into the ‘Troubled Families’ operating context 
7. The delivery of a national programme at a local level (LA3 2016). 
 
Theme One was perhaps the most illuminating as the thread of service 
transformation ran strongly throughout the interview. The LA3 Co-ordinator noted 
that the National Troubled Families Initiative could make sustained change with 
families with problems but that it was “a catalyst” to real change that had to be done 
“locally and on the ground” (LA3 2016) (pcxli). Although the programme funding had 
proved useful, the service transformation that had taken place in LA3 relied more on 
the commitment of local partners than the welcome funding by DCLG. The LA3 Co-
ordinator was very clear that the programme had enabled local partners to take a co-
ordinated approach at a time of austerity to the delivery of holistic family services 
rather than working with individual family members. He applauded the Government’s 
role in this service transformation noting that the decision not to be prescriptive about 
service delivery and to reduce the Family Grant Agreement to one side of A4 was 
refreshing. 
 
I explored service transformation and innovation in Theme Two. The LA3 delivery 
model had been transformational by building upon existing processes but taking 
more responsibility for families. Children’s Services already knew 70% of the Phase 
One families. Therefore, to save resources and time, LA3 used an existing 
assessment rather than doing a new one. LA3 did not use the term ‘referral’ as this 
implied a transfer of responsibility from one agency to another. In both Phases, LA3 
had commissioned the voluntary sector to work with their most ‘troubled’ families. 
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They innovatively replicated the principal’s Payment by Results model but retained 
the financial risk by paying them more for success than DCLG did. The remainder of 
the families received support from ten local groups who used their local intelligence 
to identify eligible families and provide appropriate support. 
 
The Co-ordinator welcomed the broadening of the eligibility criteria in Phase Two but 
noted that LA3 had worked with all families with needs in Phase One; a decision 
enabled by an injection of £1.4M-worth of funding from the County Council and 
Public Health. The inclusion of Criterion Six – parents and children with a range of 
health needs (DCLG 2014) - in Phase Two chimed with LA3’s statistics that showed 
the area had significant health needs that required addressing. Indeed, 647 of LA3’s 
1,100 Phase Two families had mental health issues compared to only 40 and 164 
who met the youth crime and anti-social behaviour triggers. LA3 showed innovation 
by including within their Phase Two family outcome plan a very local need of which I 
was unaware – home-educated children – a phenomenon that indicated parents 
avoiding prosecution for poor school attendance or who did not secure a place in 
their first-choice school.  
 
The LA3 Co-ordinator’s view of Theme Three was that ‘troubled’ families were 
largely the same across the country although the London boroughs had more 
serious youth crime than LA3. LA3’s excellent data sets and analysis provided them 
with the key characteristics of their Phase One cohort to permit appropriate targeting 









Picture 5.6.3 - The Average LA3 Phase One Family 
 
 
(Local Authority Three 2015b:12) 
 
The names and ages featured had the highest prevelance within the Phase One LA3 
cohort. 
 
When speaking of Theme Four - the programme outcomes – the LA3 Co-ordinator 
noted that they thought of the outcome framework in a more positive light of “invest 
to save” (LA3 2016) (pcxlviii) rather than PbR. LA3 were satisfied with the funding 
structure as it provided a fee for each family identified and sufficient resource to work 
with them. This covered the cost of the intervention delivered to the family even if 
LA3 were unable to achieve a successful outcome and so attract a further fee. LA3 
did not spend their Phase One outcome fee and used this to commission Transform 
in Phase Two whilst DCLG were still deliberating the future direction of the 
programme. 
 
The LA3 Troubled Families Co-ordinator highlighted that the Phase One outcome 
framework allowed one sixth of the agent’s claims to be for families who were ‘turned 
around’ by their own efforts or services outside the programme.  I was not previously 
aware of this detail and it shed an interesting light on LA1’s Phase One claims. 
However, LA3 only claimed for families who made a positive change within the 
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confines of the local programme; something enabled by both the robust local delivery 
model and the fact that LA3 had 372 more than the 1,590 Phase One families that 
DCLG said they had. The Co-ordinator felt uncomfortable about claiming for 
“freebies” and believed that local authorities who had relied on “data trawling” rather 
than service delivery would fall “off a cliff edge” (LA3 2016) (pcl and cxlix) in Phase 
Two. 
 
In Theme Five, the Co-ordinator revealed that LA3 had not taken a specific lead 
around the training and support of local key workers in either Phase. Barnardo’s 
offered support to the Transform staff, the County Council provided parenting 
programme training and local providers commissioned any other training needed 
locally. For example, in one area heavily populated by army families, staff received 
mental health first aid training to deal with families with Tier One or Tier Two mental 
health needs.  
 
The Co-ordinator singled out the Troubled Families Employment Advisors and their 
DWP Partnership Manager from the wider workforce for particular praise. These 
secondees had previous experience of working in Children’s Centres and 
spearheaded the drive to move families into work. They had taken a targeted 
approach and worked with 19-25 year olds who were closer to the jobs market than 
“mum and dad, aunty or uncle who are in their thirties, forties and fifties who have 
never worked for years and years” (LA3 2016) (pclvii). These staff had also taken an 
asset-based approach and built on families’ strengths. For example, supporting a 
father of six with a pick-up truck to become a self-employed furniture remover and 
take the children to school in his vehicle before using it for work. The LA3 Co-
ordinator called for the funding for these roles to continue beyond 2020 as they 
made the most difference to ‘troubled’ families’ lives. 
 
The principal’s lack of insight into the ‘Troubled Families’ operating context was the 
sixth theme discussed. Although DCLG calculated that LA3 had less Phase One 
families than they actually had thus depriving them of potential outcome funding, this 
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had at least given LA3 a target to aim at. LA3 had worked more closely with families 
than the principal had. DCLG’s lack of engagement with families during the design 
phase of the programme was overcome by LA3 taking a family-based approach, 
ensuring that every family had a plan, giving family members the service that this 
indicated they required and consulting with eleven local families in the evaluation of 
Phase One (Hayden 2015). 
 
The final theme – the delivery of a national programme at a local level – revealed the 
efficiencies that the National Troubled Families Initiative had enabled LA3 to make. 
Local data suggested the number of looked after children reduced by forty; creating 
a saving of £2M. Delivering a programme to reduce ASB, youth crime, poor school 
attendance and worklessness where families actually had nine separate issues 
(DCLG 2014b) had not proved an issue for a delivery model that involved agencies 
nominating rather than referring on families, taking responsibility for them and 
addressing their needs rather than chasing money. 
 
The LA3 Co-ordinator did not believe that the national funding structure should vary 
to take into account the regional variations and inequalities found in Appendix Two. 
In his view, LA3 “had mega cuts too” and saying an LA1 family was worth more than 
an LA3 family was political “dynamite” (LA3 2016) (pclv). If there was to be a review 
of the national outcome framework, he proposed that the attachment fee rather than 
the outcome fee should vary to reflect how many criteria a family met when work 
began with them. He held the view that DCLG reduced the Phase Two funding 
because the target number of families had increased and actually expressed 
surprise that the figure of £1,800 would remain static until 2020. Good LA3 budget 
management meant that they could actually roll money over into the remaining three 
or four years of the project to “get a smooth profile” (LA3 2016) (pclvi). 
 
He was not impressed by the principal’s use of a £4,000 carrot to encourage the 
agent to move ‘troubled’ families into work as a reward could be claimed when the 
family still had problems such as “some of the family locked up and in custody” (LA3 
196 
 
2016) (pclviii). He confirmed my assumption that it was easier to move ‘troubled’ 
families into work in LA3 than in LA1 and LA2 by describing LA3 as: 
 
“One of the highest areas of employment in the country [with] work out there 
generally for people who are (…) able and with the right skills” [including] “quite a lot 
of highly paid skilled jobs” (LA3 2016) (pclix and clx-clxi).  
 
This positive situation meant the local economy was less affected by zero-hours 
contracts than other areas but was affected by ‘troubled’ families’ low aspirations, 
something that the Troubled Families Employment Advisors sought to address with 
their targeted, asset-based approach. 
 
5.6.4 THE LA4 TROUBLED FAMILIES CO-ORDINATOR INTERVIEW 
 
The LA4 Troubled Families Co-ordinator interview took place on 13th May 2016 and 
lasted for forty minutes and thirty-seven seconds. The length of the interview means 
that the transcription is in Appendix Forty rather than being included here. The 
interview provided new information about the National Troubled Families Initiative 
and was my first opportunity to gain insight about the delivery of the programme in 
the North-West of England thus adding a further geographical dimension to the 
research project.  
 
This session took place approximately two weeks after the LA3 interview and was 
with a Co-ordinator who had managed the ‘Troubled Families’ programme in one 
North-West area before becoming the strategic lead for ‘Troubled Families’ in LA4 – 
a consortium of ten North-West authorities. He chaired a group of ten Troubled 
Families Co-ordinators who came together to discuss operational issues ranging 
from the spot-check process to how the programme could improve service delivery 
across a larger geographical area. Thus, this session provided: 
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 A different strategic view of the initiative to that provided by the LA3 Co-
ordinator 
 The chance to compare the North-East with another Northern area with which 
it appeared to have some economic similarities (Audit Commission 2013 and 
Sparrow 2014)  
 An opportunity to gather further data in 2016 that could be compared with the 
qualitative data collected in 2015 
 A qualitative dataset from a ten-area consortium that I could compare with 
data from two neighbouring cities and a county. 
 
The wish to interview a Troubled Families Co-ordinator from the North-West 
stemmed from the LA1 Co-ordinator’s belief that the area had more jobs and 
processes to support ‘troubled’ families into work. The lack of Phase Two 
quantitative national performance data meant I could not identify potential 
interviewees. Consequently, I liaised with my DCLG contact who recommended that 
I approach the LA4 Co-ordinator based on their excellent performance and North-
West location.  
 
Although it would have only taken an early start and one day of train travel to 
conduct the interview in person, my concern about the unreliability of public transport 
and the many ways that this arrangement could go wrong encouraged me to 
interview the LA4 Co-ordinator by telephone.  The success of the LA3 interview and 
my knowledge that I could establish a rapport over the phone with a stranger meant 
that I approached this session with some confidence. As with the LA2 and LA3 
interviews, I contacted the LA4 Co-ordinator by email and we had a prior telephone 
conversation to agree the logistics of the interview. I altered the interview schedule 
used for the LA1 and LA2 interviews to accommodate the timing of the LA4 session 
approximately ten months later and the Co-ordinator’s oversight of ten areas, 




Again, the semi-structured interview method enhanced the experience. Like his LA2 
and LA3 counterparts, the LA4 Co-ordinator had a great deal of ‘Troubled Families’ 
experience. My use of predetermined questions whose order could be changed 
based on the interviewer’s perception of appropriateness (Robson 2002) allowed me 
to give the session the natural feel of a conversation between two experts. The 
interview would have been less successful if I had used an unstructured format and 
left to chance my ability to develop the interaction with a stranger informally into 
specific areas (Robson 2002). In addition, a fully structured format with 
predetermined questions, fixed working and a pre-set order (Robson 2002) may 
have stilted my interlocutor’s flow and restricted his ability to talk at length about the 
programme. 
 
The LA4 interview was conducted ethically (Bryman 2012). I avoided harm to the 
participant and myself by speaking on the telephone rather than by meeting as 
strangers in an unfamiliar environment. In our email exchange before the interview 
and in the wording chosen for the Participant Information Sheet (Appendix Twenty-
Four), I took care to emphasise that the interview was for the purposes of learning 
more about the National Troubled Families Initiative to support improvement in the 
programme and Payment by Results provision. I made it clear that the interview 
would not challenge LA4’s Phase Two delivery - in the absence of any DCLG 
national performance data - or question the model adopted in Phase One. During the 
session, although I referenced the qualitative data already gathered, I took care not 
to intimate that one area’s approach was better than that selected elsewhere. 
 
By presenting the LA4 Co-ordinator with a Participant Consent Form (Appendix 
Twenty-Five) whilst we were planning the session and again before it began, I 
underlined the voluntary nature of his participation and gave him the opportunity to 
withdraw himself and his data at any time. A few weeks following the interview, I 
emailed him the transcription and invited him to make any amendments to the 




The data collection phase may have benefitted from interviewing the LA3 and LA4 
Co-ordinators together to understand how delivery in the North-West exactly 
compared with that in the South-East. However, to save two of us a lengthy journey - 
and because I only had limited technology - I just interviewed the LA4 Co-ordinator 
on his own and from the peace and seclusion of my office. 
 
Like his LA2 and LA3 counterparts, the LA4 Co-ordinator was an engaging, 
interesting speaker. He had an in-depth knowledge of the LA4 delivery model and, 
because he often discussed innovations with Co-ordinators in other high-performing 
parts of the country, he had a firm understanding of the programme elsewhere. 
Thus, what the session lost in not being able to make chronological, hierarchical or 
geographical comparisons at the point of recording, it gained in providing an 
overview of ‘Troubled Families’ in 2016 from the standpoint of a successful North-
West consortium. I also did not find that conducting the interview by telephone rather 
than face-to-face impacted negatively upon my ability to build a rapport with my 
interlocutor. 
 
The thematic narrative analysis of the Local Authority Four interview was as 
challenging as that of the LA3 interview as it also tightly interwove the key themes of 
service transformation, service delivery and the key worker. However, for the sake of 
consistency with the three previous interviews, the LA4 data is in the same format: 
 
1. Service transformation 
2. The local delivery model 
3. The concept of the ‘troubled’ family 
4. The programme outcomes 
5. The importance of the key worker role 
6. The principal’s lack of insight into the ‘Troubled Families’ operating context 
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7. The delivery of a national programme at a local level (LA4 2016). 
 
Service transformation was again a thread, which ran throughout the interview. LA4 
had extremely good data systems and data analysis processes, which facilitated 
movement away from “ten different models” with “different strengths and 
weaknesses” towards having a “single view of what a successful delivery model will 
look like” linked “into broader system transformation and wider reform” (LA4 2016) 
(pclxiv). LA4 did not view the National Troubled Families Initiative as operating in 
isolation or being solely responsible for the change achieved locally. Instead, it was a 
vehicle for supporting LA4’s broad ambitions around service transformation. 
 
LA4’s desire to have a single vision and to reduce duplication and inefficiency 
impacted upon their relationship with national and regional partners. They submitted 
data to DCLG as a consortium not as ten different local authorities and were to 
receive future funding on a regional and not an individual basis. LA4 also negotiated 
with partners such as health services, the Police, prisons and the National Probation 
Service as a one entity rather than several. Leadership was a key tenet of the local 
work and a recent evaluation was conducted with a view to demonstrating the 
collective value of ‘Troubled Families’ to LA4 with regards to its ambition around 
economic growth and enabling local people to take advantage of this. 
 
Service transformation underpinned the local delivery model. LA4 recognised 
‘Troubled Families’ ability to make sustained change with families with problems but 
presented the initiative as providing the funding to upscale existing work rather than 
solely encouraging the agent to work in a different way. Through extensive 
consultation with families, LA4 had been able to reflect on the Family Intervention 
Project model of intensive family work. They identified that which worked with 
families and currently prevented them from making changes. The cost of the FIP 
approach meant that LA4 could not replicate it for every family so they isolated the 
crucial factors that made the difference and rolled this out across the consortium. 
Thus, regardless of whether a family had a key worker from Social Care, the youth 
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offending service or the community police, they received the same standard and type 
of holistic family support, which included an asset-based approach and a single plan 
to avoid duplication and encourage agencies to share information and offer 
integrated services. 
 
The local Phase Two delivery model ensured that all families received support as 
opposed to the costliest families as recommended by DCLG (2014a). LA4 used their 
data to identify two types of families in need, the current most resource-rich families 
and those who would require services in the future. They targeted the latter 
proactively with Early Help support to address the problem now rather than waiting 
until the family become more ‘troubled’. 
 
Theme Three explored the concept of the ‘troubled’ family. The LA4 Co-ordinator 
firmly believed “there isn’t really a single view of what a troubled family is or should 
be” and claimed this was attributable to “granular detail around what motivates 
people in those communities [and] how those communities operate” (LA4 2016) 
(pclxix). He held the view that, although gang issues and knife crime were more 
prevalent in the south of the country, this was because, by definition, big cities had 
more families with different issues and some specific different types of issues and 
not because these areas were different in anyway. This was an interesting contrast 
to the view of the other three Co-ordinators. 
 
When discussing the programme outcomes, the LA4 Co-ordinator acknowledged 
that moving families with entrenched issues into employment was challenging but a 
number of local innovations meant that LA4 were “relatively pleased with our job 






 Encouraging engagement with the Troubled Families Employment Advisors 
 Empowering the Troubled Families Employment Advisors to invite key 
workers to give greater consideration to employability 
 Allowing the Troubled Families Employment Advisors to work alongside 
mainstream Job Centre Plus Advisors so that the aspirational, transformation, 
asset-based ‘Troubled Families’ approach was more widely adopted across 
the workforce 
 Using a case review process to support ‘troubled’ families to take some steps 
towards employment even if they are just small ones (LA4 2016).  
 
The LA4 Co-ordinator was keen to see the Troubled Families Employment Advisor 
role continue beyond 2020 due to the benefits that this provided. However, he 
confirmed - under Theme Five - the importance of the key worker role. LA4 showed 
great innovation over their attitude to this role. The consultation with families had 
enabled LA4 to agree a common description of a good key worker. Chief Executives 
across the area had then signed up to this and work was underway to develop this 
positive, asset-based, holistic ethos in all LA4 staff thus providing a consistent offer 
to families regardless of their point of entry to the programme. 
 
The LA4 Co-ordinator praised the principal for gaining more insight into the ‘Troubled 
Families’ operating context as the programme developed, broadening the Phase 
Two eligibility criteria and ensuring that they were “a bit more grounded in reality” 
(LA4 2016) (pclxix). However, LA4’s consultation with families and robust data 
analysis suggested that they had more insight into the operating context than DCLG. 
 
When discussing the final point - the delivery of a national programme at a local level 
– the LA4 Co-ordinator noted that the local area was experiencing significant growth. 
In my mind, this placed LA4 closer to LA3 than LA1 and LA2 economically. However, 
the challenge was to engage employers so that ‘troubled’ families can experience 
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these economic benefits too. An example of this was not letting practical challenges 
such as having a criminal record prevent an adult getting a job and moving off 
workless benefit.  
 
The LA4 Co-ordinator was not in favour of ‘Troubled Families’ continuing beyond 
2020; believing that this gave the agent sufficient time to mainstream its holistic 
approach and transform local services. However, he wanted to see the Government 
use this vehicle to show other departments such as the Departments of Health, Work 
and Pensions and Education what was achieved at a local and national level. This 
would provide a shared understanding of: 
 
 The achievements of the National Troubled Families Initiative 
 How family support should look 
 How all services must contribute to the collective whole (LA4 2016).  
 
The LA4 Co-ordinator also wanted the principal to reflect on the programme from a 
national perspective to understand the positives and the negatives and use this 
learning to influence future provision. He was also keen to use this research project 
to support this reflection. 
 
5.6.5   THE LA1 SENIOR MANAGER INTERVIEW 
 
I conducted the LA1 Senior Manager interview on 15th June 2016. It lasted ten 
minutes and fourteen seconds. It provided new information about the National 
Troubled Families Initiative. Although the transcription of the interview is relatively 
short, it is in Appendix Forty-One rather than appearing in its entirety here. This is to 
create consistency with the other four interviews. 
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The LA1 Senior Manager interview took place almost a year after the interview with 
the LA1 Troubled Families Co-ordinator. This gave me an opportunity to analyse the 
programme: 
 
 Chronologically - from Summer 2015 to Summer 2016 in the local authority 
area of which I had the most insider knowledge  
 Hierarchically - through the eyes of an LA1 strategic manager and LA1’s 
‘operational’ Troubled Families Co-ordinator 
 Geographically - through the eyes of a strategic manager in the North-East 
and ‘strategic’ Troubled Families Co-ordinators from the South-East and 
North-West 
 Socio-economically - and compare this and the other two North-East 
interviews with those conducted elsewhere in the country.  
 
A number of factors led to me choosing the specific LA1 strategic manager that I 
interviewed: 
 
 She was the most senior manager in the City Council who was directly 
involved with LA1’s ‘Troubled Families’ programme 
 She was part of the local Programme Board and always present at the 
strategic meetings that set the future local focus of the initiative 
 We had a long-standing personal relationship  
 She was supportive of me in 2004 when I began my MBA research project 




I therefore felt comfortable approaching her to be part of this research project and 
knew that the interview would be illuminating and enjoyable. As an experienced 
researcher, I was aware of the challenges in interviewing senior staff but, because of 
our personal relationship, I did not approach this interview any differently to the one 
with the LA1 Troubled Families Co-ordinator. 
 
However, as with the previous four interviews, I conducted this final one ethically 
(Bryman 2012). We discussed the parameters of the interview by email beforehand. I 
shared the Participant Information Sheet (Appendix Twenty-Four) and the Participant 
Consent Form (Appendix Twenty-Five) during the planning of the session and again 
before it began. I highlighted that I designed the interview to learn more about the 
National Troubled Families Initiative from a strategic point of view and so improve 
both ‘Troubled Families’ and Payment by Results provision. I made it clear that I did 
not intend the interview to challenge LA1’s delivery of the programme. 
 
I chose not to interview the LA1 senior manager either with her operational 
counterpart or with the LA3 and LA4 Troubled Families Co-ordinators for ethical 
reasons. The former would have enabled me to learn more about the operational 
delivery of ‘Troubled Families’ in 2016 and to compare it with how the programme 
was currently being viewed at a strategic level. However, interviewing the LA1 
Troubled Families Co-ordinator in front of a strategic colleague may have caused 
harm to both participants (Bryman 2012). The senior manager may have felt 
uncomfortable discussing her and her peers’ views of the programme with an 
operational colleague present. The Co-ordinator may not have wished to divulge her 
personal opinions about the local delivery model in front of the organisation’s 
Assistant Chief Executive. Such an interview would also have presented some 
logistic difficulties. The Co-ordinator departed the organisation in January 2016 and 
LA1 did not replace her. An interview with the LA3 and LA4 Co-ordinators would 




 One strategic manager (the LA1 senior manager) in a local authority with a 
“failing” Children’s Social Care Service (LA1 2016) (pclxxxii) 
 One strategic Troubled Families Co-ordinator (from LA3) with a strategic role 
across the national programme from a local authority with “a highly-rated 
Children’s Services, (…) a good youth offending team (…), a good, a 
committed Police Force” (LA3 2016) (pcxlii) 
 One strategic Troubled Families Co-ordinator (from LA4) who had linkages 
across ten authorities and bargained with the Police and other key regional 
partners on behalf of the consortium. 
 
However, I elected not to do this to both avoid asking two participants to undertake a 
lengthy journey or to be part of a complicated cross-country simultaneous phone call 
involving speakerphones and mobile telephones. I also did not wish to cause 
embarrassment to any of the three parties or appear as if I wanted to pitch three 
areas in competition with each other.  
 
We had agreed the interview schedule beforehand. I did not present her with the 
same interview schedule as used with the LA1 Co-ordinator or the shortened version 
of this used with the strategic LA3 and LA4 Co-ordinators. Instead, I asked just three 
questions to provide a strategic perspective on: 
 
 The clarity of the Phase One and Phase Two targets. I wished to test the 
theory that they were clear in Phase One because they were quantitative  
 The ease with which the agent could measure the Phase One and Phase Two 
targets. I wished to test the theory that they were easy to measure in Phase 
One because they were quantitative but less so in Phase Two because 




 The issues involved in applying the Phase One and Phase Two targets to 
service delivery. 
 
The semi-structured interview method enabled me to ask these three questions plus 
others to probe my interlocutor further. A fully structured format with predetermined 
questions, fixed working and a pre-set order (Robson 2002) would have prevented 
this but an unstructured format where I left to chance my ability to develop the 
interaction (Robson 2002) would have created challenges. Even discussing 
‘Troubled Families’ in this manner with a valued colleague may have left crucial 
areas unexplained. My use of predetermined questions (Robson 2002) did not affect 
the flow of our interaction or make the brief session seem stilted.  
 
By the time of the interview, I had insider knowledge that the prediction of the LA1 
Co-ordinator (LA1 2015a) had come true and the local authority had faced some 
challenges in converting work done with ‘troubled’ families into verifiable, attributable 
Phase Two outcomes that they could present to DCLG. I was therefore interested to 
gain a strategic view of this but to do so in an ethical, appropriate manner and not 
cause harm to my colleague or LA1, invade her privacy, behave deceitfully (Bryman 
2012) or ask distressing or offensive questions (SRA 2003). 
 
The interview was scheduled to take place in the LA1 senior manager’s quiet office. 
Our acquaintanceship meant that this was perfectly appropriate and did not cause a 
threat to either of us. However, due to my own ill health that week, we actually 
conducted it by telephone. I was unconcerned by this detail because I felt secure in 
our relationship, now had the experience of two successful telephone interviews with 
senior managers that I did not know and had already provided my colleague with the 
interview schedule.  
 
The change of plan did not detract from the session and I was still able to gather 
rich, meaningful data. The session flowed and was informal. I used it as an 
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opportunity to gather new data and reflect on some of the information that I had 
learned about other areas’ Phase One performance including LA2 simplifying the 
national outcome framework and registering no ASB rather than ASB reduced by 
60% (DCLG 2012b). I also shared my perception and that of LA3 and LA4 that 
health data was proving a challenge because it was measured qualitatively and not 
quantitatively in Phase Two. However, I took care to do this in a discreet manner that 
did not name any of my previous interlocutors or make any insinuations about the 
quality of their local offer. 
 
The thematic narrative analysis of the response revealed the presence of two 
themes: the difficulty of delivering a national programme locally and the potential of 
‘Troubled Families’ to deliver service transformation. The LA1 senior manager stated 
that the guidance issued by the principal in Phase One was clear. The challenge was 
applying the principal’s definition of a ‘troubled’ family to the local population in LA1 
and ascertaining who was in the cohort and who was not. The difficulty had lain 
around local families’ data being on different data systems, which had to be updated 
and overlaid. However, the process was more difficult in Phase Two due to the “high 
level outcomes” (LA1 2016) (pclxxix) and the fact that the difference made with 
families had to be demonstrated before an outcome funding claim could be made as 
opposed to just achieving a clear, quantitative target. In her opinion, “there could be 
a better way of doing it” (LA1 2016) (pclxxx). Further complications were: 
 
 Data protection and specifically the “data audit guardian role” (pclxxx) 
 Ascertaining if families were giving informed consent or not 
 The part that Health played in the programme 
 The volume of families involved in Phase Two who had to be identified, 




The LA1 senior manager applauded the overall ‘Troubled Families’ policy direction 
but noted that the backdrop to the programme of “public sector reform, the budget 
situation” that encouraged the agent to be innovative actually detracted from it. She 
hinted at the impact of the austerity measures and stated, “everything is getting cut 
back (…) time and personnel who actually deliver direct interventions (…) welfare 
reform” (LA1 2016) (pclxxxi). She noted the difficulty of getting partners to be part of 
the programme and make a difference; an interesting contrast with her former 
colleague’s view of ‘Troubled Families’ as an “embedded model” (LA1 2015a) (pxc). 
This meant that it was hard to mainstream the ethos of the programme and stop 
partner agencies seeing it as time-consuming and separate from their core business 
rather than part of it. A further issue was the high standards expected of local 
authorities. Ofsted had branded Local Authority One’s Children’s Services as 
inadequate and placed them in the anomalous position of having a successful 
‘Troubled Families’ programme addressing children who need help under Criterion 
Three (DCLG 2014b) but where Social Care practice was not actually good enough. 
 
5.7 THE THEMATIC ANALYSIS OF THE QUALITATIVE INTERVIEW DATA 
 
The thematic narrative analysis of the five interviews was followed by their thematic 
analysis. This enabled me to: 
 
 Comprehend four hours-worth of qualitative data 
 Integrate related data drawn from five different transcripts, four geographical 
areas and across almost one year 
 Explore further the key themes of service transformation, the concept of the 
‘troubled’ family, the programme outcomes, the local ‘Troubled Families’ 
delivery model, the importance of the key worker role, the principal’s lack of 
insight into the ‘Troubled Families’ operating context and the delivery of a 
national programme at a local level 
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 Develop and test explanations and theories based on apparent thematic 
patterns or relationships 
 Draw and verify conclusions about the case study of the National Troubled 
Families Initiative that could support the achievement of targets in Payment by 
Results provision (Saunders et al 2016). 
 
I drew seven propositions directly from the thematic analysis of the Phase One 
DCLG national and LA1 local quantitative data (DCLG 2015c and LA1 2015b) and 
the narrative analysis of the five qualitative interviews and tested these.  
 
5.7.1 Proposition One 
The real value of the National Troubled Families Initiative is not to make sustained 
change with families with problems by, for example, reducing their entrenched anti-
social behaviour, youth crime, poor school attendance and worklessness but to 
encourage local services to work together in a transformative way to reduce 
duplication and create efficiencies by offering, targeted, preventative holistic family 
support 
 
This proposition rejected the notion propagated by the Phase One eligibility criteria 
(DCLG 2012b), the DCLG Phase One national performance data (DCLG 2015c) and 
the unpublished Phase Two performance data that achievement under the four key 
performance indicators was the most important outcome of the programme. The 
length to which the four interlocutors who either held a senior role in their authority or 
were Wave One Early Starters discussed this proposition reflected: 
 
 The importance of service transformation to them 




 The need for the agent to be transformational in order to achieve the 
programme’s targets.  
 
30% of the Local Authority One senior manager’s interview (LA1 2016) comprised 
service transformation. 36% of the LA2 Co-ordinator’s testimony discussed service 
transformation and specifically referred to “a way of working that might transform 
quite a few other things” and “the service transformation agenda” (LA2 2015) (pxcviii 
and cv). 37% of the LA3 Co-ordinator’s testimony referenced service transformation. 
Interestingly, the third sector consortium commissioned by Local Authority Three to 
achieve positive outcomes with their “untransformed families” (LA3 2016) (pclvii) was 
called ‘Transform’. 67% of the Local Authority Four interview discussed service 
transformation and the phrases “broader system transformation and wider reform” 
and “our broader ambitions around service transformation” appeared (LA4 2016) 
(pclxiv).  
 
The three Wave One Early Starters claimed that the National Troubled Families 
Initiative supported rather than launched their desire to adopt multi-agency holistic 
family working as a means of transforming local services. LA4 had taken the greatest 
strides in transforming local services including viewing the initiative as a consortium 
of ten authorities rather than separate areas and negotiating collectively with the 
agent and other key partners such as the Police and National Probation Service. 
Their Co-ordinator claimed that ‘Troubled Families’ had provided much needed 
funding for their work with ‘complex’ families. This had enabled LA4 to upscale 
existing services or those that needed to be in place. Without the initiative, local 
delivery would have been very traditional and based on the FIP approach. With 
‘Troubled Families’, LA4 had developed innovative work based on a shared 
understanding of what a good key worker was and a common desire to embed this 
across the area; an asset-based approach that built on families’ strengths and 





LA2 and LA3 concurred with this view. The National Troubled Families Initiative had 
given “impetus” (LA2 2015) (pcxxxiii) to the whole systems approach that LA2 were 
moving towards anyway. It enabled partners to work ‘with’ families with complex 
needs rather than sanction them and improved collaboration between Adult Services 
and Children’s Services. The programme funding had also enabled LA2 to meet the 
shortfall in their budget in Phase Two and link all partner agencies into a shared 
family outcomes plan. In LA3, ‘Troubled Families’ provided a “catalyst” and helpful 
“seed funding” (LA3 2016) (pcxli) for work that local partners committed to and which 
reaped a conservative estimate of £2.4M per annum of costs avoided including 
£1,300,000 for DWP.  
 
There was some frustration that the transformational ability of the National Troubled 
Families Initiative was not more widely recognised. The LA2 Co-ordinator called for 
more acknowledgement of the culture shift in terms of how partner agencies now 
worked together to deliver family services rather than just a focus on the 
measurement of families’ progress. The LA4 Co-ordinator advised the principal to 
reflect on the programme’s achievements and to use this learning when designing 
future programmes. 
 
In a related issue, it is noticeable that the principal presented ‘Troubled Families’ as 
a programme in which the English local authorities worked with other stakeholders 
including Health partners (DCLG 2012b and DCLG 2014a). DCLG (2014a) claimed 
that a new national health offer launched in November 2014 included a new protocol 
to enable the safe sharing of health information with troubled families’ key workers. 
However, all five participants spoke of the need for Health to commit more to the 
ethos of the programme rather than erect barriers. The London Rough Sleepers 
Project highlighted data protection and the unavailability of key health information 
thus suggesting that this is an on-going concern across Payment by Results 
provision. In the context of ‘Troubled Families’ only LA3 had taken definite steps to 
address the issue by recruiting a health secondee to the local programme. Thus, it 
appears that, while the agent and its partners transformed services at a local level, 
the principal and its partners at a national level were not replicating this. 
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5.7.2 Proposition Two 
Despite being a Payment by Results programme, the National Troubled Families 
Initiative’s outcomes framework lacked clarity and ease of measurement 
 
The literature stated that the principal should set clear expectations for performance 
in their Payment by Results provision (NAO 2015) and that an effective outcome 
must have clarity and complexity, be verifiable and attributable and factor in 
deadweight (Webster 2016). In Phase One, the principal required the agent to 
reduce ‘troubled’ families’ ASB by 60% and their youth offending by 33%, improve 
their school attendance to 85% or more and move adults into training or employment 
(DCLG 2012b). Such was the significance of this issue to the four participants whom 
I quizzed; the programme outcomes framework comprised 39%, 33%, 33% and 50% 
of our interviews (LA1 2015, LA2 2015, LA3 2016 and LA1 2016). 
 
The LA1 Senior Manager agreed that the guidance issued by the principal in Phase 
One was clear. Any difficulties had been local ones and related to families’ data 
residing on several databases thus making identification difficult. However, two 
challenges were present in Phase Two; the “high level outcomes” (LA1 2016) 
(pclxxix) and the fact that, rather than achieving a specific quantitative target with the 
families, the agent had to demonstrate the difference made with them before 
requesting an outcome payment. The volume of families in the Phase Two system 
and the barriers erected by Health partners who did not wish to share families’ 
personal health information increased the difficulty of this task. 
 
The LA2 Co-ordinator echoed these concerns and noted that some information from 
health was still outstanding from the local family outcomes plan. Phase Two required 
the agent to track “thousands and thousands and thousands of bits of data” (LA2 
2015) (pcxi) so that they could evidence the progress of each family member in each 
relevant entry criteria. LA2 used their database to great effect in Phase One to both 
identify families already receiving a service that could be extended to reach the 
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whole family and those who had triggered a payment. However, they were 
concerned about their lack of “an all-singing, all-dancing case recording system” in 
Phase Two (LA2 2015) (pcxii).  
 
LA2 overcame one challenge posed by Phase Two by only targeting work at family 
priority groups for which they could collect baseline data and then measure their 
progress. Thus, there was no outcome for young carers although LA2’s policy of 
supporting all families in need meant these youngsters would still receive a service 
where required. LA2 also took a preventative approach for example targeting 
families characterised by school lateness and well as poor school attendance 
therefore preventing rather than reacting to ‘troubles’ 
 
Although the Phase One outcome framework appeared simple, in that it provided 
clear quantitative targets for the agent to aim at, it did allow some unintended 
consequences. Therefore, LA1’s Phase One performance (DCLG 2015c) included 
families who achieved success within the programme, families who did not receive a 
service and ‘turned around’ themselves, families whom an agency outside of 
‘Troubled Families’ ‘turned around’ and families who made no change but no longer 
meet the eligibility criteria. LA2 and LA3 audited their claims to remove these 
“freebies” (LA3 2016) (pcl). However, LA1’s legitimate making of such claims means 
that the principal funded three types of ‘successful’ family outcome and one type of 
‘unsuccessful’ family outcome in Phase One; something backed up by my own 
personal experience of the local programme. 
 
The LA1 Co-ordinator was adamant that these anomalies would be removed from 
the Phase Two outcomes plan and only families who made a positive change in the 
context of the programme would be claimed for but predicted that it would be difficult 
to “get families out at the other end” (LA1 2015a) (plxxxvii-lxxxviii) and evidence 
tangible claimable progress. She also noted that national legislative changes must 
make health data easier to obtain.  
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Her North-Eastern colleague revealed that Local Authority Two had actually 
simplified the Phase One performance framework (DCLG 2012) and claimed for 
families who had completely ceased committing ASB rather than those who 
committed 60% less. This represented value-for-money for the principal but also 
indicated that there was no consistency between the final performance data reported 
by the principal (DCLG 2015c). Here, ‘success’ therefore ranged from families who 
had either completely ceased misbehaving in their communities or who had 
committed only four offences recently rather than ten. This therefore makes it 
unclear exactly what Phase One achieved, an unsatisfactory state of affairs for a 
Payment by Results programme. 
 
Changes in the environment can have an unforeseen impact on PbR provision. 
Welfare reform meant that the agent of the London Rough Sleepers Project 
anticipated finding it easy to reconnect non-UK nationals with their home country as 
individuals from the European Economic Area could only claim housing benefit in 
specific circumstances (DCLG 2015a). Therefore, any future success in the 
‘reconnection’ outcome was likely to be attributable to fate as much as specific work. 
Athletes’ potential future abilities to mask their use of performance enhancing drugs 
will impact on Team GB’s medal success and record-breaking. Therefore, they must 
continue to invest in elite athletes’ performance and marginal gains to overcome this. 
These examples illustrate that, while the principal cannot always predict the future 
impact of the environment on their PbR provision, gaining true insight into the 
operating context (NAO 2015) and predicting potential unintended consequences 
can remove some opportunities for the agent to exploit the principal and clearly show 








5.7.3 Proposition Three 
The key worker role is integral to ‘troubled’ families achieving positive outcomes 
while the Troubled Families Employment Advisors are crucial to increasing the 
numbers of ‘troubled families’ in employment.  
 
The theme of the key worker role did not capture the imagination of my interlocutors 
as much as service transformation and the programme outcome framework. 
However, the importance of the key workers to the delivery of ‘Troubled Families 
was evident by the fact that this discussion comprised 17% of the interview with the 
LA2 Co-ordinator, 11% of the interviews in Local Authority One and Four and 9% of 
the LA3 interview. 
 
The testimony of the four Troubled Families Co-ordinators clearly placed these 
“super beings” (LA2 2015) (pcxix) at the heart of integrated, multi-agency family 
support. So committed were LA4 to the role, they identified the essential qualities of 
a key worker and agreed at Chief Executive level to cascade this ethos throughout 
their delivery so that service users received a co-ordinated, asset-based service 
regardless of their point of entry. Where LA1 and LA2 specifically commissioned 
mentoring, training and support to their frontline workforce and LA2 worked to 
improve their managers’ supervisory skills, LA3 allowed their ten local delivery areas 
to commission the workforce development that they needed to meet local needs. 
Phase Two saw LA1 working hard with partners to convey the message that all 
family services had a part to play in achieving positive outcomes with service users 
and working towards the programme targets. 
 
The success of the ‘Troubled Families’ key worker role mirrored that of the Rough 
Sleepers’ navigators whose innovative work achieved progress with their service 
user cohort. Team GB mirrors this with the relationship between athletes and their 
coaches. The Delaware Substance Misuse Programme supports its service users 
through greater access to staff via expanded opening hours (Webster 2016). 
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Another group of ‘Troubled Families’ staff singled out for praise were the 
Employment Advisors seconded from Job Centre Plus. The Co-ordinators saw them 
as making the greatest impact on moving the families closer to employment. They 
had raised awareness of local jobs, challenged key workers to be more aspirational 
about local ‘troubled’ families, supported them to discuss employability with the 
families, targeted young people in LA3 who were closer to the jobs market, took an 
asset-based approach and encouraged families with resources such as a pick-up 
truck to become self-employed. There was the suggestion that economically 
depressed areas such as LA2 needed additional investment in the local economy to 
create jobs. Further work was required with employees to encourage them to remove 
barriers to ‘troubled’ families working such as criminal records checks and to 
consider employing someone with a complex lifestyle as a means of supporting them 
away from this. 
 
This praise of the key workers and Troubled Families Employment Advisors 
confirmed my personal experience of the importance of their roles to my local 
‘Troubled Families’ programme. 
 
5.7.4 Proposition Four  
‘Troubled’ families are not the same across England. 
 
The comparison of the LA1 Phase One quantitative data (LA1 2015b) with the entry 
criteria that the national cohort of Phase One families met (DCLG 2012b) revealed 
that ‘troubled’ families are not the same across the country. Indeed, more of the LA1 
Phase One cohort met each of the three eligibility criteria of youth crime and ASB, 
school issues and worklessness than the national cohort and appeared to have 
further to travel to ‘turn around’ their ‘troubles. The four Troubled Families Co-





There was some disagreement between the four Troubled Families Co-ordinators as 
to whether ‘troubled’ families were the same or not. The LA1, LA2 and LA3 
representatives saw families from the South or London as having a specific set of 
issues relating to violent crime. These included “gang-related issues (…) knife crime 
(…) gun crime (…) the extremism agenda” (LA1 2015a) (plxxvii). The LA1 Co-
ordinator also highlighted that the ‘troubles’ of rural families’ were very different to 
those of families residing in inner cities. The LA4 Co-ordinator agreed that ‘troubled’ 
families were different but extended the concept, believing that: 
 
“There isn’t really a single view of what a troubled family is or should be so you know 
whether it is kind of based on different cultures and different demographies” (LA4 
2016) (pclxix). 
 
This caused an issue for the agent who the principal asked to affect specific change 
with a particular type of service user in return for a uniform payment without truly 
understanding the diversity of that service user. This is an argument in support of 
segmentation (Webster 2016) and the adoption of a varying attachment fee as 
suggested by the LA3 Co-ordinator. 
 
There was consistency in the acknowledgment that different stakeholders had 
different perceptions of ‘troubled’ families. The two North-East Co-ordinators noted 
that the public held a stereotypical view of ‘troubled’ families promoted by media 
output such as “Benefit Street” (LA2 2015) (pc). They saw them as “neighbours from 
hell” (LA2 2015) (pc) and: 
 
“A person with nine kids who doesn’t go out to work, whose kids cause a load of 
problems in the neighbourhood, who are always fighting in the streets, drinking” (LA1 




This view contrasted with the key workers who saw their “vulnerabilities” (LA2 2015) 
(pci) and perceived them as “dysfunctional” (LA1 2015a) (plxxvii) rather than 
‘troubled’ and the families themselves who did not recognise themselves as 
‘troubled’, just as dealing with life. 
 
This is an argument against labelling service users with a negative term such as 
‘troubled’ when they are in fact ‘vulnerable’ and managing difficult circumstances in 
the best way that they can and is a useful lesson for future funders, principals and 
agents of PbR provision to address social need. 
 
5.7.5 Proposition Five 
Despite the principal’s guidance, the agent is working with all Phase Two ‘troubled’ 
families and not just those costly families with multiple problems who are most likely 
to benefit from a whole-family approach 
 
The principal clearly invited the agent to work in Phase Two with families presenting 
the “highest cost to the public purse” who were “most likely to benefit from an 
integrated, whole family approach” (DCLG 2014a:7). The four Troubled Families Co-
ordinators discussed this challenge for an average of 5.75% of their interviews.  
 
All four Co-ordinators welcomed the broadening of the eligibility criteria for Phase 
Two (DCLG 2014a) but made it quite clear that they viewed this Phase as 
encouraging preventative work with all families in need rather than those with the 
most entrenched issues. The principal may address this issue during the Phase Two 
spot checks. However, potentially by asking the agent to demonstrate progress with 
families rather than begin with a quantitative baseline, identify families who did not 
meet this and then work with them to achieve a specific numeric target, DCLG 




The Delaware Substance Misuse Programme has an element of prevention like 
‘Troubled Families’ Phase Two. Although all of its clients are already substance-
misusing offenders and therefore in ‘trouble’ rather than moving towards it, its three-
level structure allows preventative work with lower level male and female offenders 
and is not only open to higher level prisoners with up to eighteen months still to 
serve (State of Delaware 2016). The London Homeless Project too supported a 
range of clients including those from Central and Eastern Europe who came to the 
UK to work, lost their jobs and became homeless. These European clients generally 
had construction skills, were closer to the labour market and did not have the 
complex barriers of substance misuse and mental health illness (DCLG 2015a). 
 
The notion that PbR can prevent future ‘trouble’ as well as address current ‘trouble’ 
is significant and funders, principals and agents should note it. 
 
5.7.6 Proposition Six 
The principal did not have enough insight into the operating context when designing 
the National Troubled Families Initiative. 
 
The literature is very clear that the principal must develop insight into the operating 
context before designing their PbR scheme (NAO 2015). Prior to designing ‘Key’, 
‘Crest’ and ‘Aftercare’, the State of Delaware developed insight into the extent of 
their offender population’s substance misuse issues, its impact on reoffending rates 
and the seven-fold bonus that investment in substance misuse-treatment reaped 
(State of Delaware 2016). Team GB’s Olympic and Paralympic Programme 
continues to develop insight into the operating context and invest in marginal gains 
to achieve their targets (Fordyce 2016 and Hudson 2016). In contrast, DCLG did not 
gain insight into the operating context before launching ‘Troubled Families’; 
particularly around not even having a clear idea of how many families in England 
actually committed ASB and youth crime and did not engage with education or 
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employment (Levitas 2012). They had also not consulted ‘troubled’ families when 
designing the programme.  
 
This lack of insight was crucial to Local Authority Two and Three and led to some 
limited discussion in all four Troubled Families Co-ordinator interviews. LA2 and LA3 
lost out significantly and materially in Phase One because of it. Local data informed 
the former that they had 80% more ‘troubled’ families than their target while the latter 
had 372 more Phase One ‘troubled’ families than the DCLG figure. The principal’s 
lack of insight into the number of eligible families in each local area therefore cost 
the two authorities up to £3,232,000 and £1,488,000 in outcome funding.  
 
Local Authority Two made up for this oversight by analysing their own local situation 
to understand what was already in place and what new provision was needed to 
achieve the programme’s targets and collect the full funding allocation: 
 
“I think for the first six months I think from the March to the September I probably 
spent a lot of time looking at you know building partnership arrangements that we 
could get data sharing in place, we could get those sort of that data in, you know and 
looked at I suppose again we used quite an analytical approach in saying if we did 
nothing what would we achieve if we used the kind of false criteria that we had. So 
we have this is what our sort of you know situation normal nothing changes so in fact 
what do we need to do to enhance that. Where do we get those kind of results? So 
we looked at the kind of you know, where would we have had success? So that kind 
of informed a kind of thematic approach then to say that we needed to work in 
particular areas (…) We already knew that we had quite a good platform of intensive 
family support services so we built on some of that (…) we kind of selected our 
groups of 1010, we knew not all of them were going to need or tolerate intensive 
family support. So it was kind of a third, so we knew probably about a third of that 
group would need intensive family support. About a third would need kind of focused 
work in an integrated way Team Around the Family and then a third would need kind 
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of like much more community-based interventions. So that is where we kind of like 
you developed our programmes” (LA2 2015) (pcii-ciii). 
 
The interviews illustrated that the agent had largely yet to recognise the importance 
of speaking to the families to gain insight into their needs. The LA1 Co-ordinator was 
unmoved by the previous lack of consultation with the programme’s service users 
and had no plans to involve families in the delivery of Phase One. Local Authority 
Two had also not listened to the voices of their families in a significant way although 
service users did inform the development of intensive family work by feeding back to 
individual providers. The LA3 Co-ordinator was aware that families could make a 
greater contribution to the programme and resolved to encourage local providers to 
use them as a resource in Phase Two to build community resilience. Only Local 
Authority Four had truly placed their families’ voices at the heart of their offer. They 
ascertained the drivers and barriers to local families’ success and built their delivery 
model around this. 
 
The interview transcriptions therefore revealed the significant material impact that 
the principal’s lack of insight into the operating context can have upon the agent but 
showed that the ‘Troubled Families’ agent was slow to consult their service users to 
ensure that the programme met their needs and would achieve its targets because of 
this.  
 
5.7.7 Proposition Seven 
The principal of the National Troubled Families Initiative required the agent to 
manage unacceptable financial risk.  
 
Both Phases of the National Troubled Families Initiative required the agent to work at 
risk, an issue that the Troubled Families Co-ordinators briefly referenced. The 
principal only released the full programme funding when the agent was able to 
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demonstrate the achievement of the requisite outcomes. This offered a particular 
challenge to LA2. The austerity measures hit them heavily (Appendix Two) and 
included a £5M cut to their family services in 2015. The authority overcame this 
disadvantage by building the ‘Troubled Families’ service delivery model around 
ensuring that the programme’s targets were reached so that they could claim all of 
the funding available. This presented an interesting contrast to the other heavily-cut 
North-East local authority (Appendix Two) whose Co-ordinator spoke of Phase Two 
as “an embedded model” where they “don’t use the money for anything” (LA1 2015a) 
(pxc). Therefore, making it unclear to what extent LA1 relied on the ‘Troubled 
Families’ outcome funding. 
 
Despite LA2’s financial pressures, they had refused to pass the ‘Troubled Families’ 
financial risk onto their voluntary sector commissioned providers although they had 
asked them to work towards achieving the Phase Two family outcome plan and 
periodically collected data from them. LA3 had shown similar leadership and actually 
paid their commissioned provider more than the £4,000 available from DCLG in 
Phase One to ‘turn around’ their most ‘troubled’ families. 
 
LA3 were in the fortunate position of being able to supplement their Phase One 
‘Troubled Families’ model with £1.4M-worth of County Council and Health funding 
and thus work with all families requiring support in Phase One rather than just those 
who met the eligibility criteria (DCLG 2012b). They also viewed the Phase One 
attachment fee as being sufficient to meet the needs of their local families and saved 
up the outcome fee. 
 
Despite LA1 and LA2 suffering significantly from the austerity measures (Appendix 
Two) and the latter using the programme funding to underpin existing delivery rather 
than commissioning new provision neither Co-ordinator objected to DCLG offering 
the same reward for success regardless of the resources of each local authority or 
the reduction in the fee per family for Phase Two. This significantly challenged my 
own assumptions about their views. Both described the latter as commensurate with 
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a programme that had to achieve success with 400,000 families rather than 120,000. 
The LA3 Co-ordinator was clear that a funding structure that took into account the 
agent’s resources beyond the programme was unfair, as it would suggest that one 
set of service users were more valuable than another set. However, he conceded 
that ‘segmentation’ (Webster 2016) based on the number of eligible criteria that 
entrants met was one possible way to adjust the size of the attachment fee. 
 
The example of the Delaware Substance Misuse Programme and the London 
Homeless Project underlined the importance of getting the performance framework 
completely right. The former had proxy indicators, which were as effective as 
outcomes (Webster 2016). The latter challenged the agent who was negatively 
affected by the principal’s lack of insight in the operating context of rough sleepers. 
For example: 
 
 The baseline measure of reduced rough sleeping failed to recognise that 
some successful clients still sleep out occasionally 
 Some clients volunteered but for less than eight hours per week thus meaning 
no claim could be made for this key step in their progress 
 The health metric quantitatively measured Accident and Emergency 
admissions. However, this data was hard to get and not the optimum 
measurement of individual wellbeing (DCLG 2015).  
 
Collectively, these issues reduced the opportunity for the agent to draw down all of 
the programme funding. Perhaps, if the principal had not provided 40% of the 
funding through the stable accommodation outcome, the project would not have 
been financially viable.  
 
These lessons coupled with those from ‘Troubled Families’ illustrate the need for the 
principal to fully understanding the operating context before designing their PbR 
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provision and potentially ‘exploiting’ the agent by passing the financial risk onto 
them. 
 
5.8 SUMMARY  
 
Chapter Five comprised the creation and interpretation of new knowledge (K1). This 
knowledge came from my analysis of the Phase One DCLG national and LA1 local 
quantitative data provided by the principal and the agent of the National Troubled 
Families Initiative and the qualitative data gathered during the five semi-structured 
interviews with employees from four local areas in which ‘Troubled Families’ was 
delivered. Chapter Five showed my ability to make informed judgements in the 
absence of complete data - particularly quantitative data - on complex issues relating 
to Payment by Results and the National Troubled Families Initiative case study (S1). 
It also illustrated my aptitude for undertaking applied research and development at 
advanced level to contribute substantially to the development of a new approach to 
target achievement in PbR (S2) and my ability to exercise personal responsibility and 
largely autonomous initiative - as a lone insider researcher - in complex and 
unpredictable situations in professional environments (S3). 
 
The knowledge gained during the research project significantly increases the 
understanding of the National Troubled Families Initiative. It also challenged my 
considerable ‘Troubled Families’ insider knowledge; particularly with regards to LA1 
and LA2’s positive management of financial risk and their refusal to allow local 
austerity measures to detract from the programme delivery. The new knowledge 
supplements Hoggett et al (2014) and Hayden (2015) in two ways. Firstly, because I 
was an insider researcher with an existing knowledge of the programme and 
collected and analysed data from across the country and from operational and 
strategic employees of the agent rather than just focusing on a single city. Secondly, 
because I drew on my existing knowledge of the business and management 
literature and used the lens of Stakeholder Theory and Agency Theory and Payment 




Chapter Six will interpret the new knowledge created by this research project, which 
is of a quality to satisfy peer review, extend the forefront of professional practice in 
Payment by Results provision and merit publication (K1). I will clearly communicate 
my practical framework for target achievement in PbR and recommendations for 
improved target achievement in the National Troubled Families Initiative in a manner 
understandable to specialist and non-specialist audiences (S1). I will also display my 
aptitude for applied research and development at advanced level and substantial 





CHAPTER SIX – A PRACTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ACHIEVING 
TARGETS IN PAYMENT BY RESULTS PROVISION AND THE 




Chapter Six presents a practical framework for achieving targets in Payment by 
Results provision. It provides an example from the ‘real world’ of public sector PbR 
provision to direct policy and to instruct strategic and operational managers how to 
use the framework as a management tool for target achievement. This ‘real world’ 
scenario is a mentoring project for vulnerable young people aged 5-25, which Local 
Authority Two (LA2) intend to commission in 2017. However, the dynamic nature of 
this management tool means it can be applied beyond the world of ‘troubled’ families 
and vulnerable young people. The framework can be generalised for all PbR 
provision. It can be used locally, regionally and nationally across the public sector 
wherever target achievement and the provision of value to stakeholders is required. 
Thus, it can be applied in policing and law enforcement; defence and homeland 
security; health - in settings as diverse as GP practices, hospitals and Clinical 
Commissioning Groups; primary, secondary, further and higher education; and 
training and employment. Chapter Six closes with recommendations for the 
achievement of the requisite Phase Two ‘Troubled Families’ targets locally and 
nationally.  
 
The applicability of the tool across a breadth of public sector PbR provision renders it 
extremely commercially viable. There will be less wastage in schemes managed by 
the framework. Less wastage creates efficiencies for the principal and means that 
the agent can effectively utilise more of the available outcome funding. This offers 
further positive outcomes. The resulting efficiencies can fund further Payment by 
Results schemes led by the principal, create additional jobs for the agent and 
generate further good outcomes for other service users. For example, if the practical 
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model was to be applied within the adult offending sector with a view to reducing re-
offending and moving former prisoners into stable accommodation and employment 
and into better health, the resulting programme would create efficiencies by reducing 
the money spent on policing, court services and custody and the scheme would be 
managed robustly with less wastage. The ex-offenders would achieve positive 
outcomes, lead healthier and more economically-productive lives and become 
taxpayers rather than users of tax that needed to be fed and accommodated in 
prison. The population would see their taxes used to create jobs, which would then 
have a further positive impact on the economy. The success of such provision may 
reap additional commercial benefits empowering the public sector to bring more 
services in-house rather than subcontracting them to the private sector or even 
selling the PbR framework to the private sector or other countries wishing to benefit 
from Payment by Results delivery. 
 
This new knowledge about target achievement in Payment by Results provision 
came from original insider research. This research reflected upon the Stakeholder 
Theory, Agency Theory, Payment by Results and management practices literature. I 
then collected and analysed ‘Troubled Families’ data from the Northeast, Southeast 
and Northwest of England rather than just the local authority, which employed me. 
Although this research has some limitations, which will be explored later in the 
chapter, I firmly believe that it will satisfy peer review, extend the forefront of 
professional practice and merit publication (K1). Chapter Six exemplifies my ability to 
communicate my ideas and conclusions clearly and effectively to specialist 
audiences with knowledge of Payment by Results and ‘Troubled Families’ and non-
specialist audiences who are not versed in these areas (S1). It also demonstrates 
my aptitude for applied research and development at advanced level and substantial 






6.2 A PRACTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ACHIEVING TARGETS IN PAYMENT BY 
RESULTS  
 
The Stakeholder Theory, Agency Theory and Payment by Results literature and the 
qualitative analysis of the Phase One DCLG national quantitative data (DCLG 
2015c), the LA1 local quantitative data (LA1 2015b) and the five interviews (LA1 
2015a, LA2 2015, LA3 2016, LA4 2016 and LA1 2016) revealed a practical 
framework for achieving targets in Payment by Results provision. The framework 










Strategic managers implement the first three steps of Stakeholder Analysis, Principal 
Identification and Agent Identification. Strategic and operational managers carry out 
Steps Four, Six and Seven - Strategy and Operations Implementation, Data 
Collection and Analysis and Findings and Action. Operational managers implement 
the fifth step of Delivery. 
 
6.3 THE ‘REAL WORLD’ APPLICATION OF A PRACTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
ACHIEVING TARGETS IN PAYMENT BY RESULTS PROVISION BY STRATEGIC 
AND OPERATIONAL MANAGERS  
 
Local Authority Two (LA2) is in the early stages of using the practical framework for 
target achievement in Payment by Results provision to commission a PbR scheme 
to improve the life chances of the city’s residents. Their analysis of quantitative data 
from the city’s 16-18 population and of qualitative data gathered from fifty youngsters 
from this age cohort revealed that young people who required support from 
Children’s Social Care between the ages of 0 and 18 were more likely to experience 
negative outcomes such as teenage parenthood, homelessness, no qualifications 
and unemployment than those who had no such intervention (Local Authority Two 
2017). This data encouraged the local authority to: 
 
 Seek ways to support families with offspring aged 0-18 at an early stage and 
thus not need a Tier 4 intervention 
 Achieve improved outcomes with those families currently open to Children’s 
Social Care and de-escalate them to Tier 3, hopefully never to return to 
statutory support.  
 
LA2 saw a mentoring service as one route to achieving this and I have provided LA2 
strategic and operational managers with the following tool to ensure successful 
target achievement in this provision. 
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Step One – Stakeholder Analysis  
The LA2 commissioner must develop insight into the operating context before 
designing the Payment by Results provision (NAO 2015). This insight is fundamental 
to the commissioner being able to: 
 
 Clearly articulate the need for the young people’s mentoring programme to 
the principal and the agent, an essential ingredient for the relationship 
between these two parties to have a firm base (See Figure 2.3.1a) 
 Identify all the stakeholders who can affect or will be affected by the 
provision’s achievement and upon whom it will be dependent (Freeman and 
Reed 2014) 
 Learn valuable lessons from recent PbR good practice and prepare the 
programme for internal and external change and challenges (Freeman 2010).  
 
For the correct management of the PbR provision at the outset and during its lifetime 
this insight has five sources:  
 
1. An in-depth scoping exercise to clearly identify the exact need for the 
mentoring programme 
This will identify whether the aim of the PbR is to improve outcomes, improve 
outcome focus, achieve value-for-money, improve service quality, innovate, open up 
the market to new entrants, defer payment until later in the programme or reduce 
inequalities (Webster 2016). The successful management of the Delaware 
Substance Misuse Programme drew from the insight that substance misuse was a 
huge issue in the state’s offender population, had the potential to increase the 
reoffending rate above seventy per cent but would repay sevenfold every dollar 




LA2 identified that a mentoring programme was needed to improve young service 
users’ outcomes by preventing them from needing intervention during childhood or 
adolescence from Children’s Social Care or reducing their time spent involved with 
Children’s Social Care. Their quantitative data suggested that this reduced interface 
with Social Care would reduce inequalities relating to emotional, physical and mental 
health, education, training and employment and housing. By choosing PbR, the LA2 
commissioner also anticipated deferring payment until later in the programme. The 
scoping exercise will also identify the ‘real world’ stakeholders (Appendix Ten) - 
including the target audience for the provision - and examine the impact that the 
provision will have upon them. By understanding who its stakeholders were at the 
outset, the Delaware Substance Misuse Programme was then able to have a 
positive impact upon each stakeholder group: 
 
 The agent benefitted from a clear tripartite structure to follow whose 
demonstrable positive outcomes offered outcome funding 
 The workforce gained from being part of a successful, innovative programme 
 The offender population achieved improved outcomes and life chances 
through reduced substance misuse and re-offending 
 The Delaware populace enjoyed less offending in their community and a 
smaller percentage of their taxes spent on punishing re-offenders. 
 
I advised LA2 to draw upon the ‘Real World Stakeholder Theory Grid’ (Appendix 





Table 6.2.1 - The ‘Real World’ of the LA2 Mentoring Payment by Results Programme  
 
 Formal or 
Voting Power 











-Wider Public Sector  




Influencers   -Employees 
- Young People (Service 
Users) and Their Families 
- Academics  
-Local Electorate  
-Local Political Parties  
-Media 
-Organisations that 
Campaign on Behalf of 
Young People and Families 
-Wider SIG 
(Based on Freeman and Reed 2014) 
 
I believe that one flaw of DCLG’s design of the National Troubled Families Initiative 
was their failure to identify the families as a key stakeholder. My insider knowledge 
suggested this led to DCLG applying the pejorative term ‘troubled’ to the recipients of 
the programme and publishing DCLG (2015b) which portrayed ‘troubled families’ and 
the ‘taxpayer’ as two entirely different sets of people and suggested that the former 
were a financial drain on the latter. I anticipate that, by identifying the key 
stakeholders for their mentoring programme including local young people and their 





2. A full review of relevant home and overseas Payment by Results literature 
This will identify specific and general good practice for the LA2 mentoring 
programme to follow and pitfalls to avoid.  I advised LA2 to carry out three tasks: 
 
 Examine the national and international good practice literature appertaining to 
mentoring schemes for children, young people, and young adults 
 Study the two reports written following the qualitative evaluation of the London 
Homelessness Project, the internal economic impact evaluation and final 
report, all of which DCLG (2015a) highlighted. This will help them to 
understand how to manage a programme designed to address a number of 
issues and improve outcomes for disadvantaged service users. Perhaps if the 
Department for Communities and Local Government had examined good 
practice literature more widely before launching ‘Troubled Families’, they 
would not have built Phase One on an outcome framework that enabled the 
agent to claim for families who had made no change (LA1 2015a) just ceased 
to meet the eligibility criteria 
 Learn from poorly managed provision such as the aborted HMP Leeds pilot 
(NAO 2015) and so avoid mistakes already made by others  
 
3. A detailed consultation with all stakeholders relevant to the mentoring 
programme including the service users (Sheil and Breidenbach-Roe 2014 and 
Crowe et al 2014) 
If the commissioner consults the service users with the social need and is clear 
“what is it they need and also how (…) the current system (…) prevents [them] from 
making those changes” (LA4 2016) (pclxvii), they will understand from the outset 
how the provision must be managed to engage, retain, progress and achieve 
positive outcomes with the target cohort. I have advised Local Authority Two to 
supplement the qualitative data already gathered from fifty youngsters aged 16-18 by 
consulting the stakeholders from the ‘real world’ of the LA2 mentoring Payment by 
Results programme (Table 6.2.1); in particular potential service users. This will 
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enable local young people to advise the commissioner of their exact needs prior to 
the commissioning of the provision  
 
4. A review of current or planned provision targeted at the 5-25 age group 
This will prevent duplication such as occurred when the National Troubled Families 
Initiative launched months after a similar programme to move families with multiple 
problems into employment (NAO 2013), an action that had the potential to trigger 
principal and agent failure. In such an instance, if one agent is more successful at 
engaging service users than the other, the latter will miss their outcome and funding 
target and the contract will not be financially viable for them to deliver. Alternatively, 
in this example, both agents may work with and claim identical outcomes for the 
same service users thereby ‘exploiting’ the principal (Miller and Sardais 2011) and 
failing to provide ‘value’ (Bosse and Phillips 2016). 
 
I advised LA2 to review the local, regional and national landscape for related current 
or planned provision for children, young people and young adults. My insider 
knowledge suggests that there is no current or planned provision that directly 
duplicates their proposed mentoring programme. However, a more thorough 
execution of this task may reveal schemes that I am unaware of. As the National 
Troubled Families Initiative runs until March 2020 and offers holistic family support to 
families on the cusp of or open to Children’s Social Care, the LA2 commissioner 
must ensure that the proposed programme does not duplicate the local ‘Troubled 
Families’ offer  
 
5. A horizon-scan of the environment 
This will identify negative and positive influences upon the mentoring programme. It 
encompasses national issues such as legislature changes. These meant, in the case 
of the London Rough Sleepers Project, that it was easier to repatriate foreign 
nationals who were no longer entitled to UK welfare benefits (DCLG 2015a). Local 
issues are also crucial and caused difficulties such as agents like Local Authority 
One struggling to deliver ‘Troubled Families’ with a Children’s Social Care Service 
branded “failing” by Ofsted (LA1 2016) (pclxxxii). The former change meant that one 
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outcome from the programme was no longer challenging and too easily achieved 
while the latter factor may preface agent failure and an inability to deliver the 
requisite outcomes and draw down funding. Both can challenge the successful 
management of the PbR provision.  
 
Colleagues in Local Authority Two are well aware of the on-going significant austerity 
cuts (Appendix Two). My insider knowledge suggests that this perhaps reinforced 
their decision to choose the Payment by Results mechanism to monitor the proposed 
mentoring scheme and to select a Social Impact Bond and a philanthropic partner to 
fund the programme. The LA2 commissioner should also examine the environment 
for other negative and positive influences upon the proposed programme.  
 
The commissioner will not rush Step One. They can abandon the decision to 
proceed with PbR or any type of provision at this stage if – like the HMP Leeds pilot 
– the provision appears to be unviable (NAO 2015) and difficult to manage well. 
Although LA2 believe that their qualitative and quantitative data points towards the 
commissioning of a mentoring PbR programme to improve local people’s life 
chances, they should still implement the aforementioned checks before proceeding 
to Step Two and beyond. 
 
Step Two – Principal Identification 
The commissioner identifies the optimum principal from the ‘real world’. A key 
influence here is which stakeholder will principally provide the financial resource for 
the PbR programme, can act as a ‘responsible’ party (Miller and Sardais 2011) and 
has the best record of overseeing provision of this type. The principal will hold both 
power and a stake within the PbR (Appendix Ten). Although DWP were not the 
principal for ‘Troubled Families’ the input of their Employment Advisors was crucial to 
the success of the programme. Their role in LA3 was particularly noted as DWP 
were “the biggest winners” (LA3 2016) (pclviii) and avoided £1,300,000 costs thanks 
to adults moving into paid employment. This is evidence that DWP could be 
justifiably ‘responsible’ for future PbR provision to support disadvantaged service 
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users including those on workless benefits if it built on the good practice of the 
National Troubled Families Initiative.  
 
Local Authority Two have a corporate commissioning process to identify a 
philanthropic organisation to provide the funding for the 5-25 mentoring programme. 
I have advised that they should build into this a mechanism for locating a 
‘responsible’ principal (Miller and Sardais 2011) with a good track record of 
overseeing PbR provision and programmes that mentor disadvantaged young 
service users. 
 
Step Three – Agent Identification 
The commissioner and the principal identify the optimum agent to act as a 
‘responsible’ party (Miller and Sardais 2011); act in the best interest of the principal 
and present the principal with the ‘value’ anticipated (Bosse and Phillips 2016). The 
agent can refuse this opportunity based on their prior experience of this or other 
principals or knowledge of other agents’ experiences with the principal (Bosse and 
Phillips 2016). Team GB’s on-going success story shows that they merit future 
investment in their Olympic and Paralympic programmes as the organisation is able 
to manage success both on a sport and individual athlete basis and achieve the 
outcomes of podium finishes, gold medals and world records.  
 
Once the philanthropic body is in place in LA2, the local authority in the ‘real world’ 
example must work with them to choose a delivery agent for the 5-25 mentoring 
programme who exhibits the characteristics recommended by Bosse and Phillips 
(2016). Once LA2 have appointed a responsible, experienced principal to fund their 
mentoring programme, I hope to work with strategic managers from both 
organisations to enable them to find a responsible, experienced agent who has a 
good record of accomplishment in achieving targets in Payment by Results, bringing 





Once the Stakeholder Analysis, Principal Identification and Agent Identification are 
complete, it is crucial that the fruits of these three steps are combined before 
strategic and operational managers implement Step Four. I therefore recommend the 
establishment of an ‘Expert Body’ to achieve this. This group will transform the 
framework from a static model to a practical one and is individual to each PbR 
scheme. This cohort of experts will comprise key stakeholders from the ‘real world’ of 
the Payment by Results provision (Appendix Ten) including: 
 
 The commissioner 
 The principal 
 The agent 
 Academics with experience of Payment by Results 
 Academic with experience of the need addressed by the programme 
 The service users.  
 
This will ensure that all key stakeholders have a voice in the on-going management 
of the PbR provision. The inspiration for the formation of an Expert Body comes 
directly from the National Troubled Families Initiative. It reflects and combines: 
 
 The commissioner, the principal and the agent 
This reflects the collaboration between the Wave One Early Starters and DCLG at 
the beginning of Phase Two (DCLG 2014a) 
  Academics with experience of Payment by Results and the programme need 
This reflects LA3’s commissioning of a team of academics to evaluate their local 
programme (Hayden 2015). Local Authority Two has two universities located within 
it. My insider knowledge suggests that these institutions can provide academics with 
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knowledge of good practice in PbR and the mentoring of young people to support the 
strategic and operational implementation of the 5-25 mentoring programme 
 The service users 
This reflects LA3’s plan to involve “families who have been through the programme 
to build community resilience with families that are currently on the programme” (LA3 
2016) (pclxii) and LA4’s “extensive consultation with families” (LA4 2016) (pclxvii) to 
understand their needs and barriers. LA2 have already collected and analysed some 
qualitative data from the local 16-18 population. However, I expect them to widen 
this and gather data from the full age range that the 5-25 mentoring programme will 
cover. 
 
Together the Expert Body will view the PbR programme through the lens of Agency 
Theory and Payment by Results best practice. They will set the direction of the 
programme and the work that the agent will carry out in exchange for an agreed fee 
(Eisenhardt 1989). The body will agree: 
 
 Shared goals between the principal and the agent 
 A shared attitude to risk between the principal and the agent 
 A shared course of action between the principal and the agent  
 A clear outcome-based contract between the principal and the agent 
(Eisenhardt 1989).  
 
This will safeguard the successful management of the PbR provision. 
 
During this discussion, the Expert Body will set clear expectations for performance 
(National Audit Office 2015). This will build on the example of Team GB’s Olympic 
and Paralympic programme where the quantitative targets for individual athletes and 
sporting bodies in terms of world records, gold medals or podium finishes were made 
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clear (Fordyce 2016 and Hudson 2016). It will also set clear expectations for 
performance (NAO 2015) and avoid: 
 
1. The Local Authority One ‘Troubled Families’ scenario of the principal 
rewarding the agent where families 
 Made no change 
 Changed themselves (LA1 2015a) 
 
2. The Local Authority Two scenario of the agent claiming solely for families who 
no longer committed anti-social behaviour rather than for families where their 
ASB had reduced by 60% (LA2 2015). 
 
The Expert Body will identify challenging but achievable outcomes upon which to 
base payment. Following Webster (2016), these outcomes will be: 
 
 Clear, complex and quantitative rather than qualitative. The London Rough 
Sleepers Project exemplified how outcomes covering multiple issues such as 
rough sleeping, stable accommodation, reconnection, employment and health 
can be combined in one programme (DCLG 2015a) but illustrated the need 
for outcomes that are appropriate to the individual and linked to available data 
(DCLG 2015a). This example will be particularly useful for the proposed LA2 
5-25 mentoring programme which will address multiple issues including 
safeguarding; positive parenting; physical, mental and emotional health; 
housing; education; training and employment with a view to achieving positive 
outcomes with the target cohort and reducing their interface with Children’s 
Social Care. The Delaware Substance Misuse Programme provides a model 
whereby proxy indicators function as outcomes (Webster 2016). This is a 
useful model for LA2 and is an improvement on the outcomes framework 
used for Phase One and Phase Two of the National Troubled Families 
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Initiative, which did not follow PbR best practice (NAO 2015 and Webster 
2016) 
 Externally verifiable so that, as with the Delaware Substance Misuse 
Programme (State of Delaware 2016), which uses reoffending data to 
understand the impact of the provision upon the service users, the change 
that the PbR provision made to the target cohort is clearly visible. LA2 must 
consider carefully how to verify the impact of their mentoring programme so 
that it does not replicate the mistakes of ‘Troubled Families’ Phase One where 
it was not possible to demonstrate that all positive outcomes claimed for were 
achieved within the boundaries of the programme (LA1 2015b). They should 
also ensure that the agent installs a robust data system so that, unlike the 
Work Programme (Crowe et al 2014), delivery does not begin before the 
programme outcomes can actually be verified  
 Attributable to the agent to prevent them claiming an outcome payment for 
clients who addressed their own problems or received help from another 
organisation with no links to the PbR. The latter was present in LA2’s 
‘Troubled Families’ programme with their “whole system approach” (LA2 
2015) (pcxxv) but should be avoided for the 5-25 mentoring programme. I will 
work with the LA2 Expert Body to identify how to avoid this 
 Cognisant of deadweight and the achievable performance without the 
programme. A control group will prevent the principal for claiming for a 
positive change that would have happened anyway; a point noted in 
connection with ‘Troubled Families’ (NAO 2013). I have a number of options 
in the future, when I work with LA2 to identify a control group for their 
mentoring programme. It is not ethical to deny a service to a cohort of young 
people who would benefit from the programme just so their outcomes can be 
compared with those who receive the service. More ethical alternatives are 
therefore to select a control group of young people who refuse to engage with 
a mentor or to use pre-programme historical data 
 Pertinent to either individuals or cohorts so that the principal and the agent 
are clear whether they wish to address a need in individuals such as the 
jobseekers supported by DWP’s Work Programme (NAO 2014) or in a cohort 
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of clients like Transforming Rehabilitation’s offender population (NAO 2016). 
Again this is a piece of work that I will undertake with the LA2 Expert Body 
 Segmented if the target audience entering the programme are particularly 
diverse. The Delaware Substance Misuse Programme (State of Delaware 
2016) exemplified this approach with its three levels of support for 
incarcerated males, lower level male and female prisoners and offenders 
living in the community. It represented a substantial step forward from earlier 
UK drug and alcohol PbR programmes. These targeted binge drinkers 
needing a short intervention or dependent heroin and crack cocaine users 
needing a very intensive and lengthy service but appeared to be less 
streamlined (Maynard et al 2011). Although Phase One of the National 
Troubled Families Initiative included families who had recently fallen into 
difficulty and those with entrenched behaviour (DCLG 2012b), local authorities 
such as LA2 segmented their client group into those needing an intensive 
service, a TAF and community-based support therefore having clear lines of 
entry and exit. I will support the LA2 5-25 mentoring programme to segment 
their target audience. Options may include segmentation around age, intensity 
of support, number of issues, multiplicity or type of need. 
 
The Expert Body will develop effective incentives for the agent from these outcomes. 
The programme outcomes will be stretching enough to ensure that the agent does 
not exploit the principal with their superior knowledge (Miller and Sardais 2011) and 
effects genuine change with the service user group. The Delaware Substance 
Misuse Programme (McLellan et al 2008), the London Rough Sleepers Project 
(DCLG 2015a) and the Team GB Olympians and Paralympians (Fordyce 2016 and 
Hudson 2016) exemplified this. The National Troubled Families Initiative does not, 
particularly in Phase One in Local Authority One (LA1 2015a). To manage an 
instance such as this, the Expert Body must decide whether to have penalties as 
well as rewards or if the withholding of outcome funding where the agent has clearly 
exploited the principal is a sufficient deterrent. I will work with LA2’s Expert Body so 
that the agent commissioned to deliver their 5-25 mentoring programme has 
effective incentives for the agent. I will begin with the blueprint of the London 
Homelessness project’s five-strand outcome framework. Each outcome was 
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weighted differently. This factor made the programme financially viable for the agent 
to deliver as the stable accommodation outcome accounted for 40% of the outcome 
payment (DCLG 2015a). Thus, when the agent struggled with evidencing 
achievement in the health metric, the project did not become financially unviable to 
deliver; unlike the ‘111’ non-emergency medical helpline from which NHS Direct 
withdrew (Torjesen 2013). 
 
Early agreement between the principal and the agent will avoid the setting of 
unrealistically challenging targets or targets where data is not readily available. The 
former occurred in ‘Troubled Families’ Phase One where the average family had 
nine separate problems (DCLG 2014b) and 49% were single parents (DCLG 2014b) 
but the principal expected them to move off benefits and into work. The latter 
occurred with ‘Rough Sleepers’ and ‘Troubled Families’. Both had targets relating to 
the service users’ health but health providers refused to release personal health data 
to the agent (LA1 2015a, LA2 2015, LA3 2016 and LA1 2016) and the health 
outcome chosen shed limited light on individual service users’ improving wellbeing 
(DCLG 2015a). It is likely that the LA2 mentoring programme will have a spectrum of 
outcome targets including those relating to health. I will therefore stress the 
importance of having local, regional and national health partners on board and a 
data-sharing protocol in place before delivery commences to ensure that distance 
travelled by the service users whilst on programme can be calculated and outcome 
funding claimed by the agent. 
 
The principal will allow the agent to draw down sufficient funding to make a change 
with the programme entrants and avoid financial risk and poor management of the 
provision. The London Homeless Project’s payment structure for achievement in 
stable accommodation made the programme financially viable (DCLG 2015a). In 
contrast, five potential providers in the HMP Leeds offender rehabilitation pilot 
withdrew their services due to its unworkable model and level of financial risk (NAO 
2015). DCLG’s lack of insight into the operating context meant they allocated a lower 
target and significantly less programme funding to Local Authority Two and Three 




The Expert Body will agree how to monitor the performance of agents regularly 
during the course of the programme. The London Rough Sleepers Project was 
rigorously evaluated during its three-year lifespan through two reports from the 
qualitative evaluation, an internal economic impact evaluation and a final report 
drawing analysis from the two strands together (DCLG 2015a). So that LA2’s new 5-
25 mentoring programme can benefit from on-going reflection, I will work with the 
Expert Body to implement robust agent monitoring procedures. 
 
The Experts Body’s clear oversight and intervention mechanisms will minimise the 
impact of agent failure on public services. This would have benefitted ‘Troubled 
Families’ providers like Local Authority Two who were subject to austerity measures 
and had limited other resources. If during the course of the delivery, the LA2 agent 
presents a clear reason why an outcome or the payment framework must be altered 
to either incorporate a significant change in the environment or improve the service 
to the client, there will be sufficient flex in the programme to allow this. The London 
Rough Sleepers Project exemplifies this good practice. The reconnection outcome 
became easier to reach due to a change in EU law and the lack of forthcoming 
health data and the inappropriateness of the chosen health metric to measure 
individual wellbeing merited a change in the performance framework (DCLG 2015a). 
The LA2 mentoring programme could fail if it does not meet local service users’ 
needs or the landscape changes unexpectedly and impacts negatively upon it. The 
LA2 Expert Body must therefore be prepared for this and adjust the programme as it 
proceeds, if need be. 
 
The Expert Body will agree how to evaluate that the PbR programme has improved 
service delivery and overall value-for-money (NAO 2015). They may decide to 
quantify improvement: 
 As the return for each amount spent, which showed the benefits of the 
Delaware Substance Misuse Programme (State of Delaware 2016) and 
Phase One of ‘Troubled Families’ (DCLG 2015b) 
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 As the social return on investment also used for ‘Troubled Families’ Phase 
One (Hoggett et al 2014). 
 
Either way, service users must be involved in the evaluation of the LA2 mentoring 
programme (Sheil and Breidenbach-Roe 2014 and Crowe et al 2014). The target 
cohort is best placed to comment on the impact of the PbR provision on their lives; a 
model followed in the two Rough Sleepers qualitative evaluations (DCLG 2015a), by 
LA3 and LA4 (Hayden 2015 and LA4 2016). The LA2 Expert Body will also consider 
how to disseminate these lessons so that future commissioners, principals and 
agents can benefit. The LA4 Co-ordinator called for this research project to be used 
in this manner (LA4 2016). 
 
These actions will not be rushed and the LA2 Expert Body will exist for the 
programme duration and not just the period prior to Step Four. Its makeup may alter 
in response to the changing environment of the provision including changes in the 
stakeholders, commissioner, principal or agent or changes in the service user cohort 
or their needs and barriers. This practice mimics LA1 who brought new partners from 
the voluntary sector into their local ‘Troubled Families’ programme; LA2 who 
commissioned provision ‘Troubled Families’ from the voluntary sector; LA3 who 
seconded a colleague from Health to address data issues in the programme and LA4 
who wanted to see the “Department of Health, DWP, DFE” (LA4 2016) (pclxxvi) 
recognise more the achievements of ‘Troubled Families’. The good practice 
recommendations made by this body must be fed continually into all steps of the 
framework. This makes the framework practical and ensures a continuous focus on 
the ultimate prize of target achievement. So that LA2’s new 5-25 mentoring 
programme can benefit from on-going reflection, support the authority’s other 
outcome-based provision and generate learning for related programmes across the 
UK, I will work with the Expert Body to implement robust agent monitoring 
procedures. 
Step Four – Strategy and Operations Implementation 
247 
 
When the Expert Body has met initially to agree the points listed above, the principal 
and the agent will implement the PbR provision at a strategic and operational level. 
Steps One to Three and the work of the Expert Body should enable the successful 
management of Steps Four to Seven. 
 
Step Five – Delivery 
The agent begins to deliver the programme to the target audience. For the LA2 
mentoring programme, I will recommend that the agent: 
 
 Builds on the key worker/navigator role used to great effect in the National 
Troubled Families Initiative (LA1 2015a, LA2 2015 and LA4 2016) and the 
London Rough Sleepers Project (DCLG 2015a) to engage, motivate and 
effect change with disadvantaged and complex young service users open to 
Children’s Social Care or in danger of becoming so. This role is also mirrored 
in the athlete-coach relationship used by Team GB (Fordyce 2016 and 
Hudson 2016) to achieve medals and world records 
 Seconds operational staff from elsewhere to improve outcomes in specific 
areas. The arrival of the Troubled Families Employment Advisors increased 
movement into training or employment (LA1 2015a, LA2 2015, LA3 2016 and 
LA4 2016). A Department of Health secondee planned to improve DoH 
engagement and client data sharing (LA3 2016). Team GB use experts such 
as sports scientists and sports medics to achieve marginal gains (Fordyce 
2016). If elements of the LA2 mentoring programme becoming difficult to 
deliver – for example, if the challenges in obtaining health data translate from 
‘Troubled Families’ into the new provision – I will advise the local agent to 
second a health partner in to remove this hurdle 
 Acts as a consortium of agents rather than individual agents - as in Local 
Authority Four - where this will enhance service delivery and create 
efficiencies through data pooling, providing services across a wider 
geographical area and collective negotiation with regional partners (LA4 
2016). Team GB follows this model. It is a single entity overseeing individual 
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sporting bodies such as British Gymnastics (Fordyce 2016). The London 
Rough Sleepers Project was delivered by two providers who pooled their 
expertise rather than working separately. The agent for the LA2 mentoring 
programme may find ways to work with other local and regional partners to 
improve elements of their delivery and make this more cost effective. My 
insider knowledge suggests one possibility could be to co-locate with an 
existing, trusted and established local voluntary sector provider such as 
Barnardo’s, Action for Children or Children North East to share their premises 
and build upon the good reputation that they already have with local service 
users 
 Shows leadership so that training, mentoring and support opportunities are 
spread across the workforce. This model is used by Team GB (Fordyce 2016) 
and ‘Troubled Families’ (LA1 2015a and LA2 2015). It is important that the 
LA2 agent ensures that all of its staff – both frontline and managerial – receive 
support throughout the delivery period; an action that will increase their 
likelihood of achieving positive outcomes with the young target audience and 
claiming all of the available outcome funding 
 This leadership stance also prevents financial risk from being cascaded down 
to smaller and more vulnerable subcontractors. It was used by Local Authority 
Two and Three (LA2 2015 and LA3 2016) but was lacking in the Work 
Programme where large agents sub-contracted delivery to smaller voluntary 
sector agents thus passing the financial risk onto them (Rees et al 2013a and 
b). It was also absent from the HMP Leeds pilot where five of the six potential 
providers withdrew, believing the model to be unworkable (NAO 2015). If the 
LA2 agent choose to subcontract some of their mentoring delivery to other 
local providers, it is essential that they use the seven-step dynamic framework 
as a tool to manage successfully the programme. 
 
Step Six – Data Collection and Analysis 
This is the regular collection of quantitative and qualitative data by the agent and its 
analysis by them and the other members of the LA2 Expert Body against the clear 
outcome-based contract. This will identify flaws in the five previous Steps and the 
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alterations required to keep target achievement on track. The London Rough 
Sleepers Project had published by 2015 two reports from the qualitative evaluation 
based on interviews with stakeholders and homeless people in receipt of support 
and a review of available performance data. It also planned an economic impact 
evaluation and a final report for 2016 (DCLG 2015a). Team GB have their evidence 
of individual and group performance at each Olympic and Paralympic Games 
(Fordyce 2016) and collect and analyse performance data in the run-up to each 
event to ensure that the best athletes compete for their country. I will impress upon 
the LA2 key stakeholders the importance of identifying at the earliest stage the type 
of quantitative and qualitative data that they require and agreeing how and when this 
will be collected and analysed. This will ensure the mentoring programme retains its 
focus on target achievement. 
 
Step Seven – Findings and Action 
The LA2 Expert Body feed the findings from their data analysis upwards into every 
step of the process and implement intervention mechanisms to minimise the impact 
of agent failure (Eisenhardt 1989) and to ensure the good management of the PbR 
provision. These mechanisms can include revisiting any one or all of the previous 
steps to develop further insight into the operating context; identifying a new principal 
or agent; reviewing the provision strategically and operationally including changing 
the outcome-based contract; realigning the delivery and altering the data collection 
and analysis procedures. This ensures that the programme is practical, benefits from 
on-going reflective improvement during its delivery and informs subsequent PbR 
provision. For the practical framework to work there must be a way of dealing with 
‘complex’ families’ lives at a local level. This was not the focus of the research 
project but future research into this is recommended. For more information on 
‘complex’ families, I invite the reader to look at Appendices Six, Seven and Eight. 
 
If the analysis of the LA2 5-25 mentoring programme’s qualitative and quantitative 
data shows that it has gone adrift, I will advise the Expert Body to revisit each of the 




 Reconsider the exact need for the young people’s mentoring programme 
 Re-review the home and overseas PbR literature to identify new good practice 
or any omissions when this action was done the first time 
 Re-consult with all relevant stakeholders including new entrants to the 
programme to gain an inside view. They may wish to also speak with local 
people who refused to engage with the scheme to ascertain their reasoning 
behind this 
 Re-review current or planned provision to take into account new programmes 
or any omissions when this action was done the first time 
 Horizon scan the environment for emerging challenges or opportunities 
 Identify a new principal if the current incumbent has not behaved as 
responsibly as expected or they no longer wish to be involved with the 
provision 
 Identify a new agent if they have not provided the principal with the 
anticipated value or they no longer wish to be associated with the programme 
if they feel the principal is ‘exploiting’ them 
 Re-appraise the goals, attitude to risk, course of action and outcome-based 
contract shared by the principal and the agent if these have ceased to be fit-
for-purpose 
 Re-configure the delivery, which can include re-aligning the key 
worker/navigator role at the heart of the programme; seconding additional 
staff to improve outcomes in specific areas; acting as a consortium with a 
different set of agents; providing further training or improved mentoring to the 
workforce and re-consider how they are working with any subcontractors 
 Collect qualitative and quantitative data differently and at different intervals 




Within reason and to ensure target achievement, the LA2 Expert Body should take 
these actions when required and as many times as are needed. 
 
The seven-step practical framework for achieving targets in Payment by Results 
provision is a management tool for the ‘real world’ of public sector PbR provision, 
which directs policy and instructs strategic and operational managers. It was inspired 
by original insider research into the Stakeholder Theory, Agency Theory, Payment 
by Results and management practices literature and the collection and analysis of 
‘Troubled Families’ data from the four high performing English local authorities. I 
used the ‘real world’ scenario of a forthcoming mentoring programme for vulnerable 
children, young people and young adults aged 5-25 in LA2 to illustrate its potential to 
strategic and operational managers. The dynamic nature of this management tool 
means it can be applied locally, regionally and nationally across the public sector 
wherever target achievement and the provision of value to stakeholders is required. I 
look forward to colleagues using it across a variety of fields including law 
enforcement, community safety, defence, health, education and employment and to 
hearing their results.  
 
6.4 THE LIMITATIONS OF THE PRACTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ACHIEVING 
TARGETS IN PAYMENT BY RESULTS PROVISION 
 
The dynamic framework contributed to knowledge through its fusion of Stakeholder 
Theory, Agency Theory and the PbR framework to deliver target achievement and 
increased value to stakeholders. It presented the best of the management practices 
literature and my analysis of ‘Troubled Families’ data from local authorities across 
England. However, the research project had some limitations. 
Firstly, I only applied the practical framework to the case study of Local Authority 
Two’s proposed mentoring programme. However, as the introduction to Chapter Six 
shows, the framework can be applied to all types of PbR provision. It will facilitate the 
commercialisation of these services by reducing wastage, generating efficiencies, 
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creating additional jobs through the improved use of scant resources, returning work 
from the private to the public sector and providing the public sector with a model, 
which they can market and sell. 
 
Secondly, it only presented best practice drawn from three PbR programmes. The 
Delaware Substance Misuse Programme exemplified good practice with very 
challenged individuals whose ‘troubles’ include offending, imprisonment and 
substance misuse. It also showed the benefits of developing insight into the 
operating context before designing the PbR scheme; setting clear expectations for 
performance; identifying challenging but achievable outcomes by using effective 
proxy indicators and providing effective incentives for agents through payments on 
top of existing contracts. The London Rough Sleepers Project illustrated how to 
tackle a number of issues through the navigator/key worker role. Its stakeholders 
developed insight into the operating context by building on the knowledge of existing 
homelessness provision. They also set clear expectations for performance in five 
outcome areas with a specific service user cohort; identified challenging but 
achievable outcomes in five areas on which to base payments; developed effective 
incentives for agents; monitored the performance of agents; advised how the 
outcome framework could be developed to manage unforeseen circumstances such 
as changes in legislation and evaluated how using PbR improved service delivery 
and overall value for money. Team GB’s Olympic and Paralympic programme 
underlined that PbR does not just reduce social need. It provided an example of a 
clear outcome framework exemplified by gold and other medals and world records.  
 
However, it can be argued that I should have presented good practice from more 
than three PbR programmes. A further limitation was that my belief in the benefits of 
all three examples came from my reading of the literature rather than any specific 
research of my own into the initiatives. Researchers who wish to develop the 
dynamic framework for target achievement may wish to revisit this provision and 
either independently re-evaluate the three programmes before building on their 
seeming good practice or re-design the framework around other independently 




Thirdly, the ‘Troubled Families’ quantitative data that I analysed was very general. 
The national Phase One data (DCLG 2015c) merely provided an overview of the 
achievement in four local authorities and the ‘England average’. The local Phase 
One data (LA1 2015b) lacked any personal information appertaining to the families. 
Neither enabled me to understand more about verification, attribution and 
deadweight in Phase One. Researchers may therefore wish to analyse quantitative 
data from a different PbR programme or request permission from an English local 
authority to analyse their ‘Troubled Families’ data with families’ personal information 
intact. 
 
Fourthly, the ‘Troubled Families’ qualitative data that I collected and analysed was 
provided by employees of the agent and not the service users despite good practice 
dictating that their voices should be heard (Sheil and Breidenbach-Roe 2014 and 
Crowe et al 2014). Furthermore, I only conducted ethical interviews in four out of the 
152 English local authorities and three out of five interviews were by telephone. 
Researchers may therefore wish to approach this exercise differently and: 
 
 Gather qualitative information about the National Troubled Families Initiative 
from a range of stakeholders including service users 
 Conduct further ’Troubled Families’  interviews in more English local 
authorities 
 Carry out more face-to-face ’Troubled Families’  interviews 
 Hold some focus groups 
 Gather qualitative information about other PbR provision from a range of 
stakeholders including service users, in more areas, face-to-face and using a 




By conducting further study and overcoming some of the limitations of my research 
into the creation of a dynamic framework for target achievement in PbR, researchers 
will make their own contribution to knowledge. This will increase the applicability of 
this tool across the public sector, its commercial viability and its ability to increase 
target achievement in fields beyond ‘troubled’ families and sectors outside local 
authorities. 
 
6.5 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE DELIVERY OF ‘STRENGTHENING 
FAMILIES’ IN LOCAL AUTHORITY ONE  
 
The analysis of the DCLG national performance data (DCLG 2015c) and the Local 
Authority One quantitative and qualitative data (LA1 2015b, LA1 2015a and LA1 
2016) revealed the benefits of ‘Strengthening Families’, the local name for ‘Troubled 
Families’: 
 
 805 Phase One families were ‘turned around’ and 769 improved their 
education outcomes and committed less ASB and youth crime (DCLG 2015c) 
 A ‘partial’ funding claim was made for 804 LA1 families and a ‘full’ claim for 
110 families (LA1 2015b)  
 The Phase Two local outcome framework has an outcome focus and 
combines aspiration with practicality to achieve improved outcomes with 
families with a range of needs (LA1 2015a) 
 Local family services prevent rather than react to ‘trouble’. They innovatively 
identify families with needs through the Intelligence Hub and offer them 
holistic, integrated support in the locality where they live (LA1 2015a) 
 This delivery model aspires to achieve value-for-money by proactively 
creating efficiencies and does not rely on the programme funding (LA1 2015a)  
 Inequalities are reduced by identifying families’ needs and addressing them 
early (LA1 2015a) rather than waiting for them to become multiple, 




However, ‘Strengthening Families’ still has some challenges to overcome in Phase 
Two. Their solutions appear in the thematic narrative analysis and thematic analysis 
of the qualitative data gathered in the four local authorities (LA1 2015a, LA2 2015, 
LA3 2016 and LA4 2016): 
 
Table 6.5 – LA1 ‘Strengthening Families’ Challenges and Potential Solutions 
 
LA1 ‘Strengthening Families’ 
Challenges 
Potential Solutions 
Not all 805 Phase One families 
who were ‘turned around’ did so 
in the context of the programme 
and some made no change at 
all (LA1 2015a)  
The Phase Two local outcome framework will ensure that 
the agent only claims for families who make genuine 
change. More local agencies are being aligned to the 
‘Troubled Families’ model and their staff encouraged to 
work holistically (LA1 2015a)  
It is unclear whether the Phase 
Two local outcome framework 
can generate successful 
funding claims (LA1 2015a)  
The agent will ensure that the Phase Two local outcome 
framework only references priority groups for whom LA1 
can collect baseline data and then measure their progress 
(LA2 2015)  
Health partners do not share 
families’ personal data so it is 
difficult to directly identify 
families with health needs and 
to track their progress (LA1 
2015a)  
The agent builds on the model established by Job Centre 
Plus’ Troubled Families Employment Advisors and 
seconds a senior local health figure to the programme to 
overcome this barrier (LA3 2016)  
Social Care has not yet fully 
embraced the ‘Strengthening 
Families’ concept (LA1 2015a) 
and Ofsted rated the local 
Children’s Social Care Service 
as “failing” (LA1 2016)  (pclxxxii) 
The agent builds on the model established by Job Centre 
Plus’ Troubled Families Employment Advisors and 
seconds a senior local Social Care figure to the 
programme to improve linkages with ‘Strengthening 
Families’ (LA3 2016). The agent uses Integrated Working 
Mentors to improve social workers’ skills (LA2 2015). The 
agent evidences the cost efficiencies created thus far by 
‘Strengthening Families’ in reducing the number of 
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children who are looked after or have Child Protection 
Plans. The agent uses this to encourage the further 
engagement of Social Care (LA3 2016)  
Local families have not been 
consulted (LA1 2015a)  
The agent collates and reflects on families’ views 
submitted to local providers (LA2 2015). The agent 
encourages local providers to utilise Phase One 
‘successful’ families to build capacity in Phase Two (LA3 
2016). The agent consults families directly and uses this 
to ensure that Phase Two meets their needs and 
overcomes their barriers (LA4 2016)  
Only four LA1 families achieved 
the progress to work outcome 
and only 26 achieved the 
continuous employment result 
(DCLG 2015c). There are no 
local jobs, key workers do not 
traditionally discuss 
employment with families, 
‘troubled’ families have multiple 
problems and no aspirations 
and other areas have better job 
processes (LA1 2015a)  
Families across the North-East did progress but the local 
employability provider lacked the data systems to record 
this (LA2 2015). The agent uses the Troubled Families 
Employment Advisors to raise awareness among key 
workers of local employment and self-employment 
opportunities (LA1 2015a, LA2 2015, LA3 2016 and LA4 
2016) and how to discuss these with families. The agent 
asks the Troubled Families Employment Advisors to 
target younger family members with fewer barriers to 
work (LA3 2016). The agent works strategically with local 
and regional partners to overcome families’ barriers to 
employment such as past criminal convictions (LA4 2016) 
and creates priority work placements and local 
employment opportunities (LA2 2015)  
Some services continue to be 
funded to work with individuals 
and not families (LA1 2015a)  
The agent asks key stakeholders such as the LA1 
Members of Parliament to raise this issue nationally (LA3 
2016)  
Phase Two requires 400,000 
families to be identified, worked 
with and ‘turned around’ (LA1 
2016)  
The Intelligence Hub is in place to identify families (LA1 
2015a). The agent explores how this can be extended to 
capture progress data too 
It is unclear whether families 
are giving informed consent to 
be worked with or not (LA1 
2016)  
The agent views families as being ‘nominated’ for support 
rather than ‘referred’. The agent takes responsibility for 
each family and has “guiding principles about one person 
leading the work” (LA3 2016) (pcliv) 
Austerity measures are The agent ensures that all services – including those from 
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impacting on the personnel who 
directly deliver interventions 
(LA1 2016)  
the voluntary sector – who could work in a whole family 
way are doing so (LA1 2015a)  
Partner agencies do not wish to 
be part of the programme (LA1 
2016)  
The agent revisits the Phase Two family outcomes plan 
and ensures that it includes their priorities so that 
‘Strengthening Families’ is part of their core business and 







6.6 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE NATIONAL DELIVERY OF ‘TROUBLED 
FAMILIES’ 
 
The analysis of the quantitative and qualitative data from the ‘Troubled Families’ 
case study (DCLG 2015c, LA1 2015b, LA1 2015a, LA2 2015, LA3 2016, LA4 2016 
and LA1 2016) revealed that the National Troubled Families Initiative: 
 
 Improved the national focus on outcomes in Phase One by asking the agent 
to achieve four key performance indicators (DCLG 2015c) 
 Improved family outcomes in Phase One by ‘turning around’ 116,654 
‘troubled’ families; reduced the ASB and youth offending and improved the 
education outcomes of 104,733 ‘troubled’ families; achieved the continuous 
employment outcome with 11,921 ‘troubled’ families and achieved progress to 
work with 9,106 ‘troubled’ families (DCLG 2015c) 
 Enabled the agent to transform local services by identifying and targeting 
future as well as current service user need; heard some service users’ voices 
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and delivered services how they wanted them; took a whole family approach 
rather than working with individuals; promoted the crucial key worker role; 
funded the equally effective Troubled Families Employment Advisors; 
allocated a named worker to families; up-skilled the local workforce; delivered 
services in an integrated way and encouraged disadvantaged members of 
society to become economically active (LA1 2015a, LA2 2015, LA3 2016, LA4 
2016) 
 Deferred payment until later in the programme but still oversaw financially 
viable provision (LA1 2015a, LA3 2016, LA4 2016)  
 Reduced inequalities amongst families (LA1 2015a, LA2 2015, LA3 2016, LA4 
2016) by supporting the agent to work with families across the spectrum of 
need (Webster 2016). 
 
However, ‘Troubled Families’ still has some challenges to overcome in Phase Two. 
Solutions exist in the thematic narrative analysis and thematic analysis of the 
qualitative data gathered in the four local authorities (LA1 2015a, LA2 2015, LA3 
2016, LA4 2016 and LA1 2016): 
 
Table 6.6 – ‘Troubled Families’ Challenges and Potential Solutions 
 
‘Troubled Families’ Challenges Potential Solutions 
Only 97% of the Phase One target 
cohort were ‘turned around’; only 
87% reached the youth crime, ASB 
and education outcomes and only 
10% and 8% achieved continuous 
employment or progress to work 
(DCLG 2015c) 
The principal works with the agent to identify the 
actual number and needs of their local ‘troubled’ 
families and ensures that, in the remainder of the 
programme, the target and outcome funding available 
equates to the number of local ‘troubled’ families 
(LA2 2015 and LA3 2016). The principal continues to 
encourage the agent to be outcomes-focused and 
work in a transformative, way to meet this need (LA1 
2015a, LA2 2015, LA3 2016, LA4 2016). The 
principal continues to fund the Troubled Families 
Employment Advisors (LA3 2016 and LA4 2016)  
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Not all Phase One families who 
were ‘turned around’ did so in the 
context of the programme and some 
made no change at all (LA1 2015a)  
The principal continues to encourage the agent to 
deliver a Phase Two local outcome framework that 
only claims for families making genuine change 
thereby ensuring that a labelled outcome such as 
‘turned around’ has a single, clear definition (LA1 
2015a)  
Not all key stakeholders are as 
engaged locally and nationally with 
the programme as they should be 
(LA1 2015a, LA4 2016 and LA1 
2016)  
Central Government promotes and celebrates the 
culture change that the programme has created (LA2 
2015). The principal collates the agent’s Phase Two 
Family Monitoring/Progress Data and cost savings 
(DCLG 2014a) and shares this with stakeholders 
such as the Departments of Health and Department 
of Education and the Ministry of Justice to help them 
to understand the benefits of the programme and the 
impact of their better engagement (LA4 2016)  
Some key stakeholders have a very 
negative perception of families with 
‘troubles’ (LA1 2015a and LA2 
2015)  
The principal shares the agent’s local case studies 
with stakeholders to help them understand the 
barriers faced by families with ‘troubles’ and the 
significant progress they can achieve with the correct 
support (LA2 2015 and LA3 2016)  
‘Troubled’ families are not the same 
across the country (LA1 2015b, LA1 
2015a, LA2 2015, LA3 2016 and 
LA4 2016)  
The agent ensures that the Phase Two local family 
outcomes plan meets local need (LA1 2015a, LA2 
2015 and LA3 2016). Central Government ensures 
that future PbR provision targeting a broad range of 
service users has appropriate segmentation to 
support the agent’s delivery (Webster 2016) 
Some services continue to be 
funded to work with individuals and 
not families (LA1 2015a)  
Central Government addresses this issue (LA1 
2015a)  
The sharing of personal health data 
is still a barrier to identifying families 
in need and tracking their progress 
(LA1 2015a and LA1 2016)  
Central Government addresses this issue nationally 
to support ‘Troubled Families’ and other PbR 
provision designed to improve health outcomes (LA3 
2016)  
Employment opportunities are not 
equal across the country (LA1 
2015a, LA2 2015 and LA3 2016)  
Central Government explores how additional jobs can 
be created in the most deprived areas of the country 
(LA2 2015) and barriers such as criminal records 
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checks are overcome so that ‘troubled’ families can 
become economically active (LA4 2016). The agent 
works with local strategic partners to offer priority 
work placements for ‘troubled’ families (LA2 2015). 
The Troubled Families Employment Advisors 
continue to build on families’ assets and encourage 
self-employment (LA3 2016)  
‘Troubled’ families voices are not 
uniformly heard (LA1 2015a, LA2 
2015 and LA3 2016) 
The agent consults families directly and uses this to 
ensure that Phase Two meets their needs and 




Chapter Six presented a practical framework for target achievement in Payment by 
Results provision. It gave an example from the ‘real world’ of an embryonic 
mentoring programme for service users in Local Authority Two aged 5-25. This 
provision is designed to reduce their interface with Children’s Social Care and enable 
them to achieve positive outcomes. I used this example to direct policy and instruct 
strategic and operational managers in the use of the framework as a management 
tool. The framework is a fusion of Stakeholder Theory, Agency Theory and PbR 
good practice and draws upon the National Troubled Families Initiative, the 
Delaware Substance Misuse Programme, the London Homelessness Project and 
Team GB’s Olympic and Paralympic Programme. However, the dynamic nature of 
this tool means it can be applied beyond the world of crime, anti-social behaviour, 
poor school attendance, children in need, unemployment, domestic violence, poor 
health, substance misuse, homelessness and elite sport and be used locally, 
regionally and nationally across the public sector wherever target achievement and 
the provision of value to stakeholders is required. I envisage it being used in a range 
of public sector settings including local authorities, police forces, hospitals, schools, 
universities and any other location where Payment by Results is used to promote 
target achievement. The applicability of the tool across a breadth of public sector 
PbR provision renders it extremely commercially viable. I very much look forward to 
strategic and operational managers using the dynamic framework and exploring its 
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possibilities. Chapter Six closed with recommendations for the achievement of the 
requisite Phase Two ‘Troubled Families’ targets locally and nationally.  
 
In Chapter Six, I presented new knowledge through original research, which will 
satisfy peer review, extend the forefront of professional practice and merit publication 
(K1). I made informed judgements on complex issues in my specialist field in the 
absence of some data and communicated my ideas and conclusions clearly, 
effectively and in a manner appropriate for specialist and non-specialist audiences 
(S1). I demonstrated my aptitude to undertake research and development at 
advanced level contributing substantially to the development of new techniques, 
ideas or approaches in PbR (S2).  
 
During the research project, I followed the learning outcomes of the applied 
management research project and the DBA programme (Appendix One). I used the 
National Troubled Families Initiative as a case study to answer the research question 
of how to develop a practical framework, rooted in business and management 
literature, for the effective implementation of Payment by Results (PbR) programmes 
in the public sector.  
 
The detailed study of the National Troubled Families Initiative case study allowed my 
first two research objectives to be achieved. I collected geographic, social and 
economic data about the four areas in scope of the research project to compare and 
contrast a quantitative baseline of information at a very basic level. Thus, I acquired 
an enhanced understanding of the geographic and socio-economic context in which 
‘Troubled Families’ was implemented. I then presented the principal’s views about 
how the agent should deliver ‘Troubled Families’ in Phase One and compared this 
with my own experience of the programme as an employee of the agent. I then 
reviewed the portrayal of ‘troubled’ families in the literature to highlight the 
challenges faced by them and provide an overview of the concept of the ‘troubled’ 
family and the complex social need that the PbR programme had to overcome. This 
exercise helped me to understand better the ‘troubled’ families service user group 
with whom the PbR programme intended to achieve positive outcomes.  
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My motivation for conducting doctoral research into Payment by Results was my 
realisation - whilst employed by an agent of the programme - that not all of its 
outcomes were being achieved and not all local ‘troubled’ families who appeared to 
have achieved a positive outcome with the support of the programme had actually 
done so. Into this latter group came families who made no change at all but ceased 
to meet the programme’s entry criteria; families who received help outside of 
‘Troubled Families’ and families who changed their own negative behaviour. 
 
I was deeply troubled by this revelation and resolved to investigate the phenomenon 
further. As an MBA graduate, I was well aware of the business and management 
frameworks that could support further this. Consequently, I overlaid my ‘practitioner’ 
foundation with a systematic, ‘academic’ approach and set out to improve PbR 
provision. This enabled me to achieve the third research objective of understanding 
how success can be achieved specifically in the National Troubled Families Initiative 
and generally in Payment by Results provision. 
 
During the research project I created through original research a new, seven-stage 
practical framework for achieving targets in Payment by Results and made 
recommendations relating to performance achievement for the local and national 
‘Troubled Families’ programme. My work is of a standard to satisfy peer review. It 
has extended the forefront of professional practice in both Payment by Results 
provision and the National Troubled Families Initiative. It also merits publication and I 
intend to write up my findings for a renowned journal (K1). 
 
This new knowledge was generated by my systematic acquisition and understanding 
of a substantial body of knowledge at the forefront of my specific area of professional 
practice, specifically Stakeholder Theory, Agency Theory and Payment by Results 
best practice (K2). I defined the concepts of a stakeholder and Stakeholder Theory 
and introduced the ‘real world’ of stakeholders. I defined Agency Theory and 
discussed outcome-based contracts in Agency Theory. I introduced the concept of 
Payment by Results and presented the variations upon the Payment by Results 
mechanism and the findings from recent UK PbR provision. I presented the 
guidelines for principals considering commissioning PbR provision and the six key 
qualities of an effective outcome and outlined the importance of service user 
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involvement in Payment by Results programmes. I then reviewed the National 
Troubled Families Initiative case study in terms of its stakeholders and their ‘real 
world’, the contract between the principal and the agent, the ‘Troubled Families’ PbR 
mechanism and the reasons for its adoption. I then mapped ’Troubled Families’ 
against the National Audit Office’s 2015 guidelines for commissioners and Webster’s 
2016 recommendations. This revealed that the programme offered the agent the 
chance to return a service of less value to the principal and confirmed my own 
experience. I also ascertained that, by agreeing to act as the agent for ‘Troubled 
Families’, the English Local Authorities made themselves liable for the potential high 
cost of the programme and financial risk if they were unable to achieve its outcomes. 
This was due to the contract between the two parties failing to meet the 
recommended good practice PbR guidelines and the ineffectiveness of the 
programme’s Phase One and Two’s outcomes. 
 
I juxtaposed this flawed PbR provision with three examples of successful Payment 
by Results programmes. The Delaware Substance Misuse Programme was notable 
for its use of incentive payments; innovative practice around clinical interventions 
and expanded opening hours as well as its effective proxy indicators, clear 
performance expectations, performance monitoring and performance evaluation. The 
London Rough Sleepers Project had challenging but achievable outcomes with 
effective incentives for the agent and showed the benefit of the principal and agent 
being able to review the performance framework and adjust the performance 
outcomes in the light of changes in the external environment. However, it also 
highlighted the difficulty of the agent obtaining clients’ health data and the barriers 
that this can create. Team GB and the Olympic and Paralympic programme showed 
that the Payment by Results model is not just a mechanism for use with 
disadvantaged service users and social need and can be applied in any situation in 
which the principal seeks performance improvement. 
 
With this knowledge in place, I explained the conceptualisation, design and 
implementation of a research project to generate new knowledge about target 
achievement in Payment by Results, which responded to the absence of any 
264 
 
guidance for principals, agents and other stakeholders. I adjusted the project as it 
developed and unforeseen problems arose such as when I was asked not to 
interview ‘troubled’ families and was too unwell to conduct the final qualitative 
interview face-to-face (K3).  
 
Here, I demonstrated my detailed understanding of applicable techniques for 
research and advanced academic enquiry (K4). I outlined the pragmatic research 
philosophy, pragmatic epistemology, Stakeholder Theory and Agency Theory 
theoretical perspective, case study methodology, mixed method mainly influenced by 
qualitative data analysis and deductive/inductive approach. I presented the ethical 
guidelines that governed the research and the steps I took to avoid harm, obtain 
informed consent, protect the privacy and avoid deceiving the ‘troubled’ families 
whose quantitative data I analysed and the five professionals that I interviewed. I 
highlighted the limitations of the research project but ably countered these. 
I showed my ability to make informed judgements in the absence of complete data - 
particularly quantitative data - on complex issues relating to Payment by Results and 
the National Troubled Families Initiative case study (S1). I illustrated my aptitude for 
undertaking applied research and development at advanced level to contribute 
substantially to the development of a new approach to target achievement in PbR 
(S2) and my ability to exercise personal responsibility and largely autonomous 
initiative - as a lone insider researcher - in complex and unpredictable situations in 
professional environments (S3). I also provided evidence of my ability to identify and 
effectively utilise the components of the self-system that foster authentic leadership, 
appropriate to a given leadership environment (S4). 
 
The new knowledge that I generated significantly increases the understanding of the 
National Troubled Families Initiative. It supplements research carried out by Hoggett 
et al (2014) and Hayden (2015). Firstly, the research project did not focus on a single 
city but collected and analysed data from across England and from operational and 
strategic staff employees of the agent. Secondly, I drew on my existing knowledge of 
the business and management literature and used the lens of Stakeholder Theory 
and Agency Theory and Payment by Results good practice through which to regard 
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